

Evaluating the Gender & Governance Programme

Kenya 2008

**Final report
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List of acronyms

AA	Affirmative Action
ACWICT	African Centre for Women and ICT
ACEGA	African Centre for Empowerment, Gender and Advocacy
ACK	Anglican Church of Kenya
AMWIK	Association of Media Women in Kenya
AWC	African Women and Child Features Services
CIDA-GESP	Canadian International Development Agency – Gender Equity Support Project
CDF	Constituency Development Fund
CJPC	Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
CMD	The Centre for Multi-Party Democracy
CDF	Constituency Development Fund
CPDA	Christian Partners' Development Agency
CFWL	Caucus for Women's Leadership (formerly Kenya Women's Political Caucus)
COVAW	Coalition on Violence Against Women
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DFID	Department for International Development
DTM	Development through Media
DSC	Donor Steering Committee
ECK	Electoral Commission of Kenya
ECWD	Education Centre for Women and Democracy
EPPP	Engendering the Political Participation Process
FASI	Family Support Institute
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GGP	Gender & Governance Programme
GJLOS	Governance, Justice Law and Order Sector reform programme
GoK	Government of Kenya
GRRU	Gender Rapid Response Unit
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KWPC	Kenya Women's Political Caucus
LKWW	League of Kenya Women Voters
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MOV	Means of Verification
MP	Member of Parliament
NCEP	National Civic Education Programme
NCKK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NEP	North Eastern Province
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicators
PFMA	Programme and financial management agent
PNU	Party of National Unity
RBM	Results Based Management
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
WOKIKE	Womankind Kenya
WRA	Women's Regional Assembly
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association
YWLI	The Young Women's Leadership Institute

Executive summary

1. The Gender & Governance Programme phase II (GGP II) has been a significant intervention in a key area of on-going need within Kenya, which lags behind its East African partners in the area of gender equality and representation. With a basket fund budget approaching US\$5m, this has been a significant investment in the area by development partners.
2. The programme has had both successes and failures, predictably enough for a large, multi-partner programme (and one that changed programme and financial management agency (PFMA) during implementation). A great deal of hard work and good work has happened, and many notable achievements have been recorded – more women than before entered the political and electoral process, some important legislative items were passed, many local people were trained or sensitised. In 2002 there were 44 women parliamentary candidates, 2007 had 269 - a 511% increase. Civic elections also show an increase from 382 candidates in 2002 to 1478 in 2007 (a 287% increase).
3. The Political Parties Bill was passed. The Government of Kenya (GoK) issued a policy directive requiring the public sector to ensure at least 30% representation of women in public positions. The government also set up a women's enterprise support fund. Gender equality was fought for and found place in proposed drafts for the new Constitution. Political parties embraced the discourse of gender equality and made it an important policy issue. These are significant achievements, from any perspective, and should be celebrated.
4. But attributing success to GGP is extremely difficult – in part because it is poorly designed, the PFMA changed halfway through the programme, there is no baseline data against which to measure progress, and the administrative costs are considerably higher than international norms.
5. That there is a need for a gender and governance programme in Kenya is absolutely clear. But GGP needs considerably improved design, and considerably enhanced management, to realize its goals. The programme operates in a hostile legal, policy, institutional and political climate. It's first task is to develop multiple strategies for advancing gender equality in this terrain – no single approach (such as more women in elected positions) will suffice alone. The link between gender and governance needs to be explicitly addressed; so does the link between representation (numbers of elected women) and the gender agenda. Without accountability to a broader women's movement, elected women will be indistinguishable from their male counterparts.
6. Internal management must also improve, in monitoring and evaluation, financial management, and ensuring that UNIFEM draws on its international networks for the benefit of the Kenyan women's movement and of GGP. GGP II should be proud of key successes it has achieved, but also frank about the challenges (internal and external) it faces, and get them right. Gender equality is a long-term struggle, and programme design should reflect this.
7. The results of this evaluation were validated by partners and stakeholders at a workshop in late June 2008.

Key findings and recommendations¹

Issue	Recommendation
Overview	
<p>Was the programme a success or a failure? Both donors and partners believe that GGP II was a mixed bag.</p> <p>A great deal of hard work and good work has happened, and many notable achievements have been recorded.</p> <p>In 2002 there were 44 women parliamentary candidates, 2007 had 269 - a 511% increase. Civic elections also show an increase from 382 candidates in 2002 to 1478 in 2007 (a 287% increase).</p> <p>The Political Parties Bill was passed. The government issued a directive requiring 30% representation of women in public positions. The government set up a women's enterprise support fund. Political parties made gender equality a manifesto issue. These are significant achievements and should be celebrated. But attributing success to GGP is extremely difficult – there is no baseline data against which to measure progress.</p> <p>GGP lacks a unifying conceptual approach to what it seeks to achieve. The programme lacks a grounded focus on governance and transformation.</p>	<p>GGP design reflects uncertainty about exactly what the ultimate goal of the programme is – what are elected women meant to do? - and the result is that the sum is less than the parts.</p> <p>If GGP wants to be a platform for enhanced representation, there is nothing wrong with that – but then programme design and activities should be tailored accordingly. GGP says it is a governance transformation programme, but behaves as a vehicle for enhanced representation.</p> <p>GGP needs clarity and consensus around its overall objective – it doesn't currently have one – that explains why it is doing what it does.</p>
<p>There are many arguments for a critical mass of elected women - equity, natural justice etc. – but the dangers should also be clear, most obviously the fact that without accountability to a broader women's movement or set of shared goals, there is no guarantee that the elected women will work for a broader progressive goal rather than their own political futures.</p>	<p>The quality vs. quantity debate is not an either/or matter – both are needed – but GGP has erred too much on the side of quantity. This must be corrected before GGP III is initiated.</p>
<p>Changing the character of the state and the practice of politics is important, given the patrilineal nature of patronage and ethnic politics and the evolution of the state in Africa.</p>	<p>Transforming the state, political leadership and political institutions ought to be the focus of gender struggles for equality.</p>
<p>Many partners are focusing on service delivery.</p>	<p>Governance, policy-making, and holding the state accountable for delivering gender equality (substantive and formal) should be the focus of a GGP-type programme.</p>
<p>Plans to design and implement GGP III began before this evaluation.</p>	<p>The programme needs to pause, and develop clarity of focus on the issues it wants to articulate, before proceeding. GGP needs to create space for reflection, learning and strategising so that GGP III knows what it is mobilising for (and against).</p>
<p>There are at least two critical features of Kenya's</p>	<p>(As Albertyn noted in South Africa) 'Women</p>

¹ A number of lower-level recommendations appear in the text but not in this summary.

politics that inform the practise of governance: patronage and ethnicity.	need to use multiple strategies at different sites within the state and civil society to advance a gender agenda. These change over time and in changing circumstances.'
Ethnicity is the fulcrum around which major social-political events in the country revolve.	How, strategically, is GGP seeking to change this situation?
Gender equality has been accepted in constitutional negotiations.	Deepening the moral consensus around gender equality must remain a priority.
GGP is not insulated from, but inherently part of, the political situation in Kenya. Ethnic tensions and differences have seeped into civil society generally, including GGP.	Healing is important and needs to be a GGP priority to permit united action.
Feminist activists have argued for the need to use multi-pronged strategies to advance gender equality.	Alliances and partnerships with other gender and governance programmes are of central importance for GGP III.
There are real success stories, based on elected women, that could be used to show-case GGP.	Media partners could use these as powerful tools.
Institutional arrangements & programme management	
Donors are seen to add value beyond their funds; are seen to micro-manage in moments of urgency or high-profile interventions; but are generally very well-regarded.	Donors should continue their value-adding role.
PIU staffing may now be adequate – though capacity only arrived late – but quality remains a concern.	Recommend an assessment of technical expertise in all components of the programme, particularly outreach and networking components.
A concern raised is that there is no input by partners into financial and management decisions made by the PFMA, leading to some allegations of favouritism.	A revised organizational structure – including a policy-making forum for all partners – is proposed.
A lot of commendable capacity building has occurred, but there remain serious concerns about the quality of RBM, M&E and financial management.	Partners require robust needs assessments. UNIFEM capacity also needs to be assessed, to make sure they can improve the quality of provision and services.
Finance	
Value for money is difficult to measure in such a short space of time and with UNIFEM operating under considerable strictures as a late PFMA. UNIFEM's role is generally appreciated and the staff well-liked, but its procedures are very strongly disliked.	Administrative costs vary widely across partners – some as high as 40% - and a far more consistent approach is needed in future to budgeting and expenditure.
Financial monitoring is uneven, many organisations have no spot checks while others have them monthly, etc.	As above: far more rigorous and consistent financial monitoring must be evenly applied across the whole of GGP III.
Delays in disbursements were significant.	Some devolution of decision-making to the Nairobi office of UNIFEM has occurred, but UNIFEM must demonstrate far greater efficiency in financial procedures.
The evaluation suggests that UNIFEM's financial management capacity may be inadequate.	UNIFEM needs to demonstrate full capacity before work begins on GGP III.
M&E	
No baseline data exist, and very little data have been gathered during implementation, so measuring impact is virtually impossible, as is attributing any success to GGP. This is a key failing of the GGP and the PFMA in particular.	Accurate, relevant and systematic baseline data must be a prerequisite for GGP III.

We find no standard approach to monitoring and evaluation of activities by partners. The importance of monitoring in a programme that did not have basic baseline data need not be stressed.	M&E needs to be considerably improved, from logframe design to baseline collection to on-going monitoring to dissemination of findings and report-backs to verification of data and so on.
Management	
UNIFEM undertook far more capacity building exercises than many other FMAs in governance programmes in Kenya, a commendable finding.	On-going quality monitoring of capacity building – building on needs assessments – is needed in future.
UNIFEM does not seem to have maximised its wide range of technical expertise to provide analytical and policy support.	A thorough Kenyan-specific contextual analysis must inform GGP III and contribute to policy dialogue and inform programmatic interventions by implementing partners.
UNIFEM was able to convene and manage critical meetings and processes with the implementing and donor partners in a highly politicized environment, to ensure and verify that the programme addressed strategic gender issues in governance.	UNIFEM’s strategic advantages are revealed when called upon.
UNIFEM has high legitimacy with GoK but did not develop partnerships with governance programmes/institutions and GGP.	UNIFEM must utilise its strategic position – as well as international networks – to greater effect in GGP III.
UNIFEM’s value add is seen as bringing together organisations working towards a common purpose of gender equality in governance, in a highly politicised and ethnicised Kenyan society; and has professionalized GGP.	UNIFEM has demonstrated value add, though unevenly.
Strategy and progress	
We found different approaches to gender issues based on generational status; ethnic divisions have coloured the lenses through which people see the struggle for gender equality. These differences are the result of the lack of a common ideology or a belief and value system around which gender issues are articulated.	Helping build a women’s movement should be considered as a key activity for GGP III.
No risk analysis had been undertaken and the programme was not equipped to deal with issues such as ethnicity or patronage or violence.	GGP III should not be started without a thorough – internally produced – risk analysis.
GGP has no overall objective or vision binding it together, reflecting the lack of strategic thinking about the overall thrust of the programme.	A vision for the programme is vital.
The need to ‘go national’ was positive but also resulted in the selection of some inappropriate partners.	Selection criteria need to be tightened up and rigorously applied.
GGP II is a mix of national and local partners, differing in scope, scale and workload. Other programmes (such as NCEP) use a very different model.	The institutional arrangements for GGP III should be carefully considered before the programme begins; specifically, the comparative advantage of the current model and of other models should be assessed for both efficiency and effectiveness.
Three factors that helped progress were: implementing at scale, complementarity of GGP with implementing partner programmes, and implementing partner’s experience in gender and governance.	These factors should be included in the selection criteria for GGP III to ensure a better chance of broad-based success.
Four external factors were important: the existence of	As above.

independent media; other governance programs; pre-existing gender friendly programs and policies such as affirmative action; having a woman parliamentarian who had delivered as contrasted to the consistent failure of male leadership; partnerships between youth and women seeking elective office	
Internal factors that hindered progress: programme design not taking on board key Kenyan gender and governance issues; a weak M&E framework resulting in uninformed interventions; the mapping strategy which resulted in uneven implementation; delays in disbursements and roll out of the programme; the small amounts of money disbursed.	These need to be carefully considered in the design of GGP III.
One of the main weaknesses of GGP II was the very weak logframe, which is analysed in detail in the report.	Detailed recommendations are made for improving the logframe, which should be a prerequisite for GGP III. This is both a conceptual and technical concern.
The Strategic Plan identifies 5 strategies, some cross-cutting, to enhance implementation. Little evidence was found that they were systematically implemented.	On-going small-scale evaluations – requiring an evaluation strategy – will help keep the programme on course.
Dialogue was constrained by lack of trust and competition amongst implementing partners.	Building trust is an important early activity for GGP III.
The women’s movement and GGP are no more immune to issues of ethnic chauvinism and patronage than any other actors operating in Kenya.	There is a need for the discourse pertaining to diversity to be advanced within the GGP.
Sustainability will be a challenge since no baseline surveys and or needs assessment were undertaken and there is no guarantee that GGP interventions are consistent with beneficiary priorities or demands.	GGP III must be far more customised in respect of local needs and concerns.
Successful strategies included the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnerships between the youth and women to ensure the election of candidates sympathetic to their needs • Manifestos for women candidates • Long-term consistent interventions; start early and keep financing programmes that are working. Changing gender attitudes and power relations has taken centuries, and will take a long time in Kenya as elsewhere in the world. • Identify institutions with a strong track record in the gender and governance sector and cultivate their strengths • Form partnerships with other governance sector programmes • Work at local level and in context. Engaging local communities and providing strategic support to local women leaders should be a key strategic point for GGP III. 	These should inform the design of GGP III.
Gains already made in the constitution-making process must be secured, and more advances made.	The constitution must remain a priority and it must be used to ensure pro-active engagement.

Introduction²

8. The Gender and Governance Programme (GGP), officially launched in September 2004, grew out of the earlier Engendering Political Participation Process (EPPP) programme of the early 2000s. The first phase of the GGP (2004-2006) was managed by ActionAid Kenya, and funded by the governments of Canada, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Management was then transferred to the United Nations Development Fund for Women, better known as UNIFEM, in July 2006 when the second phase (2006-07) began. Current donor support is provided by the governments of Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The GGP uses a collaborative basket fund approach to harmonise funds and avoid duplication where possible. The budget for 2006-2008 was US\$4,987,947.00.³
9. GGP has over 30 partners, operating across the country. Each is contracted by UNIFEM as PFMA using its standard contracts and release of funds is governed by UNIFEM's internal rules and regulations. UNIFEM also signs bilateral agreements with contributing donors, who disburse agreed funds to a UNIFEM account for Kenya.
10. GGP was implemented in the period leading up to the 2007 elections, and **election-related work has dominated this phase of the programme**; and because of the post-election violence, the programme has also had to respond to the humanitarian crisis facing Kenya. An **innovative mix** of mainstream media and face-to-face work in communities was a hallmark of the programme, and (with organisational work) allowed mobilisation of women as candidates, signatories in favour of the Affirmative Action Bill, and so on. The programme also reacted to the violence against women during the election campaign through a gender rapid response unit.
11. Less positively, there was confusion and some hostility over expectations that **support for women candidates** meant financial support, and that some women heading CSOs were expected to step down from their position if they ran for election. (This remains a sore point among many participants.) There is also evidence of some resentment among partners over budget and work areas, and – most worryingly – ethnicity is percolating the programme, as it has much of life in Kenya.
12. The primary question facing this as with any other evaluation is, **was the programme a success or a failure?** All sorts of qualifications are applied to the answer – access and data reliability, resource constraints, and so on – but, ultimately, that is what we need to answer. Both donors and partners believe that GGP II was a mixed bag – all donors said it was a 'mix' of success and failure (donor survey respondents), while a third of partners thought it was a mixture – in contrast with the 69% who felt it had been successful. It is notable that 17% of partner organisations do not believe GGP reflects the needs of women in Kenya today, so from the outset we have the sense that the programme was a mixed bag, with mixed results, and disagreement over design and purpose.

² Readers should note that all sections of this report are treated as analytic – not descriptive – and both analysis and recommendations occur throughout the report.

³ UNIFEM (nd.) 'GGP report'.

13. The view of the evaluation team is similar: the programme has some positive achievements and some key failings to its name. A great deal of hard work and of good work has happened, and many notable achievements have been recorded – more women than before entered the political and electoral process, some important legislative items were passed, many local people were trained or sensitised. But **attributing success to GGP is extremely difficult** – in part because it is poorly designed, its PFMA changed halfway through the programme, there is no baseline data against which to measure progress, and the administrative costs are considerably higher than international norms.
14. Ultimately, however, our concern is that **GGP lacks a unifying conceptual approach to what it seeks to achieve**. A governance programme by name, in reality GGP paid for more attention to numbers – numbers of women in power – and what was needed to get them there. **GGP partners do not speak with a single voice**, and – beyond GGP’s remit but fundamental to its work – **there is no strong, unified women’s movement in Kenya that could demand accountability of GGP partners, women MPs and others**. This we regard as a critical failing for Kenya, not just GGP. **The result is a programme that looks one way (transformed governance) but acts another (get women elected)**; whose design reflects this uncertainty about exactly what the ultimate goal of the programme is – what are those elected women meant to *do*? - **and the result is that the sum is less than the parts**. This should not undercut the hard work that has been done – but we do believe that basic conceptual and design flaws can be rectified, and *must* be rectified before additional resources are expended.
15. The GGP has **various vision and mission statements** – some documents cite ‘towards 50:50 women and men governing together’, others still repeat the older ‘towards 50/50 transformative leadership’, others ‘towards transformational leadership and governance in Kenya’, and yet others have none at all. The status of these various visions and missions has proved difficult to determine. Sometimes a mission statement appears – such as ‘Increase and enhance women’s participation and democratic governance processes at all levels’.⁴ A ‘Mission’ appears in a report on the partner’s review meeting (apparently from 2007 but unclear) – but does not seem to appear in other documents, most crucially the ‘Strategic Plan 2006-2009’ – and probably just as well, since it is not a mission statement but a new set of outcomes and expands the remit of GGP for example to include promotion of youth participation at all levels of government.
16. These are not noted in order to be snide, but because **the programme has enormous energy and activity on the ground, some significant achievements to be proud of, but lacks an overall, cohering ideology, approach or vision, certainly one that is equally shared across partners, donors, PFMA and stakeholders**. Multiple, competing and/or absent visions and missions appear to reflect a core confusion regarding the *purpose* of the programme. **Although the core focus appears to be governance, most activity has been electoral**; and the programme’s ultimate goal appears to be increasing the number of women elected to power, rather than the development and implementation of a gender-sensitive, progressive and democratic governance regime.

⁴ UNIFEM (2006c) ‘Report of the gender and governance programme II partner’s inception workshop’, p.38.

17. The objectives of the programme are as follows:
- To support constitutional, legal, policy and institutional reform for gender equality, non-discrimination and the equal participation of women in all governance structures in Kenya.
 - To increase options, choices and capacities for Kenyan women in order to enhance women's organizing, leadership, influencing and participation for gender equality, human rights and democratic governance.
 - To strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities.
 - To strengthen the knowledge and capacities on women CSOs on gender and governance and positioned them to spearhead & transform policies, programmes and resource allocation as well as provide empowerment support actions to women in Kenya.
18. In practice, partner organisations took part in some advocacy but primarily in community mobilisation (and some media work) to try and change perceptions of women in leadership (at all levels of society) **“and more importantly to get more women into elective positions”**.⁵ And it can be argued to have worked – of the 15 women elected as MPs, GGP was operating in 13 of their constituencies. At one level, the reasons for pursuing the electoral thrust are self-evident – equity, pursuance of a critical mass of women in power and natural justice can all be marshalled in favour of this – but **the dangers should also be clear**, most obviously the fact that without **accountability** to a broader women's movement or set of shared goals, there is **no guarantee that the elected women will work for a broader progressive goal rather than their own political futures**. It is reasonable to argue that attaining ‘the engendering of governance’ requires multiple strategies, short- and long-term; but it also requires a **consistent focus on the ultimate goal – transformed governance** - which can be obscured by the hurly-burly of an election campaign, let alone the kind of post-election violence that took place in Kenya. The **quality vs. quantity debate** is rarely an either/or matter – both are needed – but GGP II (in our view, at least) has erred too much on the side of quantity. This was a choice – it was election time – but needs post-election correction.
19. An examination of the GGP outcomes reveals that **three out of the four outcomes are policy-related outcomes**. The only outcome that is not policy based is the broad based support for women leadership. **Yet the programme invested very little in policy advocacy interventions**. There was very little engagement with policy makers at community or national level, neither was there alliance-building among the implementing partners to advocate for the key policy issues in the outcomes.
20. **The programme succeeded in terms of giving funds to women organisations**. Many CSOs working on gender issues had an opportunity to access funds. However, what the CSOs did with available funds is the concern of our evaluation. On this we would like to say the following. First, although there were several gender policies formulated by the government, the initiation of many of these was not the direct result of engagement by CSOs in GGP.
21. Furthermore, we were informed that there was **tension between women MPs and gender CSOs because of differences in how each of them wanted gender issues to**

⁵ GGP (2008) ‘GGP partner’s review meeting: *Aide memoire*’ p.1.

be articulated. Some of the policy initiatives therefore were not the result of GGP or GGP and partners.

22. **Improving the image of women leadership at the local level was an important objective.** Media profiling of women candidates was an important intervention in this. The extent to which this impacted on the local social-cultural context is debatable – and unmeasurable. Our respondents carefully pointed out gender issues are achieving significant attention at the national level but the same cannot be said of the local with specific regard to GGP – again, measurable progress and attribution are impossible.
23. Some interventions aimed at achieving policy changes, e.g. training of women parliamentary and civic aspirants, took place as one-off activities by many implementing partners, without engaging with the necessary structures such as political parties, and were more of women’s campaigns than advocacy campaigns - **and hence the risk of the programme being seen as a women’s programme not a gender programme.**
24. Very few results were reported by the PFMA against some of the policy outcomes (see UNIFEM’s report to DSC). The policy and legal reforms that were achieved are as a result of concerted efforts and focus by a few of the implementing partners, who were **building on previous policy advocacy experience.**

Overview

25. Evaluating the GGP has proved extremely difficult – or, to be more precise, trying to produce an evaluative conclusion has proved difficult. On the one hand, **a great deal of hard work and good work has been done, by partners, donors and the PFMA, UNIFEM.** This ranged from enskilling thousands of citizens, supporting women threatened or attacked during the election build-up and being flexible enough to respond to this occurrence, internal capacity building by partners and by the PFMA, and so on. More women chose to be candidates than ever before, and went through the nomination process; although this did not result in greater elected representation (which is beyond the reach of the programme). Awareness about women in leadership was raised across the country. **Crucially, the global moral consensus around gender equality appears to have reached Kenya’s political elite,** reflected in commitments to (though not yet action around) representation and equality from the major political parties.
26. Programmes – especially large, multi-partner, multi-stakeholder programmes operating in politicised areas – always have problems, and GGP is no different (see below). The fact nonetheless remains that the programme has overseen a large amount of good, hard work. Gender equality has moved from the political fringe to if not centre stage then at least out of the shadows and heading that way, and is **part of the platform and rhetoric of any party seeking power through the ballot box.** At local level, many voters talk openly of the value of women’s leadership and being willing to vote for female candidates⁶ – though once the rough-and-tumble (and intimidation and violence and corruption) of electioneering begins, such support

⁶ Various GGP reports of field visits; and fieldwork undertaken by the evaluation team.

diminishes. Media organs have been engaged, capacity building and mobilisation have occurred.

27. But – and an important ‘but’ – **the evaluation team continues to struggle to understand what all these disparate activities add up to, beyond the obvious point of simply increasing the numbers of women – any women – in positions of elected authority.** The problem is that the programme seems to be less than the sum of its parts. There was a frenzied electoral phase, in which the focus was overwhelmingly on numbers – numbers of women candidates, women voters and women elected from local to national levels; coupled with media work, and a gender rapid response unit. At one level, this is understandable – equity and basic demographic representivity suggest that the ‘50/50 leadership’ slogan is entirely appropriate. (It is notable that the 50/50 slogan still appears in GGP documentation, in various permutations.⁷)
28. But at another level it is clearly inadequate. **What is the purpose of those numbers? What is the focus that draws together and holds together disparate women’s organisations? What is the theoretical understanding that coheres partners around agreed strategic goals?** Are numbers the point – or a tactic - and if so, in service of what broader strategic goals? And if the goals include transformed governance, **why so little governance activity?** Is GGP really a governance programme, or an electorally-focused programme – in practice, not on paper? Context – in this case election 2007 – can explain a lot of the reasons for the electoral dominance (with associated capacity building, media and mobilisation), but not the fact that **the programme seems sorely to lack a real and grounded focus on governance and transformation.**

The politics of representation

29. We have already argued that feminist scholarship from Africa and elsewhere strongly suggests that numbers are insufficient – critical, but inadequate in and of themselves. When the Beijing Platform was developed in 1995, it was argued that

*Women’s equal participation in decision-making is not only a demand for simple justice or democracy but can also be seen as a necessary condition for women’s interests to be taken into account.*⁸

30. **A necessary condition – but not a sufficient condition.** Numbers are a critical first step, and not one we would question. But numbers do not lead ineluctably to transformation. Hassim argued about the 1994 South African election, and the Women’s National Coalition that played a key role in furthering gender equality in the Constitution-making process in South Africa, that

The interests that were seen to hold this constituency together ... were narrowly defined in terms of a common exclusion from the processes and forums of public

⁷ See for example the report on results-based management skills training of September 2007 where “The facilitator beg[a]n by noting that the partners are all aware on the GGP goal as ‘Towards 50-50 transformative leadership’” (p.11.). The same point was made by donors in their report on a visit to Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western provinces (at p.5).

⁸ *Beijing Platform for Action* 1995 para 181.

decision making.... The concentration on 'getting women in', to a large extent regardless of political ideology, provided the glue which held together a diverse range of women's organisations...⁹

31. But within a couple of years, she argues, the debate had shifted from numbers to specific policy issues, a “maturing of women’s electoral politics and a consolidation of women as an electoral constituency”.¹⁰ The point is that **if numbers are a critical step, we need to know which path they are following – where are those steps leading?** If GGP wants simply to be a platform for enhanced representation, there is nothing wrong with that – but then the programme design and activities should be tailored accordingly. From our perspective, GGP says it is a governance transformation programme, but acts as if it is a vehicle for enhanced representation.
32. We say this because in our view, GGP II threw considerable resources at a basic thrust, namely ‘getting women in’ – any women. **This was another version of the ‘spray-and-pray’ approach, in which it was hoped that throwing resources at grass-roots work would enhance representivity – which it did not – and that simply having more women in parliament would help gender inequality become a central political issue – which, to date, it has not.** As Hassim notes, the approach makes sense because “it sidesteps the controversial areas of normative judgements about fairness, as well as the essentialist arguments about women’s difference.”¹¹ It is deliberately detached from substance in order to secure specific gains – but this is also a very dangerous path to tread, especially for a programme rather than a social movement, since **the point of representation for GGP was transformed governance, not better representivity.** And Kenyan experience has strongly shown (as a number of respondents reminded us) that once elected, women overwhelmingly focus on their constituencies and securing their political careers – not gender equality.
33. **Governance, policy-making, and holding the state accountable for delivering gender equality (substantive and formal) is, we believe, where a GGP-type programme should be focusing.** But GGP II – bearing in mind our very positive regard for the hard work done – seems still to be focused on **service delivery** rather than broader issues of accountability and equality. And as long as it remains a service delivery programme, it will fail to engage adequately with the bigger picture of transforming governance in Kenya.
34. Plans to design and implement GGP III began before this evaluation; notably, the evaluation team has been provided with *no* documentation regarding the planned GGP III (by omission or commission is unclear). Our comments should be read in this context. In our opinion, **the programme needs to pause, and develop clarity of focus on the issues it wants to articulate.** A programme of this scope and scale should not be fighting to have increased numbers for 'numbers sake' – they need to be geared to transforming governance and democratising the state and politics from bottom to top - but that is the distinct impression gained by the evaluation team.

⁹ Hassim S ‘The dual politics of representation: women and electoral politics in South Africa’ in Fick G., Meintjies S and Simons M (ed.s) *One woman one vote: the gender politics of South African elections* (2002) (EISA, Johannesburg), p.103.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.104.

35. Part of the problem – and not something GGP can resolve alone, although we believe it could play a significant part in facilitating it – is **the absence of a strong, coherent women’s movement, with an agreed national agenda for women (even a minimum package)**. This is alluded to in many programme documents, such as UNIFEM’s suggestion that what is needed is “a comprehensive ‘women’s agenda’ or manifesto in Kenya”.¹² There are certainly many strong women, strong women leaders, and women’s CSOs – but they are dispersed and competitive, including those within GGP. As GGP documents note, apparently with surprise, once elected, women behave like any other politicians – they use resources “to promote their agendas within their constituencies”¹³ in order to secure future re-election. With a broader transformational governance focus and a robust women’s movement to call elected women to (national) account, this tendency may be curbed.
36. We strongly recommend that plans for GGP III – already in process – be slowed down. **GGP needs to create space for reflection, learning and strategising so that GGP III knows what it is mobilising for (and against)**. The failure to be clear on these issues in GGP II led to a disconnected programme and actors. From the outside, it appears that most partners are there for the same reason - increasing numbers, changing policies, changing attitudes – but these are (in our opinion, anyway) means to an end, not an end in themselves. Before GGP III can commence, we must be able to answer the question: what does it see as the end or purpose of their struggle? We need to know ‘why?’ more than ‘how?’ or ‘what?’.

Reasons for the evaluation

37. This evaluation has been commissioned to assess progress in and learn lessons from GGP II. The specific aims of the evaluation are to:
- Assess progress made towards the achievement of planned results, the continuing relevance of the programme, mechanisms to ensure sustainability, institutional arrangements, and potential for replication of the initiative;
 - Draw lessons learned from the programme; and
 - Make recommendations on modifications of the project and its implementation to ensure achievement of planned results.

Scope, focus & key questions

38. The scope of the evaluation is set very widely in the ToR but limited by timing – GGP II is already complete – and by resources. It is also restricted by the absence of baseline data, which makes measurement a somewhat subjective matter.
39. As outlined in the evaluation section below, the geographic scope of the evaluation is fairly broad, although by no means matching the national scope of the programme. The scope in terms of content covers the following (see our ToR in the appendices for detail):
- Performance
 - Success or failure
 - Relevance
 - Sustainability
 - Partnership principles

¹² UNIFEM (nd) ‘GGP report’.

¹³ *Ibid.*

- Programme management modalities, and
 - Lessons learned.
40. These are standard categories for any evaluation – the creativity comes in designing a robust and defensible methodology, and providing rigorous analysis and robust recommendations. The multi-method approach adopted for this evaluation has (we hope) helped us to provide a grounded and broad-based analysis of GGP II. We have no doubt that readers will find errors of fact, which we will correct wherever possible, and for which we apologise. But we hope also to provide an ‘argument’, an analytic approach to understanding GGP II, with which readers do not have to agree, but which hopefully helps us all better understand what is required of GGP III.

Purpose

41. The purpose of the evaluation, having measured progress and identified lessons to be learned – both ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ lessons – is to inform plans for a third phase of the GGP.

Evaluation design: methodology

42. The terms of reference (see appendices) for this evaluation were extremely broad and demanding, but with a restricted time allocation, and no time or budget for a large-scale sample survey. The latter would have been ideal in answering questions (in the ToR) about the extent to which GGP matched the needs and aspirations of ordinary women in Kenya. As such, attempting to evaluate items such as whether or not GGP II “strengthened positive images of women in leadership within communities” with any representative conclusiveness, was impossible.
43. The ToR also talked of reflecting the values of gender analysis and a participatory approach. The latter has been attained via the qualitative, participatory methodologies utilised where possible, at national/programme and local levels (see below). The former has been incorporated into design and analysis, as we explain below.
44. But we should be clear from the outset: the programme has 4 objectives, and 4 expected outputs. The ToR asked the evaluation team to try and respond to 35 different questions organised across 7 different areas of focus, in participatory and gender-sensitive ways – but with very distinct time constraints. **Moreover, the programme has no baseline data, and no programme document, so measuring progress and impact – the core of any evaluation – or progress towards achieving goals - are rendered exceptionally difficult if not impossible.** This is particularly marked in a programme which is described as both “results-based and knowledge-based”.¹⁴ Furthermore, the outcomes of the GGP are poorly designed and virtually impossible to measure, given that virtually none of the requisite data are available, either from the PFMA or elsewhere. Finally, the evaluation team was provided with limited documentation to analyse. For example, despite requests, there is apparently no GGP programme document – normally the starting point for any evaluation – only a broader UNIFEM programme document. This has no doubt had a negative impact on the programme and this study.

¹⁴ *Aide Memoire op cit.*, p.2.

45. **The objectives themselves are multi-stage items** demanding time-series analysis which we self-evidently cannot do in a stand-alone once-off study. For example, strengthen knowledge and capacities among women's CBOs (2 items), position them (1 item) to spearhead and transform (2 items) policies (1 item), programmes (1 item) and resource allocation (1 item), and empower women (1 item) across Kenya (1 item) – that is a single objective with at least 10 different potentially measurable components that differ in time and space. The point is not to complain about the design – this is what GGP chose for itself – but to highlight the complexity of trying to measure such objectives, and to ask the reader to temper their expectations with a sense of the challenges facing any evaluation team.
46. For example, there is no representative survey regarding local attitudes to women in leadership before and then during or after the programme (a survey occurred late in the programme, which is clearly important as baseline data for GGP III); no numbers have been collated regarding, say, progress towards a 50% increase of women in 'critical' decision-making positions in various sectors, nor young women in parliament, Cabinet, Statutory Commissions, the judiciary, Permanent Secretaries, Local Development Funds, Local Authorities, in the police, among political parties, in Student Unions and CBOs (GGP outcomes). The PFMA bears some responsibility for failing proactively to source and collate such data.
47. At best, impressionistic data are available; **no systematic dataset exists**. This is a **key failing of the GGP**. This situation very clearly needs a radical improvement before any Phase III of GGP can commence, in our opinion.
48. Nonetheless, we sought to work from as broad a base as possible using rigorous methods of social science evaluation research. On this, Babbie¹⁵ reminds us that evaluation research refers to a research purpose, not a method or set of methods. Many methods can be used, given that evaluation is applied research – but it needs to have "some real-world effect", in Babbie's words. Our evaluation has tried to attain this through both the design (see below) and the recommendations it gave rise to.
49. We need to be very clear on one point. We have used multiple methodologies to try and ensure that our findings are based on a broad base and have some reliability. That there are contradictory views and opinions should be expected, and we reflect these in the report – but we also try to show what the majority views are, where appropriate. So the reader will find different voices – our ToR specifically instruct us to allow women's voices into the report, and women do not all speak with one voice. This is not evidence of a lack of analytic rigour, but a deliberate decision to show that **there are differences and contradictions within and beyond GGP**. We do on occasion err on the side of generalisation, even though we have used a qualitative approach. This is where findings have been corroborated from multiple sources. Even then, generalising is risky, and we ask readers to bear this in mind. We nonetheless thought it more useful for an evaluation – where data corroboration permitted – to try and make programme-wide observations that to focus only on the micro level.
50. We should bear in mind that one of the key challenges facing evaluators is **"measuring the 'unmeasurable'"** in Babbie's memorable phrase. Evaluators have to find out if something (actions, processes, etc.) did or did not happen, how it compared

¹⁵ Babbie E. (1995 edition) *The practice of social research* (Wadsworth, London), chapter 13.

with what was planned and costed, whether it had measurable outcomes, and if these look anything like what was meant to happen. More of this below: the key point is to break up the evaluation into methods that allow the researcher to observe, measure and reach solid conclusions.

51. But in this case, coming on top of the general rigours of evaluation research, was the sensitivity of gender sensitive research. An immediate distinction is needed, between gender-sensitive and feminist research, the politics of which have been long argued¹⁶ and some resolution reached (among some researchers, anyway) to the clumsy but common-sense effect that good feminist research and good gender research share the same element – namely, good research is good research. As Hammersley notes, the danger of over-stating the case for feminist research is to “set up a separate methodological paradigm based on distinctive political and philosophical assumptions which are held to motivate a unique form of research practise”.¹⁷ The pendulum is in danger of swinging too far the other way, however – a recent chapter put together feminist research with Marxist and black research as ‘standpoint methodologies’, implying that the ideology obscures (or may obscure) the capacity to utilise rigorous methodology to reach non-ideologically driven conclusions.¹⁸
52. This evaluation is gender sensitive, in composition, design and analysis; and the research team have adopted a bottom-up perspective informed by the broad notion of what we may term ‘emancipatory research’, where the outcomes of this (or any other) programme and its evaluation should have an empowering impact on beneficiaries and where the outcomes should be judged primarily through the eyes and experiences of the poor, and women from poor communities (including pastoralists, women with HIV, and others) in particular, the ultimate intended beneficiaries. But this is constrained by time and budget; and by the fact that our terms of reference (ToR) direct us to focus primarily on the *programme* – the partner organisations and programme financial and management agency (PFMA), namely UNIFEM (the United Nations Development Fund for Women). The methodology has to be sensitive to the ToR and to the demands of the subject matter, and cannot therefore utilise a free-flowing open-ended methodology that rejects hierarchy and allows sufficient numbers of women to tell their stories.

Feminist methodology

53. Feminists, for example, have long (and convincingly) argued that gender directly affects how men and women differently experience the world and that given male dominance in society, social research will ineluctably reflect this order¹⁹ – it would express the male version of the world as the natural order of the world. The problem comes when, as Hammersley put it, emphasising personal experience “also often

¹⁶ For example, see the summary by Hammersley M. (1995) *The politics of social research* (Sage, London) at chapter 3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.65.

¹⁸ This is the implication of the term, not necessarily the argument made. See Eagle G., Hayes G. and Sibanda T. ‘Standpoint methodologies: Marxist, feminist and black scholarship perspectives’ in Terre Blanche M., Durrheim K and Painter D. (2006) *Research in practice: applied methods for the social sciences* (University of Cape Town press, Cape Town).

¹⁹ See for example du Bois B. (1983) ‘Passionate scholarship: notes on values, knowing and method in feminist social science’ in Bowles G and Duelli Klein R (ed.s) (1983) *Theories of women’s studies* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)

leads to a rejection of structured research methods in favour of unstructured or qualitative methods, on the grounds that these give access to women's experience in a way which other methods do not".²⁰ This is often accompanied by the rejection of hierarchy – that only 'authentic relations' that dissolve the researcher/subject distinction can unlock authentic findings.

54. This leads to a further common aspect of feminist research, namely placing the researcher within the research focus, and requiring of the researcher openness about their various societal positions and biases – race, class, age, and so on.
55. These are all important issues, which are still often – sadly – absent from text-books and academic treatments of applied social research.²¹ The team does not disagree with the notion that only – or even primarily – personal experience can provide explanations close to women's reality, but this has to be set against the ToR; as such, our fieldwork at grass-roots level consisted of exclusively qualitative, largely unstructured in-depth interviews. More structuring was required when we used focus groups in selected communities, but even here, focus groups remain an attempt to have multiple conversations, not force respondents into choosing from pre-selected (and hierarchical) answers. So at grass-roots level, we tried to respond to the methodological demands of both feminist and gender-sensitive research.
56. We also structured our approach to research sites. **We did not assume that the country has similar gender conditions or that the country's governance conditions and how they affect gender aspects are the same everywhere in the country.** We identified areas where people voted in women leaders in the last general election and those where they did not. We also sampled regions where women candidates failed and where there were no women candidates. Resource constraints mean that our findings are not representative – but we have sampled as robustly as possible, to try and provide the most solid foundations possible for our arguments and conclusions. If on occasion our terminology veers towards generalisation, inevitable when trying to learn lessons for the programme as a whole, the reader is requested to bear this in mind.
57. While doing this, **our focus was not on numbers of women but conditions of gender and governance and how Kenya's diversity reflects these conditions.** We have covered a broad array of social-political conditions and hopefully accounted for their influence on gender. Our main limitation – which we repeat not as a complaint but because we believe that the absence of representative data, baseline and measurement, to be a terrible blunder that directly affects GGP and our evaluation - was lack of adequate time and resources to do a national sample. Even though we cannot generalize to the population using our findings, we are confident that our data adequately represents the picture on the ground.
58. Given the resource constraints we faced, there was no possibility of repeating this loosely or un-structured approach at programme/partner level. Here we had to adopt a more structured approach, with survey questionnaires for all implementing partners, and a separate questionnaire for donors. (These are attached as Appendices.)

²⁰ Hammersley *Politics of social research op cit.*, p.47.

²¹ See for example Devereux S. and Hoddinott J (ed.s) (1992) *Fieldwork in developing countries* (Harvester Wheatsheaf, London).

However, we coupled these with a review of documents, as well as a fairly loosely structured set of qualitative interventions.

59. The latter included in-depth interviews (including some repeat interviews) with a range of stakeholders – including people who may have been surveyed as part of an organisation – as well as focus groups among a range of key stakeholders including partners, ‘matriarchs’ – the older generation of women leaders – young Turks of the women’s movement, and so on. (A full list is attached in the Appendices.) Some structured interviews also occurred among beneficiaries – women candidates supported by GGP as well as women candidates not supported the programme – at local level. Again, we sought to include both structured questions to ensure that key ToR items were covered, and space for stories to be told.
60. We do believe that sampling and rigorous design and analysis, within a team including feminist researchers, political scientists, legal and sociological experts, will adequately help us understand the successes and failures of the *programme* – remembering that that is the focus of analysis for this evaluation - though the point may obtain that we have under-researched the realities of women candidates and others vying for leadership positions and the battles they face. It is also the point of trade-off, between the rigours of feminist methodology and the demands of this specific evaluation.

Data sources

61. In other words, the team sought to move beyond triangulation into multiple methods, mixing various qualitative approaches as well as quantitative survey methods and secondary data analysis, seeking to be sensitive to gender and feminist methodology as well as the demands of the discipline.
62. Data used in this evaluation are overwhelmingly primary data, with some analysis of secondary material. It needs to be emphasised that the programme is data-poor: despite clear targets regarding the number of women in leadership positions in public and private spheres, for example, no data exists on this – no baseline data, and no measurement data. **UNIFEM is not in a position track GGP progress regarding how many women are in leadership positions at local or national, public or private spheres. This weak knowledge and information base is a critical gap in the programme.**
63. This is particularly acute regarding the lack of baseline data. As evaluators, our task normally involves checking progress towards indicators against baseline data. In the case of GGP, this is impossible: many of the ‘indicators’ are poorly designed (see below) and no baseline data exists. This lack of information is a key reason we have relied on primary data – we have had to go out and try to find answers to basic questions (such as numbers of women in leadership positions in various sectors) and then seek to measure programme progress and impact, where the latter should be the focus and the former should be the function of the PFMA.
64. The lack of baseline data is a key gap in the programme. It is too late to generate genuinely *baseline* data – given that the programme is contemplating its third phase – but we strongly recommend that the PFMA is instructed to gather baseline-cum-status quo data for each and every indicator area. This requires a properly designed data

gathering strategy coupled to analysis and reporting for all partners. To proceed without such data is to yet again embark on work whose impact simply cannot systematically or rigorously be measured.

65. The methods – and thus **data sources** – used in the evaluation are reflected in Table 1. There is a mixture of quantitative, semi-structured qualitative, free-flowing qualitative, and secondary data analysis.

Sphere	Methods
National/ programme level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus groups – partners, matriarchs, women’s movement • Survey of all partner organisations • Survey of donors • In-depth interviews with stakeholders • In-depth interviews with selected project partners, donors, other interested parties • In-depth interviews with PFMA • Secondary data analysis
Local level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus groups • In-depth interviews with women candidates, successful and unsuccessful, GGP-supported • In-depth interviews with women candidates, successful and unsuccessful, non-GGP-supported (i.e. control sites) • Structured interviews with beneficiaries • Transact walks

Table 1: Summary of methodologies utilised

The context: gender, the state and politics – and GGP

66. There is growing consensus in discussions on gender and governance that the way the state evolved in Africa and attendant practice of politics has had several direct as well as indirect consequences for gender relations.²² **Firstly, the state evolved as a centralised institution; its authority was highly centralised and remains so. Secondly, centralisation of authority gave rise to domination of personal rule and patronage politics.** This form of domination often assumes coercive dimensions because of the need to consolidate centralised authority.
67. Thirdly, the **cultural context** in which the state operates and in which politics is practised is patriarchal and patrilineal. This implies male domination of the state and its institutions as well as politics. It also implies male domination of the political space, and therefore male coercion of women in an attempt to gain control of the emerging political spaces. Evolving power relations evolve with women in the periphery of decision-making and in the margins of governance.
68. **Gender relations become increasingly unequal where evolving power relations push women to the margins of political power and particularly to the margins of decision-making.** In some instances, gender relations become increasingly characterised by inequalities and inequities in how power, resources, and responsibilities are distributed between men and women in the society. Inequalities in terms of access to these in turn lead to women being poorer than men – in virtually every aspect. Gender-blind policies and laws exacerbate these conditions.
69. Democratic governance cannot be realised where there are deep inequalities in the society. Where there are inequalities in the distribution of political power, such inequalities translate to inequalities in access to and control of resources. This often invites coercion of the subjugated social groups in order to main control over them. Inequality and ethnicity are mutually reinforcing mechanisms operating – to deadly effect, in recent times – in Kenya today. In term of gender it means that women are always vulnerable because of their unequal positioning with regard to access to and control over resources, and access to physical power/protection. They are vulnerable to coercion by both male actors and the institutions regulated by men.

Quality and/or quantity?

A ... pragmatic approach agrees that the mere presence of women does not necessarily translate into the representation of women's interests, but nevertheless argues that it increases the probability that gender equality concerns will be addressed. Some of the women elected will [not] have the ability (or even inclination) to address gender, but the cumulative effect of their presence will affect Parliament.²³

70. The above suggests that changing the character of the state and the practice of politics is important. **Transforming the state, political leadership and political institutions**

²² See, for instance, Partpart J. L., and Kathleen A. Staudt (ed.s) (1990) *Women and the Sate in Africa*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers)

²³ Albertyn C., Hassim S and Meintjies S. 'Making a difference? Women's struggles for participation and representation' in Fick G., Meintjies S and Simons M (ed.s) *One woman one vote: the gender politics of South African elections* (2002) (EISA, Johannesburg), p.39.

ought to be the focus of gender struggles for equality. The main challenge here is that there are often small numbers of women in decision-making positions. These are not enough to change the character of the state and politics. Statistics show that by 2003, there were less than 14 per cent elected women Members of Parliament in the world. Some countries had fewer than 5 per cent.²⁴ This is not a straightforward matter either, as Randall made clear:

*...discourses, dominating or competing, are important features of the political opportunity framework for women. For instance, a growing literature discusses the implications of discourses of nationalism for women's political participation, both the openings they can provide, especially when combined with ideologies of modernisation, and the limits they can place on the representation of women's claims.*²⁵

71. The same is true of the 'gender-blind' neo-liberal discourse the its effects on women's political participation – and their socio-economic situation, since women comprise the first losers of any cuts in social and/or welfare expenditure by the (neo-liberal or other) state. **Numbers matter: but they are a means to an end, not an end in themselves.** The challenge is putting together a package of strategies that effect a multi-pronged assault on power (we return this below) – the 'what' - and where there is clarity on both the how and the why.
72. Above all, it should be noted that the context in Kenya is not propitious for gender struggles. **A formerly strong women's movement is smaller and more fractured, and – according to GGP participants and stakeholders – is now riven by the same ethnic considerations that have rent Kenyan politics.** In the absence of a strong women's movement, or the development of an agreed minimum programme for women, those few women elected to power have no demands made of them in terms of accountability, other than by this or that small group, CSO, constituency grouping and so on – all of which can be manipulated and played against each other, if required.
73. Tiny numbers of elected women, as in Kenya, are vulnerable in the male-dominant political game – so perhaps numbers matter more than elsewhere. But perhaps not: where such numbers lack a unifying agenda or vision, they, ironically, *become* the source of further marginalisation of women. Because of this vulnerability, the few women at the centre resign themselves (some with more vigour than others) into absorbing the male political style as a survival strategy. Political patronage, class-based politics, ethnicity and disconnection from external women's movements begin to show. This in turn weakens the foundation for struggles for gender equality and governance of the society in general. Nonetheless, the entry of women into decision-making positions broadens perspectives in governance debates. It tends to introduce

²⁴ UNESCO report cited in Mitullah, W. 2003. 'Gender Inclusion in Transition Politics: A Review and Critique of Women's Engagement', in Oyugi, W., et al. 2003. *The Politics of Transition in Kenya: From KANU to NARC*. Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation

²⁵ Randall, Vicky (1998) 'Gender and power: women engage the state' in Randall V and Waylen G *Gender, politics and the state* (Routledge, London), p.194

new values into politics and leads to governments to paying attention to social issues.²⁶ We now turn to how this conceptualisation reflects on the Kenyan situation.

Governance and gender in Kenya

74. There are at least two critical features of Kenya's politics that inform the practise of governance. **These are patronage and ethnicity.** Firstly, the authority of the state is centralised around the institution of the Presidency. This is the centre around which other political variables revolve. Access to political power is increasingly defined by proximity to the centre. The result of this is the emergence of patron-client networks comprising different actors and political institutions. For these reasons, political institutions such as political parties are highly personalised. Control of parties is in the hands of a few ethnic elites who also define the rules governing access to the parties, exit and entry into political parties. Access to these institutions is also a function of one's position in these networks. Political competition is not based on ideologies or values; the parties are mere vote machines and 'vehicles' for transporting patrons from one point to another.
75. This is critical, and borne out by country experience elsewhere. In South Africa, for instance, Albertyn concluded that **one of the key variables for achieving significant advances in women's rights was having senior women *within* the ruling party who could work in alliance with others – across party lines as well as outside parliament – and with the Women's National Coalition, a cross-party alliance of parliamentarians, NGOs, CBOs, academics and others.**²⁷ Numbers mattered – but so did seniority within the party hierarchy, *accountability* to a broader women's agenda and movement, and *working in alliance* with multiple women's organisations. As she concluded – in words the prefigure the recommendations of this report –

*...women need to use multiple strategies at different sites within the state and civil society to advance a gender agenda. These change over time and in changing circumstances.*²⁸

76. The second feature is **ethnicity**; this is the fulcrum around which major social-political events in the country revolve. Tragically, it has also come to dominate politics and is now entrenched within civil society, according to many civil society actors and activists interviewed for this evaluation. The electoral system is the majoritarian first-past-the-post system, in which any candidate with more votes than others is declared the winner. This system motivates individual politicians to mobilise ethnic constituencies ostensibly to generate numbers to out-compete others. Ethnicity then leads to political actors establishing networks based on personal loyalties revolving around ethnic leaders. Interestingly, the majority of Kenyan communities are patriarchal. Political power in these communities centres around uni-ethnic, male dominated institutions. Without exception, all ethnic political leaders are men.

²⁶ Mitullah, W. 2003. op-cit.

²⁷ See Albertyn C. 'Towards substantive representation: women and politics in South Africa. Have women made a difference in post-apartheid South Africa?' in Dobrowolsky A and Hart V (ed.s) *Women making constitutions: new politics and comparative perspectives* (2003) (Macmillan, London), pp.99-117.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.114.

Patriarchy dominates the world outlook of many political parties. This form of dominance runs from the local to the national level.

77. This is a basic fact of political life in Kenya. **The question facing GGP is, strategically, how is the programme seeking to change this situation? How will (or can) it stop elected women being sucked into the same vortex of ethnic patronage?**
78. Sustaining these networks involves resources. Such resources can come from state institutions if those involved are in power or connected to others allied to the state. For those outside the state, resources for politics also come from different sources including from those who expect to get favours from a new government. **Corruption** gradually integrates into the political system both through the state framework and through non-state approach. Domination of these networks by male elites implies **inaccessibility of political institutions for women**. It also implies **absence of women from the processes of making decisions both at the level of ethnic groups and at the level of political parties as institutions**. And as such it *demands* careful strategising around how to take forward a gender agenda in this complex context.
79. The form of governance obtaining from these conditions is one in which **patronage plays an important role and results in undermining reform initiatives**. Much governance reform post-2002 ran into exactly this obstacle. And because of the patriarchal nature of the Kenyan society, women are often placed in the margins of political institutions and the evolving patronage networks. Until recently, there were no women in senior positions in political parties. Many were tasked with leading women and youth movements in their parties while others had positions conventionally reserved for women – gender desks. Furthermore, membership in these parties has been based on loyalty to male patrons. An analysis of governance situation from around 2003 when a new government came to power bears this out more clearly. (We do so for the reader to contrast GGP and its expected outcomes with the nature of the struggles it faces.)

The politics of transition in Kenya – 2002 to 2008

80. Although Kenya's transition to a democracy began in the early 1990s when the government allowed the re-introduction of multi-party democracy, it was not until 2003 that it truly began, when a new government came to power on a reform platform following the December 2002 general election. During this election, a coalition of mainstream opposition political parties, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), defeated a party that had been in power from independence in 1963. Some of the reforms that the coalition promised to institute included gender equality policies and taking actions that would promote women's interests. They were part of a broader reform package.
81. With a new government in power at the beginning of 2003, there was much optimism that a **reform movement and democratic governance in particular would consolidate and enhance the space for democratic governance**. With regard to gender, it was expected that several bills that the previous government had failed to act upon would be realized in order to provide opportunities for gender equality. Sadly, this optimism waned in tandem with the weakening of the reform movement. The **Sexual Offences Act** stands out as a lonely if remarkable achievement. Within the coalition, disagreements arose over the distribution of power. This split the

coalition into two groups: one grouped around the government; and another grouped around leaders opposed to how the government had distributed public sector positions.

82. **It is noteworthy that the division was *not* informed by ideology. Ethnicity and personality differences acted in the main to fragment the coalition.** Gender is inherently ideological and political: but it struggles to find purchase where national politics itself is not ideological; Kenya has proved no different in this instance.
83. These divisions spilled over into the reform agenda. The constitution review process, which the new government embarked on after assuming office in 2003, became the theatre in which these differences were played out. Interestingly, each group appropriated the review process for purposes of advancing the interests of their individual leaders. The review process was adopted as an instrument for fighting political battles. In South Africa – in the post-apartheid context –

... women were relatively united across deep racial and other historical divides. This unity was forged in a common experience of political exclusion as the rhetoric of gender equality failed to materialise in the composition of the delegations to the various negotiating fora. Women aligned across parties to demand and secure a place at the negotiating table. In the main negotiating process of 1992/3 women achieved 50% representation in official delegations and a representation of 'at least one' on the technical committees. These committees, made up of about six experts, played a key role in preparing drafts for consideration and decision by the negotiating forum.²⁹

84. Not so in Kenya, despite the existence of similar cleavages and exclusions. Because of the nature of the constitution horse-trading and politicking, there were arguments and counter arguments over different positions in the draft constitution. With patronage deeply ingrained in the political process, leaders in each group sought to mobilise their ethnic constituencies or coalition of ethnic groups in order to out-compete the other. This diluted the reform foundation and considerably eroded the gains made from early 2003. **Progressive voices – including women's and gender activists' voices – waned, or at least were drowned out by the rising tide of 'business as usual'.**
85. By end of 2004, the NARC coalition was not holding together; it had split into two huge blocs. In one bloc was a grouping of politicians who preferred the *status quo*. They were mainly from the President's community. On the other hand was a group of politicians from outside the President's region who preferred a comprehensive constitutional reform.
86. It is significant that **discussions on the draft constitution did not show disagreements on the need for promoting gender equality.** GGP can claim this as a success for the gender agenda, and possibly for GGP – as we note throughout this report, attribution is extremely difficult, but our assumption is that GGP has made a contribution – if unquantifiable – to helping develop a domesticated moral consensus around gender equality. This moral consensus has proved critical at a global level to

²⁹ Albertyn 'Women in post-apartheid South Africa' *op cit.*, p.101.

advancing women's positions in society and seeking to achieve gender equality. Various constitutional drafts made different proposals seeking to further the position of women in the governance process. **Affirmative action and proportional representation were some of the main avenues identified to further gender equality.**

87. In a referendum conducted in November 2005 the majority voted against the draft constitution. Again those supporting the draft were the President's bloc, while those opposed to the draft comprised groups that had been excluded from the centre of power. The draft was criticized as having watered down key provisions agreed to at the Bomas National Constitutional Conference – but again, party politicking had taken over issues of principle and ideology, and there was **no cross-party united women's movement consistently pushing for a minimum package of advances.** Kenya has been blessed with some remarkable and powerful women's leaders, but lacks a coherent, united women's movement – this, we believe, helps explain many of the challenges that have faced GGP but also need to inform any design for GGP III.

From constitution to cul-de-sac

88. **The defeat of the draft constitution further polarised the country on an ethnic basis.** New leaders emerged to articulate interests of their respective communities. With this new form of politics, gender and other reform issues received minimal attention. The rhetoric of reform, which had so energised civil society in the late 1990s/early 2000s, dissipated, then largely disappeared. Polarisation occasioned consolidation of a new movement for change, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which was later registered as a political party. The group later split into two when one of its leaders moved out to form another political party, ODM Kenya. The President's faction of NARC formed the Party of National Unity (PNU).
89. These divisions obtained until the country went to the election in December 2007 elections. The divisions informed the voting patterns and became the basis for violent conflicts after the main actors disputed the presidential election. This dispute centred around claims that the Electoral Commission of Kenya rigged the election in favour of the incumbent President in order to ensure the continued stay in power one ethnic group and therefore further marginalisation of groups and individuals opposed to the president and elites from his region. This resulted in a violent conflict that split the country into two halves and threatened existence of Kenya as a nation-state: the Rift Valley and regions to the west; and Central Kenya and adjacent regions.
90. **As we argue throughout, GGP is not insulated from, but inherently part of, the political situation in Kenya.** Ethnic tensions and differences are not an external, but have seeped deeply into civil society generally, including GGP. **One of the first tasks facing any GGP III is how to go about healing ethnic tensions** as a vital precursor to any united action around a gender agenda.
91. This split meant that no faction would govern the country in any effective manner. A mediation process was initiated through the efforts of the international community and domestic pressure. The two factions agreed to power sharing and to a Grand Coalition government established through a constitutional amendment that provided for a new structure of political power.

GGP and politics of transition

92. The type of politics discussed above has had consequences regarding women's access to the state and its institutions as well as politics. Anne Phillips has long argued that **women need to achieve a presence within the state in order to participate within and influence politics.**³⁰ No sensible counter-argument can be (or has been) mounted. Some have taken this further to argue for a 'critical mass' of women in power, while the more recent consensus seems to be that we need to move 'beyond numbers' (the title of an IDEA publication on the issue) and worry about quality as much or more than quantity. **Feminist scholars have argued about the need to finesse the argument – or, more concretely, to use multi-pronged strategies.** As Shvedova put it, the need is for broad-based coalitions supporting the 'numbers' in parliament, though this is difficult to achieve in new democracies:

*Although governments might declare their commitment to democratic forms of change, it is nevertheless unrealistic to expect governments alone to secure women's rightful place in all spheres of society. Civil society in general, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and women's groups, must play a role in advancing women's representation. Faith-based women's organizations and unique outreach networks are also critical allies.*³¹

93. In Kenya, **the absence of critical numbers of women in decision-making positions has informed struggles for gender equality.** These struggles have been taking place in tandem with broader struggles for democratic governance. The question is, is there a strong enough women's movement to both support and be supported by GGP?
94. GGP II and its predecessor programmes (EPPP and GGP I) did recognise the absence of women in critical decision-making positions including in the legislature. Indeed the focus of the EPPP was increasing the numbers of women in electoral office. This made sense given its short lifespan, September 2001 – 2002. The bias of the programme was electoral related activities: Gender Sensitive Voter Education; Capacity building of Women's Electoral Aspirants; Advocacy and Lobbying; Campaign monitoring.³² The EPPP was clearly an electoral programme, concerned purely with the issue of women's representation. Its objectives were described as being to:
- *Increase the number of women in parliament and other institutions of representation*
 - *Increasing the visibility of women politicians in the media*³³.
95. At the start of GGP II, it was underlined that the Millennium Development Goals set equal women's representation in parliament as an indicator of achievement of gender equality by 2015. GGP was initiated to support endeavours towards women's

³⁰ Phillips A (1995) *The politics of presence* (Clarendon Press, Oxford); see also Phillips A (2000) 'Multiculturalism, Universalism and the Claims of Democracy' Paper prepared for UNRISD for Beijing +5 Review on Gender, Justice, Development and Rights: Substantiating rights in a disabling environment'.

³¹ Shvedova N (2005 revised edition) 'Obstacles to Women's Participation in Parliament' in Ballington J and Karam A *Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers (A Revised Edition)* (IDEA, Stockholm)

³² See 'Engendering The Political Process Programme (EPPP) Final Evaluation', 2

³³ 'EPPP Final Evaluation', 25

enjoyment of human rights and participation in democratic governance. Unlike the EPPP, though, the GGP was intended as both a gender (i.e. it would not solely focus on women) and governance programme (i.e. its concern would go beyond the question of numbers into addressing governance concerns including transformative leadership). This reflected EPPP evaluation recommended that areas for future work include securing gains in the constitutional reform process; strengthening the national machinery for gender equality; supporting women in parliament and local authorities and “*generating and utilizing strategic knowledge on gender and governance.*”³⁴

96. Although GGP ostensibly set out to embrace governance concerns. The targets set are biased towards representation and the question of numbers. Our concern is that whilst numbers are a noble and critical goal in the Kenyan context, this is an inadequate focus on its own, for a governance programme. **Numbers are a means to an end, but within GGP they appear to have become an end in themselves.** Particularly given that one of the key reasons that the numbers of women in decision-making in Kenya is the hostile policy, legal, constitutional and institutional framework. Kenya for example is the only member state of the East African community that does not safeguarded affirmative measures for women in decision making through its constitution. Thus the GGP’s focus on numbers whilst ostensibly stating governance objectives has limited the programme.
97. Conceptualisation of GGP appear unclear and incoherent at the theoretical level. While EPPP I focused on empowerment of women as a means for influencing the 2002 elections, **GGP’s ‘big picture’ is hazy and blurred to both implementing partners and women leaders in politics.** There are also varied opinions among both the young and old women leaders on what a gender and governance programme should concentrate on. We come back to this later.
98. The point we are making is that reflecting on recent feminist and gender scholarship we find a growing sophistication of thinking as to how to advance both women and gender via engaging and accessing power; but this is not apparent when GGP is viewed at programme level. As we have noted throughout, partners and stakeholders have done a great deal of hard work, which is not being questioned. **What is being questioned is the strategic positioning of GGP, if it is really to take forward the gender agenda via engaging and accessing power.**

Organisational arrangements & programme management

99. The programme is organised around three key structures - the Donor Steering Committee (DSC), the Programme and Financial Management Agent (PFMA) and Programme Review meetings.

³⁴ ‘EPPP Final Evaluation’, pp.32-33




Figure 1: Fulfilment of mandates (GGP partner survey)

100. **The Donor Steering Committee:** The Donor Steering Committee (DSC) is the key consultation and decision-making organ especially with regards to funding and approvals, and funding harmonisation. Donors and UNIFEM are represented in the DSC, but not implementing partners. While the DSC is an important co-ordinating structure, concerns were raised that at times there tends to be **micro-management by donors, especially when situations arise requiring urgent or high-profile interventions**. The donors and UNIFEM are nonetheless regarded as having **fulfilled their mandate**, and implementing partners reported that donors have also made valuable inputs into the programme. Value is seen to have been added by donors in a number of areas other than the provision of funds – an important finding.

Response	Frequency
Technical Support/expertise	13
Giving visibility to gender equality	5
Monitoring of activities	4
Harmonisation/consolidation of efforts	3
High level policy advocacy	3
Transparency and accountability	1

Table 2: Value add by donors (GGP partner survey)

101. **Programme Implementation Unit:** A programme implementation unit at UNIFEM is the second key structure, and is made up of a programme manager, a monitoring and evaluation expert, a budget expert and an administrative assistant. This unit also receives support from UNIFEM staff in the regional office. While staffing appears to be adequate - if late in joining - **it may be necessary to assess whether there is technical expertise in all components of the programme, particularly the outreach and networking components, given that some weaknesses were recorded in the management of these two areas.**
102. A concern that has been raised is that there is **no input by other partners into the financial and management decisions made by the PFMA**, leading to some

allegations of favouritism. This should be responded to with transparency and dialogue.

103. UNIFEM has been able to undertake capacity building and development of necessary tools to guide the implementing partners in programme and financial management, especially proposal and activity plan development, result based management, financial reporting, monitoring and evaluation and reporting requirements and formats. A number of weaknesses were noted – these are not contradictory, but reflect quality concerns behind the activities undertaken, as well as gaps to be filled:
 - No programme wide M&E system has been systematically implemented,
 - No baseline data exists against which to measure progress made on indicators,
 - Financial monitoring visits are not regularly undertaken by UNIFEM,
 - Late disbursements of funds, and
 - Unavailability of required financial data
104. **Programmatic Reviews:** The third organisational structure is the programme review meeting, and it is at this structure that implementing partners engage with donors and UNIFEM at strategic and programmatic level. In this respect a key weakness we note is the **lack of a co-ordination mechanism for the implementing partners to consult and network amongst themselves**, so as to effectively and collectively input into review meetings and other dialogue structures.
105. **Partners pointed out that the programme as currently structured does not invest in spaces for implementing partners to discuss and set agendas. Such a mechanism could be in the form of a Gender Governance Forum that will also serve to strengthen dialogue and solidarity among the implementing partners**, which is currently lacking, as well as provide a learning and knowledge-sharing platform for the programme. This Forum could also be the mechanism by which implementing partner representatives to participate in the programme’s structures are elected.
106. **Revision of organisational structure:** Arising from the above findings, the programme’s organisational structure needs to be reconsidered to allow for better harmonisation, participation and co-ordination of all partners. In this respect we propose that two additional structures be formed, namely the Gender Governance Forum (GGF) and a Programme Reference Committee (PRC).
107. The DSC, PIU and GGF will be the co-ordinating, networking and harmonisation structures for the donors, UNIFEM and implementing partners respectively.
108. The PIU will in addition provide technical support to the DSC and the GGF. The DSC, PIU and GGF will nominate representatives to the PRC, which shall be the **programme’s overall policy and strategic decision making structure**, and shall benefit from decisions made at the DSC, PIU and GGF and vice versa. The programme Review meetings will be purely for monitoring and evaluation purposes in the new structure.
109. The proposed new structure is illustrated below. It is a tentative indication of how to fill the need for greater policy direction to be set by implementing partners, as well as enhancing and living out the principles of partnership and harmonisation. It is offered as a structural means of enhancing transparency, dialogue and ownership. Precise

names, actual structures, who sits of each and so on are all left to the GGP partners and stakeholders to discuss and resolve as they see fit.




Figure 2: Proposed organisational structure

Analysis and findings

110. Much of our analysis can be found in the preceding pages, since we do not divorce describing the programme from commenting on it, or making recommendations. As such, readers are encouraged to read the report as a whole: this section is specifically focused on some key points of analysis (as instructed in our ToR), but by no means all our analysis will be found here.

Design and strategy: the limits of numbers

111. This section of the report discusses the relevance of the programme in relation to the above conceptual framework and in relation to post-2007 election crisis priorities.
112. GGP II has four inter-related outcomes. In summary these are:
- Supporting constitutional, legislative, policy and institutional reforms for gender equality
 - Enhancing capacities of Kenyan women to participate in democratic governance
 - Strengthening images of women in leadership within communities
 - Strengthening capacity of women CSOs on gender and governance
113. There is a basic question that has to be asked, about **the relevance of these objectives to Kenya's patronage and ethnic-driven politics**. That they are 'good things' in the world is not in question; **are they appropriate for Kenya in 2008**, however, is a different question. We want to pay attention to specifically to whether the programme was strategically positioned to shake the foundation of obstacles that stand in the way of gender struggles for democratic governance.
114. We note here that **a number of interventions envisaged in the programme were not under the control of the programme**. This is true especially of constitutional, legislative and institutional reforms. Parliament is responsible for the legislative agenda but its pace in legislating is slow. At the same time, the pace of reform generally – and the accompanying rhetoric of reform - had generally slowed owing to problems in the ruling coalition before the December 2007 election. **In spite of these challenges, there were important initiatives that took place during this period**. The Political Parties Bill was passed. The government issued a policy directive requiring the public sector to ensure at least 30% representation of women in public positions. The government also set up a women's enterprise support fund. Political parties embraced the discourse of gender equality and made it an important policy issue. **These are significant achievements, from any perspective, and should be celebrated. As we note elsewhere, attribution of success by GGP is tricky; but as successes in the struggle for gender equality, these are all important**.
115. Some of these interventions took place during the campaigns for the 2007 general election. The need to gain support from the women's constituency may have induced these interventions. Whether true or not, they are indicative of a gender-sensitive environment. **They indicate that advocacy for women's rights and struggles for gender equality are slowly gaining ground at the policy level**. Whether GGP II was responsible for this or not is not the issue. Of note is that **the policy environment is changing** and that it is difficult to pay lip service to the discourse of gender rights and equality; and impossible to ignore it.

116. The second outcome concerned enhancing capacity of women to participate in democratic governance. Many women were trained to sensitise communities on gender equality. Significantly, compared to 2002, **more women participated as candidates in the civic and parliamentary election in the 2007 elections.**
117. Table 1 shows the trend in number of candidates in both parliamentary and civic elections in the 2002 and the 2007 elections. The figures demonstrate an increase in number of women candidates during the period. Part of this period includes the period when activities under GGP II were being implemented (2006 to 2007).

Number of candidates	2002			2007			%increase of women candidates
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total	
Parliamentary	44	991	1,035	269	2,278	2547	511%
Civic	382	6628	7,010	1478	13,833	15,331	287%

Table 3: number of candidates in 2002 and 2007 elections by sex

118. While in 2002 there were only 44 women parliamentary candidates, 2007 had 269 women candidates. This represents a 511% increase. Civic elections also show an increase in the number of women candidates. From 382 candidates in the 2002 civic elections, the number of women candidates increased to 1478 in the 2007 elections (a 287% increase).
119. These figures show that **there are more women getting interested in elective politics.** Although there are no systematic studies on why women are increasingly interested in elective politics, one may argue that the expanding political space provided women with better political opportunities. In the 1990s, the ruling party had not altered its patriarchal nature and approach to politics (the figures of nominated women MPs – below - corroborates this). This changed in the period preceding the 2002 elections. From this period, **campaigns for reform including campaigns to better the policy and legal framework on gender and governance improved the environment for competitive politics for women.** Although this did not translate into significant numbers of elected women MPs – ultimately the decision of voters, not of programmes like GGP or of political parties - at least the number of women running for elected positions increased.
120. Remuneration of MPs has also increased. Parliament is now attractive to professionals because of its lucrative package. The package is lucrative than what obtains in many firms in the private sector. Competition for access to parliament has tended to intensify as a result of this.
121. It is interesting that many of our respondents during this evaluation have been **emphatic on increasing the number of women in decision making positions as a critical objective of a gender and governance programme.** This was emphasised both by implementing partners as well as some of the respondents not participating in the programme. Some argued that the entry of women into such positions may result in broadening debates on equality which would in turn promote positive social

change. These comments are born out of Kenya’s experience of few women in decision-making positions. Generally, the number of women in elected positions – and other senior positions in the public sector – is negligible. Table 4 shows the trend of these numbers from 1969 to 2007.

Year	Elected		Nominated	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
1969	1	154	1	11
1974	5	152	2	10
1979	3	155	1	11
1983	1	157	2	10
1988	2	186	1	11
1992	6	182	-	12
1997	4	200	4	8
2002	9	201	9	3
2007*	15	192	6	6

Table 4: Trend in number of Women Members of Parliament (1969-2008)

(Source: Mitullah, W., 2003. ‘Gender Inclusion in Transition Politics: Review and Critique of Women’s Engagement.’

*Tabulated from our own sources)

122. These figures show poor representation of women in parliament over the years. The coming to power of a new government after the December 2002 elections – initially on a reform platform – improved the numeric strength of women in parliament. Before then, the numbers were negligible. For instance, the combined number of women who got to parliament through elections in 2002 and 2007 is more than the total number of women who have been in parliament throughout the period from independence to 2002.
123. Although it is difficult to attribute this to GGP and GGP II in particular, it shows increased awareness among women about the need to participate in elective politics. The extent to which mainstream institutions demonstrated commitment and accountability to gender equality reflected in how the parties dealt with female candidates. Notably, **the parties nominated women to parliament while some of the political parties established strong gender movements.**
124. The last outcome – recognition of women leadership capabilities – also showed some progress. **There was extensive media coverage of women candidates.** In some instances, opinion leaders in some communities discussed and supported women candidates.

GGP II and the women’s movement

125. While these outcomes are relevant for a gender programme, **they lack a unifying or a common theoretical paradigm.** Even within GGP II, **a fifth of partners feel it to be a set of discrete projects, rather than a programme.** As we noted from the beginning of this report, there is a great deal of hard work and good work taking place – but it does give the impression of **discrete, sometimes competing projects, rather than a coherent programme pursuing shared goals.**

126. To some, the programme is about **increasing numbers of women in elective positions so that the debate on gender equality can broaden** –we have already reviewed arguments for and against this view. To others, the programme is **not** about numbers: **it is about transformative leadership**.³⁵ And to yet others, the programme is **a bridge to women’s political power**. The programme thus means different things to different people. There are many variations about what it ought to be doing and how it should do it.




Figure 3: ‘Is GGP II a programme or a set of projects?’ (GGP partner survey)

127. Note that two-thirds of partners believe GGP to be a coherent programme – which contrasts with a fifth who do not, a position shared by donors and some external stakeholders. The latter seems to flow from the lack of synergies between projects and need for better co-ordination and dialogue, which we deal with below.
128. The programme has not, in our view, accounted for and accommodated the state of and **differences within the broader women’s movement**. The programme needs to provide **opportunities for young and old women leaders to come together and develop a coherent picture on the struggle for gender equality** (or at least see if this is possible). The evaluation team has encountered clear divisions based on politics and generational differences in terms of how both groups see things. Ethnicity is also a growing – and deeply divisive – fault line.
129. On the one hand, **the older generation** argues that there is an expanded space for gender rights. Women’s organisations should now focus on pressurising the government to introduce relevant and enabling policy reforms to support gender struggles. They urge caution, suggesting – for example – that the 30% target for representation is an important starting point, one that will not overly threaten their male counterparts and cause a backlash.
130. On the other hand, **younger women leaders** argue that the older generation is stuck to old ways of doing things: they are happy to have a half loaf of bread where the option should be all or nothing. In their view, the old generation has introduced a large measure of conservatism into gender struggles. They are seen to come from a

³⁵ UNIFEM and some of the donors respondents.

generation more interested in **project-based advances, rather than rights-based struggles**. More damaging, they feel that older women leaders are keen to ‘**lock out**’ the younger ones from access to politics as well as power.

131. Although the older generation insist ‘we do not have any key for opening or closing the political spaces’, they argue that the nature of patronage politics is playing as an advantage to them³⁶. They are connected to actors in power because they were together in the struggles for reform in the early 1990s. They see the younger generation as lacking delicacy or strategy, standing on principle rather than negotiating small advances, and generally being insensitive to what is feasible – **an all or nothing approach that, they feel, will not take the struggle for gender equality forward**.
132. That women are also playing patronage politics and deciding on access and gender spaces speaks a lot about **how the women’s movement has weakened**. We find different approaches to gender issues based on **generational status**. We also find **ethnic** divisions infiltrating the lenses through which different leaders see and interpret the struggle for gender equality and therefore struggles for gender and democratic governance. This is worrying in a general political sense, but very worrying in a very direct sense for GGP.
133. These differences in opinion about the programme are the result of the **lack of a common ideology or a belief and value system around which gender issues are articulated**. They are also the result of **lack of a ‘political movement’ – or social movement - to champion gender issues in a coherent manner**. These disconnected ideas are evidence that there is no strong ‘women’s movement’ to champion a gender course from a political point of view. It is a demonstration that the potential for a women’s movement (or a gender rights movement) has been eroded by the practise of politics and divisive ethnic competition. With respect to this, one respondent pointed out that:

*The women’s movement in this country is like a headless chicken; without an idea about where it is going, it keeps on jumping around the same spot.*³⁷

134. To demonstrate the challenges facing the women’s movement, a former woman Member of Parliament pointed out that

*Women do not keep pressure on women MPs to account to them. In parliament, therefore, women MPs begin attending to other constituencies without reference to the women’s movement. If there was a strong women’s movement, MPs in parliament would be accountable to such a movement*³⁸

135. GGP cannot be responsible for the absence of a coherent women’s movement – although it is clearly poorer for that absence – but **helping build a women’s movement should be considered as a key activity for GGP III**.

³⁶ Interview with a prominent women’s leader active in policy advocacy and lobbying circles.

³⁷ Former (female) Member of Parliament.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

How strategic was GGP II?

136. So how relevant were the programme objectives in relation to the patronage and ethnic nature of Kenya politics and to other obstacles that undermine struggles for gender rights? First, we note that the programme did not have interventions to address **the ethnic basis of politics** at the local or national level. Ethnicity is the fundamental under-pinning of electoral and other politics in Kenya, yet GGP appears not to have developed any strategies for dealing with the issue.
137. The same is true of the ‘strategic framework’, which lacks any risk analysis. It is easy, with hindsight, to complain that a risk analysis may have helped GGP better cope with the post-election violence. It may, and it may have not. But we can say with confidence that developing a thorough risk analysis (rather than quickly adding a couple of paragraphs after an exhausting round of logframe and indicator development, as usually happens) would have better equipped everyone involved in GGP to do their jobs and to respond quickly to changing events. This ranges from tensions within the GGP to external factors such as the post-election violence. That is the purpose of a risk analysis. **GGP III should not be started without a thorough – internally produced – risk analysis.**
138. Secondly, **patronage politics intensified in tandem with competition for ‘nomination slots’ within political parties.** Because of this, many women were locked out of the mainstream political parties. They sought refuge in fringe or little known political parties – where some were successful, a point that deserves greater research and attention.
139. In our opinion, this was done because of the need to increase numbers of women candidates in the hope that this will translate into increased numbers of women in parliament. Again this happened because there was no unifying ideology or a common value system for mobilising gender efforts towards the 2007 election. Had the programme mobilised around a common theme and a common goal it is possible that there would have been no ‘headless chicken’. Clearly a vision for the programme is long overdue. **The sooner gender activists are mobilised to develop a common and coherent vision the better for the programme.**

How relevant was GGP?

140. To a very large extent, we have already answered this: the primacy of gender inequality and the design of GGP made the programme very relevant. However, the test is in the implementation, where the programme has been found wanting in many areas – and successful in others. Some appear immediately below – many others can be found throughout the report.
141. In choosing **to go national** there were positives and negatives: this is an unavoidable trade-off, but one that needs to be monitored. The GGP provided organisations that had not ventured into the governance sector with an opportunity to do so. In respect of the traditional gender and governance organisations, it may have challenged them to go into geographical locations that they had not operated in before. In the case of some institutions (especially those that were unable to customise their proposals and had no background in the gender and governance sector), there is a sense that sub-contractors have emerged who have no commitment to the programme ethos but see a market opportunity.

142. Put bluntly, **having decided to have the program operate nationally, the need was for coverage – and as a result there were some partners whose competence was questionable and yet were taken on board simply because they were the only organisation operating in or willing to go into a particular geographical location.** However there were institutions that had a genuine interest in expanding their mandate and no background in governance one would have liked to see a capacity building component such as twinning such organisations with an older traditional gender and governance organisation that may have the experience to create a form of mentoring relationship. This was only evident with WOKIKE in the North East province (NEP) as noted in the section on lessons learnt, below.
143. Some partners also felt that whereas the EPPP was **designed by the women’s movement of the 1990s** that the GGP had not been, so whereas there is a felt need for a gender and governance programme, the GGP itself was not designed in a consultative manner. In the initial stages at least, partners felt they were being asked to fit into UNIFEM’s global agenda and not necessarily the demands of the local context. These may be more sentiments than facts: survey results showed that 72% of partners indicated that they participated in planning, 90% in implementation and so on. Formal participation seems not, of itself, to account for feelings of exclusion, which should be carefully monitored.
144. There were several instances where implementing partners designed their GGP programmes in such a manner as to ensure that it **complemented existing programmes.** They also exploited the complementarity of their programmes to maximise resources. WOKIKE, for example, wanted to have a camel caravan that they would use to raise awareness in the NEP, but this was rejected on the basis of expense. So they used the fact that they had a programme with a camel caravan going to some of the locations in the NEP and tried to incorporate some GGP elements that were complementary to that programme.

Performance

145. Our ToR ask: was there a clear link from partner plan to programme document to outcome? We answer this and other performance-related questions in this section. However we must note that we have not been provided with a programme document, only with the strategic framework. The UNIFEM programme document exists, but apparently there is no GP programme document, a significant gap already being filled for GGP III.

Link from programme document to action?

146. There have been three training events for partners – one in relation to results based management (RBM), two on M&E and reporting - which means that all partners have been trained in UNIFEM’s reporting format, which correlates their activities and results to intended programme outcomes. Unfortunately **some partners merely reproduce the GGP strategic plan indicators and outcomes without customising them to their context and therefore illustrating how (if at all) their own specific programs relate to and/or have contributed to the particular GGP outcome area** they are intervening in.

147. This was the case with the Federation of Women Groups, which claimed to have ensured “*engendered district development plans*”, but did not furnish evidence of this. They also claimed to have been responsible for affirmative action in party manifestos but did not state which ones and/or furnish evidence of how specifically they had influenced a political party to incorporate affirmative action policies. In this they reflect the broader problem faced with programme-level evaluation of GGP: the near-impossibility of attribution, coupled with noble and high-level aims (and, sometimes, claims).
148. **At the UNIFEM level there was no evidence (beyond ensuring that they followed the reporting format) that UNIFEM attempted to verify these claims.** In the case of ACEGA they reproduced the general GGP objectives and did not break them down at all. It was impossible to tell from their proposal the specific goal and objectives of their own program; the indicators they used were generic e.g. “number of women in leadership positions” as opposed to specifying concrete targets. One of the sources of this problem may be that UNIFEM’s RBM training did not speak to the issue of objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) as opposed to just ‘indicators’. This may have led to partners who had no previous background in RBM not appreciating the need to not only have results but furnish objectively verifiable evidence of the results.

Progress towards achieving outcomes

149. The question ‘**is there visible progress towards achieving outcomes**’ is simply impossible to answer – with any confidence – given the absence of baseline data and the poorly designed logframe and its contents. There is only sufficient data to assess whether UNIFEM is on course with respect to outcome 1 – increased representation - which is on course, though whether this is due to GGP or not is impossible to determine. Certainly we can say that GGP played a significant role in this area, and positive change has followed.
150. As far as the other outcomes are concerned, **it is difficult to determine progress towards their achievement due to the lack of data.** UNIFEM is largely on course with respect to the diversity aspect of outcome 2. In respect of other aspects of outcomes 2 and 3, and particularly 4, it is difficult to say either because of the lack of baseline data or because the strategic partnerships that would be necessary for their achievement do not appear to be in place. Detailed answers appear in the table below.

<i>Outcome 1: Institutional reforms provide space for women and provide affirmative action and quota systems for women that ensure that at least an increase by 50% of women in critical decision making positions by the end of 2007 and towards at least 30% of women in decision-making by the end of 2009³⁹</i>		
Related Outputs	Indicators	Progress Towards Achievement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Affirmative Action (AA) Policies for gender equality adopted by political parties. New Constitution includes Affirmative Action for gender equality in public sector. Political Party Funding 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of political parties with AA policies. Number of women who benefit from AA. Increase in numbers of women by 50% nominated by political parties to stand for 2007 elections compared to 2002 elections. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Affirmative action policies were adopted by all the major parties (though cannot be directly attributed to GGP) There is no sense as to the number of women who have benefited from AA The GGP operated at a time when the number of women nominated by political parties increased: no direct

³⁹ Outcomes are listed here in the order in which they appear in the Logical Framework not in relation to the objective that they relate to.

regulated.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revised electoral laws for AA. • Legal framework for implementing the AA guidelines within the public sector. 	<p>attribution is possible, but this is a victory the programme should claim.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are revised election laws for AA except in respect of the constitution. • There is no legal framework for implementing AA within the public sector • A Gender Rapid Response Unit was set up to respond to gender based violence and provide assistance in terms of media reporting, processing complaints to the police and prosecutions. Over 250 reports were received October-December 2007, though unclear if this had an impact in terms of institutional responses by the police and prosecutions department, over and above normal provision of security.
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Conclusion re Outcome 1: The achievement of outcome 1 is mostly on course, though whether or not the achievement of some of the indicators is attributable to the GGP (such as affirmative action policies in mainstream political parties) is debatable.

Outcome 2: Women in decision making within the public sphere increase by 50% by end of 2007 and to at least 30% representation in these institutions by 2009.

Related Outputs	Indicators	Progress Towards Achievement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase by at least 50% of women in elected positions in 2007 compared to 2002. • Increase by at least 30% of young women in leadership of student unions, community groups, & in public institutions (Cabinet, Boards of Statutory Institutions and Local Devolved Funds). • All public institutions (Cabinet, Boards of Statutory Institutions and Local Devolved Funds, Judiciary, Police, etc.) reflect at least 30% of women by 2009. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategies to implement AA • Policies include diversity of women (quota for women living with HIV/AIDS, disability, women from pastoralists communities). • Number of young women in leadership positions. • At least 36 members of 10th parliament are women. • Women civic candidates for all other elections increase by at least 50% from 2002. • Numbers of women in decision making to all Public Institutions reach 30% minimum representation. • Public policies provide guidelines to all public institutions on filling posts with women. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The number of elected women parliamentarians increased by 66% (there were 9 elected women parliamentarians in the 2002 parliament and 15 elected to the 10th Parliament). • Nominations to parliament took on board some diversity concerns such as women from pastoralist communities and this is directly attributable to the GGP. • It is not possible to state what the achievements are vis-à-vis young women since there is no baseline data on young women in positions of leadership pre- or post-intervention. • 21 members of the 10th Parliament are women; only 3 up from the number of women parliamentarians in the 10th Parliament. • Again it is difficult to state whether or not the numbers of women in decision-making has reached 30% due to the absence of baseline data and UNIFEM by its own admission is not monitoring numbers. • There is a directive from the President that 30% of all positions

		will be held by women; however guidelines have not yet been drafted or implemented.
<p>Conclusion re Outcome 2: the absence of baseline data makes it very difficult to measure progress towards the achievement of most of the aspects of outcome 2. The GGP is on course vis-à-vis increasing diversity in the types of women accessing leadership. However although more diverse groups of women are accessing leadership, it is questionable as to whether or not women's rights organisations and the women's movement itself have internalised principles of diversity. Were mechanisms in place to ensure that women's rights organisations began to engage with questions of discrimination and prejudice against women who face other forms of exclusion e.g. disability, ethnicity? In respect of the indicators where there is sufficient information to assess progress, UNIFEM is only on course for one.</p>		
<p><i>Outcome 3: Governance decision making in Kenya reflects increased resources to national priorities based on gender analysis of key needs, opportunities and challenges and supports women's social and economic security and to protect overall women's human rights</i></p>		
Related Outputs	Indicators	Progress Towards Achievement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least key ministries (water, agriculture, health, justice & constitution, education, youth) increase resources by at least 50% to bridge gender gaps and promote women empowerment in the respective sectors by 2009. Local devolved funds (CDF, LACTF, etc.) prioritize women's needs and provide resources to support women's livelihoods. District Plans are engendered with budgetary allocations for gender priorities. Emergency responses include the involvement of community women from affected areas to respond to women's needs, sustain women's livelihoods and rights in emergency situations, especially in drought affected areas of Kenya. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase in resource allocation of key ministries between 2007 – 2009 based on bridging gender gaps and gender analysis. Local devolved funds' allocation support community women priorities. Engendered district plans and resource allocation for implementation. Women's livelihoods in drought-affected communities are prioritised in budgetary allocation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is not clear what UNIFEM's monitoring framework is for the first and last indicators for this outcome and its implementation strategy given that GoK institutions are not GGP implementing partners. Nor does there appear to be a mechanism for facilitating partnership between GGP implementing partners and GoK institutions. The regional women's assemblies (Caucus) seem to be ensuring some progress with respect to access to devolved funds. Also in some locations where women were elected it resulted in increased numbers of women on CDF committees (e.g. Sotik). Women MPs were also reported to be more development conscious, at the constituency level as well as those named at the national level. Some partners claimed to have engendered district plans (Federation of Women Groups) but did not furnish evidence.
<p>Conclusion re Outcome 3: there is a need for a strategy to ensure that successful results vis-à-vis the outcome are not region or organisation specific but can be replicated throughout the country. Due to the lack of an overarching strategy the results vis-à-vis this outcome are dependent on the nature of the intervention by the implementing partner. Other than the second indicator, there is little evidence that this outcome is being achieved or that there is a clear strategy for its achievement complete with adequate implementation and monitoring mechanisms.</p>		
<p><i>Outcome 4: Broad based support across the provinces and communities of Kenya reflect the acceptance of women's leadership and principles of non-discrimination and equality.</i></p>		

Related Outputs	Indicators	Progress Towards Achievement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media projects a more favourable attitude towards women and leadership. • Community leadership structures (District Officials, Chiefs, traditional elders, etc.) frequently speak out in support of women’s leadership and gender equality. • GGP becomes a “brand” and reference for gender and governance in Kenya, and frequently called upon by key policy officials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular polls indicate a change of perception about women in leadership. • Women in leadership are frequently and positively profiled in the print and electronic media. • More and more “Op Eds” in newspapers promote the concept of equality in leadership. • Number of “hits” on the GGP website. • GGP Programme is branded and most people are familiar with what it means. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was increased visibility and knowledge about women in leadership and governance achieved through targeted media products. This was a result of capacity building of media, which led to the profiling of women leaders by mainstream media and a deliberate move by the media to be more gender balanced in their coverage. Implementing partners were also trained on mainstreaming media to give more coverage and portrayal of women’s leadership, and women aspirants also trained on effective media use. The GGP website was established and had received 7,039 hits by December 2007 • There was also change in attitude and perceptions towards electing women into leadership positions through various media programmes, such as the TV programme <i>Together on the Move</i> and community radio listening programmes. • There were some changes mentioned in relation to community level leadership structures (although there is no indicator for this it is an intended output - see below). In sites we visited, women are now holding the position of chief and/or assistant chief. Interestingly there are challenges to having women hold the position of village elder (perhaps because it is the most traditional form of leadership). In the Rift Valley there were instances where communities were willing to have a woman hold very high positions of leadership such as President, Cabinet Minister, MP and indeed had elected them to positions of MP but were <i>not</i> willing to have them as village elders. In Taveta on the other hand women’s leadership has been accepted at all levels.
<p>Conclusion re Outcome 4: there are insufficient indicators for the measurement of the progress towards achievement of this outcome. The indicators only relate to two of the outputs (the media and branding outputs). While the media outputs were quite successful at national level, there does not seem to have been engagement at the local level, and the branding of GGP as a programme was overtaken by other more resourced governance programmes (e.g. NCEP II) and also by the ‘hijacking’ of GGP media outputs and successes by political aspirants. There needs to be more strategic use of the media, given that it is key to achieving both public education and policy outcomes There are no indicators for</p>		

monitoring community leadership structures' attitudes towards women's leadership. There is also need to have a strategy to address cultural barriers to women's leadership as these were identified as being the greatest obstacle to women's leadership in all locations visited. Focus group participants did report greater acceptance of women's leadership – although this was not necessarily due to the GGP, however in locations where the GGP was being implemented, there was a deeper understanding of the value and acceptance of women's leadership, except in the Western Province.

Table 5: Summary of findings on progress towards achievement of outcomes

151. In conclusion, whilst the objectives of the GGP are related to key governance concerns, the focus has been on electoral concerns. The indicators set have also been for an electoral rather than governance programme. There is need to revise the logical framework and indicators as well as institute a comprehensive strategy for the achievement of the *governance* objectives of the programme.

What helps and what hinders progress?

152. There were three internal factors that emerged as helping progress towards the achievement of the programme's goal, objectives and outcomes. These were:

- The decision to implement the programme on a national scale.
- Complementarity (where it existed) of the GGP programmes with implementing partner programmes
- Implementing partner's experience in respect of the gender and governance sector.

153. The decision to implement the programme on a national scale has enhanced progress towards the achievement of its goal which is: *To transform leadership and governance at all levels in Kenya in order to deliver on poverty reduction, access to basic needs and equality between and among persons.*

154. There is a presence of GGP implemented programs in all the provinces in the country. **This has diversified the scope of women's rights organisations with the capacity to engage on questions of governance.** In one instance, WOKIKE in the North Eastern Province, the GGP implementing partner is the lead organisation in the governance sector. This worked to the advantage of GGP since the institution was already a trusted authority on the issue of governance.

155. The national nature of the program has also brought on board **voices of diverse constituencies of women** – two of the intended outcomes of the program (outcomes 2 and 4). This in turn has enhanced the achievement of objective 4 which includes, *inter alia*, “*spearhead and transform policies, programmes and resources allocation*” with the intended output of *Local devolved funds (CDF, LACTF, etc.) prioritize women's needs and provide resources to support women's livelihoods.*

156. Focus group participants asserted that **women leaders tend to prioritise development concerns and are more prone towards issue-based politics.** Women in leadership were generally said to be more development-conscious and it was observed by most participants that they had largely not been implicated in corruption – **this perception of women as being clean and accountable has led to a perception that they are better managers of communal resources and more trustworthy.** This is a key resource that should be used effectively by GGP III.

157. In the case of marginalised communities where GGP-implemented programs had led to women being placed in positions of national leadership such as parliament, the women leaders were said to have delivered and placed constituent's concerns on the national agenda in a way in which previous male incumbents had not. **This is a key success.** In Taveta Constituency for example, where the incumbent MP, Honourable Dr. Naomi Shabaan is a woman and to whose re-election GGP contributed – constituents noted that she has delivered on her promises. She not only developed a manifesto but an accountability mechanism for it – she had published calendars with her electoral promises on them, which constituents were encouraged to tick beside what she delivered on.
158. **By going national the GGP has created an opportunity for women from historically marginalised communities to showcase their leadership abilities.** Speaking about Honourable Sophia Abdi Noor, the first woman from the North Eastern Province to become a parliamentarian participants in the Garissa, focus group participants had the following to say:
- All these years we have voted for men – now we have a woman who was nominated to Parliament and she is the first MP to ever bring an ambassador to our province. She had the humility to travel by road even the ambassador travelled by road, from here to Ijara, to see how we live⁴⁰. I do not think that the ambassador would have come by road if she was not a woman. All these men we have voted for over forty years and they never bother to come and see how we are faring. A woman is nominated not only does she travel in the way that we do – she brings another woman. Women are more concerned about our welfare.*
159. **Where GGP-funded projects were found to be complementary to a previously existing program being implemented by a partner, it seemed to also enhance the achievement of results of the GGP project.** Complementarity was particularly important given the fact that amounts of money available for GGP funded projects were often perceived to be small for the nature of interventions that implementing partners felt needed to be undertaken in order to achieve the programme's goals.
160. Some of the ways that partners dealt with small budgets was by **designing programs that would complement and be complemented by existing programs.** For example the Education Centre for Women in Democracy (ECWD) intervention in Sotik Constituency was enhanced by the fact that they had a pre-existing paralegal project in the area. The paralegal project provided an entry point for discussing issues pertaining to constitutional, institutional and legal reform. The Coalition on Violence Against Women (COVAW) deliberately chose to intervene in geographical locations where they had worked previously and therefore had baseline data on gender and governance concerns and needs.
161. **Finally, implementing partner's experience in respect of the gender and governance sector as well as history in a geographical area in which they were intervening were factors that positively contributed towards the progress of achievement intended outcomes.** ECWD, for example, has had a presence in Sotik for over ten years. As mentioned earlier WOKIKE is a leading governance

⁴⁰ The road from Garissa to Ijara is notoriously bad, it is virtually non-existent and constituents have been complaining about it for a long time.

organisation in the NEP and is one of the lead institutions for implementing Uraia and other governance related interventions in the region. The Caucus has a long track record in undertaking gender and governance programs. Six of the fifteen women elected to the 10th Parliament were running in constituencies where ECWD was implementing GGP funded projects.

162. External factors that are contributing to the achievement of the GGP goal include:
 - The existence of FM stations (independent media).
 - The presence of other governance programs e.g. Uraia.
 - Pre-existing gender friendly programs and policies such as affirmative action policies.
 - Having a woman parliamentarian especially if she had been in the 9th Parliament and had delivered as contrasted to the consistent failure of male leadership.
 - Partnerships between youth and women seeking elective office
163. Independent media, such as FM radio stations, were a positive external contributing factor in progress towards achievement of the GGP objectives, bolstering the work of the GGP media partners. FM stations provided alternative information on governance, especially if there was a governance program in the area that was promoting alternative perceptions of transformative leadership. When focus group participants were asked what **factors had contributed towards a positive change in attitude towards women's leadership one of the factors that was consistently mentioned was independent FM stations.**
164. Again **the presence of other governance programs** emerged as a key factor in enhancing the progress towards the achievement of the GGP objectives. Both the existence of FM stations and other governance programs such as Uraia were mentioned as promoting alternative perceptions of transformative leadership in areas where the GGP was being implemented and those in which it was not but a woman had been elected. Incidentally Kakamega in Western Province, where there was not much evidence of a positive change in attitudes towards women's leadership (and yet is in a district in which the GGP is supposed to be being implemented), is the one location where FM stations and other governance programs were not mentioned as factors influencing positive images of women's leadership.
165. **Other governance sector actors in Kakamega also did not know that the GGP partners in the region were implementing a gender and governance programme.** GGP visibility in Kakamega was therefore low – given that this is the provincial headquarters it raises doubts about programme visibility in the province generally. **In Eldoret South Constituency where there was no GGP implementing partner and a woman was elected, Uraia and governance programs implemented by the Anglican Church of Kenya through the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCK) were identified by focus group participants as contributing positively towards changes in attitude towards women as leaders.**
166. Pre-existing gender responsive and affirmative action policies were also identified as being a contributing factor towards achievement of the GGP's objectives. In Eldoret South Constituency, it emerged that during its interventions re the clashes in the early 1990s, the **ACK had a deliberate policy of having women hold positions of leadership. KANU also had a policy of affirmative action around 1997** in which

wards were asked to nominate women. Participants in the focus groups in the constituency cited these **early experiences of affirmative action as having exposed them to women's leadership potential**. Despite the lack of a GGP programme being implemented in the area they had a very positive attitude towards women in leadership. Anti female genital mutilation campaigns in the Rift Valley and Taveta had also given women opportunities to develop skills around community mobilisation against discriminatory practices.

167. **Having had a woman MP** in the 9th Parliament **who delivered** was also an enhancing factor, especially given the failure of decades of male leadership. This was cited in both the constituencies where women had been elected and the GGP was being implemented (Sotik and Taveta) and the one where a woman had been elected but no GGP was being implemented (Eldoret South) as well as in Dujis, North Eastern Province, where GGP was being implemented but no woman was elected. Although a woman was not elected in Dujis (none was running) focus group participants felt that the man who had been elected was responsive to women's concerns and stated that **he had campaigned on a ticket of supporting gender equality**. Furthermore several women (for the first time) had been nominated at the civic level and had also won civic seats.

168. So enamoured were the constituents of Taveta of their MP and the work that she has undertaken in their constituency that the evaluator never got round to asking the question "*would you vote for a woman as your president?*" One man who said that he previously would never have voted for a woman but was so impressed by Hon. Dr. Shabaan's achievements during her first term as an MP that he started campaigning for her second term in 2005 two years ahead of the December 2007 election. He volunteered his opinion that if Kenya had just 30 women MPs he believes that Taveta would be like London and the country would be a first world country. He then went on to state that if he was asked to vote for a woman as president he would not only do so but campaign for her.

169. In the Rift Valley, focus group participants said:

We've had very wealthy people running for office over here. Some of them are so rich they campaign in helicopters and could afford to buy all of our votes, but what have they delivered for us?

170. So impressive has the track record of women who have been in leadership that asked if she would vote for a woman president an old woman in Garissa (who said that she would not have voted for a woman prior to the training she had received from Womankind through their GGP intervention) had this to say:

Would I vote for a woman as president? If there was a woman who was running for the presidency, I would strip off these clothes, because they are heavy, and travel all over this country campaigning for her. I have learnt that men only love you on two nights when they want to sleep with you or if they want your vote. After that they just beat and harass you. I believe it is only a woman who can address the issues of women. I am bitter with men and the way that they have been treating women that's why I would go out of my way for a woman who wanted to be president. I have understood the purpose of leadership.

171. Some of the internal factors that have hindered the success of the GGP include:
- The programme design did not take on board key gender and governance issues relevant in the Kenyan context
 - Weak M&E framework resulted in uninformed interventions
 - The programme’s mapping strategy resulted in uneven implementation
 - Delays in disbursements and roll out of the programme
 - The small amounts of money disbursed relative to the scale of the challenges faced.
172. The GGP was intended to broaden the objectives of the EPPP and was designed based on the findings of an evaluation of the EPPP. The first identifiable hindrance to broadening the governance space in respect of gender equality, is the **GGP’s conceptualisation and design**. As was noted in interviews with women in the governance sector as well as implementing partners, Kenya has a unique situation – **unlike neighbouring East African states the numbers of women in decision making in Kenya are extremely low**. This is in part attributable to the absence of affirmative action policies and laws, which exist in all other East African states.
173. In addressing gender and governance in Kenya therefore there is need **to develop a Kenyan specific program that takes on board the unique dynamics of the Kenyan context. This should not be misinterpreted to mean GGP is an externally designed programme, but to mean it needs a very thorough grounding in the realities of politics that partners (and women) face on the ground, which in turn demands localised specificity**. Aside from addressing the issues of policy, law and institutional reform, a Kenyan-specific program must have a clear strategic focus on numbers. GGP focused on numbers at one level, but cloaked it in the language of governance transformation. Proponents of this critique argue that the EPPP had a concrete strategy for addressing the issue of numbers and so produced results - increased women in the 9th Parliament.
174. The GGP approach to the question of numbers is ambivalent. On the one hand there is a stated desire to increase the numbers of women in decision making in Kenya and yet there is **no baseline data**; no provisions for needs assessments or baseline surveys; and a PFMA member who told us they do not “*focus on numbers*” in their monitoring despite several quantitative indicators contained in the programme’s logical framework.⁴¹ In our view, a simple and unambiguous statement about the overall objective of GGP would go a long way to clarifying this confusion and ambiguity.
175. The second design question that arises in respect of the GGP and which directly affects its implementation is that of its **weak monitoring and evaluation framework**.

Logframe

176. In this section of the report we critically analyse the logical framework, as provided in GGP’s Strategic Plan, and make recommendations as to how the framework can be improved. It is important to note at the outset that whilst there are many different approaches to Logical Frameworks, and it is up to the programme to decide which approach it wants to use, the characteristic they all share is that they are consistent

⁴¹ This, we are assured, is *not* a UNIFEM position but the views of the specific respondent.

with the terminology they use and that they provide a certain logic to the hierarchy employed. It is the view of the evaluation team that the existing framework does not comply with basic principles of logical frameworks as outlined in, for example, the European Commission’s Manual on Project Cycle Management (2004)⁴². We therefore provide detailed comment below in order for the programme to give careful thought as to how best to revise the framework in order that it conforms to accepted practice.

177. It is worth recalling the purpose of a logical framework:

A tool that has the power to communicate the essential elements of a complex project clearly, and succinctly throughout the project cycle. It is used to develop the overall design of a project, to improve project implementation monitoring, and to strengthen project evaluation. In essence the Logframe is a “cause and effect” model of project interventions to create desired impacts for the beneficiaries.⁴³

178. In other words, the construction of such a framework is not a desktop and/or theoretical exercise but rather, if done properly, it provides a useful robust instrument with which to monitor ongoing progress of the programme.

Objective and purpose

179. The project’s **overall objective(s)** is stated in the GGP’s Strategic Plan:

	GGP Logical Framework	Comment
Objective	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To support Constitutional, Legal, Policy and Institutional reform for gender equality, non-discrimination and the equal participation of women in all governance structures in Kenya. 2. To increase options, choices and capacities for Kenyan women in order to enhance women’s organizing, leadership, influencing and participation for gender equality, human rights and democratic governance. 3. To strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities. 4. To strengthen the knowledge and capacities on women CSOs on gender and governance and positioned them to spearhead & transform policies, programmes and resource 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Usually in projects and programmes of this nature the overall objective is to contribute to an aspect of the country’s growth and development/ poverty relief strategy. Initially this would have been the ERS, but now Vision 2030. ▪ Typically a programme has only one overall objective or Programme goal, which talks to the higher consequence of this programme. It is inappropriate for a programme to have more than one objective. Multiple objectives create confusion and often lead to poorly defined roles and responsibilities. ▪ The four objectives provided in this logical framework would be better suited at the outcome/ result area of the framework. In other words, the four objectives provide the four central building blocks for GGP, and thus these are the four organising principles under which the key

⁴² European Commission (2004). *Project Cycle Management Guidelines*, Volume 1. European Commission: Brussels.

⁴³World Bank (2005). *The Logframe Handbook: A Logical Approach to Project Cycle Management*. World Bank: Washington, DC.

allocation as well as provide empowerment support actions to women in Kenya.	activities will be managed.
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Table 6: Logframe objectives: comment

- 180. Normally the overall programme goal or overall objective for a programme would be assessed by an indicator that speaks to the ultimate impact of the programme. **No indicator has been provided at this level in the existing GGP logical framework.** For instance, if it is agreed that the overall objective of GGP is to contribute to Vision 2030, then the indicators should point out, in a quantifiable manner, the nature of this contribution. Thus the indicator needs to signal the extent to which the benefits of the programme can be shared by more than just the direct beneficiaries of the programme. The indicators should also indicate the long-term benefits of the programme
- 181. Below the goal or objective of a programme would normally be found the **purpose of the programme.** This statement provides the final goal of the programme, and typically highlights the specific problem the intervention will address. Often the purpose describes why the programme or project is required and what benefit the direct beneficiaries will get out of it. This is not a semantic issue, the programme purpose is the key point of reference, the ‘true centre of gravity’ for programme management, **which permits measurement of the programme’s success or failure in terms of sustainable benefits for the beneficiaries.**
- 182. Again a programme would typically have **only one purpose to avoid confusion and conflict that multiple purposes typically engender.** A project/programme purpose would also have indicators associated with it, which would signal the overall impact of the programme to the direct beneficiaries. Typically the indicators would speak to the reason for the programme’s existence and thus demonstrate that the final outcome of the programme will address the specific needs of the beneficiaries.
- 183. The absence of high-level objectives and matched indicators, coupled with (as noted elsewhere) various ‘vision’ and ‘mission’ statements, strongly suggest a **confused programme design.** There are multiple objectives but no overarching objective, and no theoretical framework (and thus no sound logical framework) holding the whole entity together.

Programme outcomes and indicators

- 184. In the current GGP logframe the terms *outcomes* and *outputs* are used. It is important to note that one would usually only refer to outcomes or results at this particular level in the logical framework hierarchy. Outputs are merely the products or deliverables of the intervention (key activities), whereas an outcome is the product or effect of a series of outputs. Thus when determining the outcomes or end results of the activities, one should ensure that they:
 - Are often phrased as services delivered to the direct beneficiaries;
 - Usually stated as the end-of-project/programme-milestone achieved through the implementation of each component;

- Are generally the responsibility of the project/programme team for ensuring the delivery of the results as part of good project design, and good implementation planning and delivery; and
- For simplicity and clarity of the logic, there should be one result statement for each corresponding project component.

185. The project's **outcomes** as stated in the GGP's Strategic Plan:

	GGP Logical Framework	Comment
Outcome 1	Institutional reforms provide space for women that ensure an increase by at least 50% of women in elected positions in 2007 and at least 30% representation of women in all decision making in the public sector by end of 2009	This statement is that of a good indicator (or output) but is not appropriate as an outcome as it begs the question "so what will be the result or outcome of this increase in the representation of women?" – the fundamental question GGP should answer, but fails to do so
Outcome 2	Women in decision making within the public sphere increase by 50% by end of 2007 and to at least 30% representation in these institutions by 2009	Similar to Outcome 1, and what will be the result or outcome of this increase in the representation of women?
Outcome 3	Governance decision making in Kenya reflects increased resources to national priorities based on gender analysis of key needs, opportunities and challenges and supports women's social and economic security and to protect overall women's human rights	This powerful statement could be adapted slightly to become the overall purpose of the programme
Outcome 4	Broad based support across the provinces and communities of Kenya reflect the acceptance of women's leadership and principles of non-discrimination and equality	This statement also refers to the purpose of the programme and could be combined with Outcome 3 to make a single powerful purpose statement for GGP

Table 7: Logframe outcomes: comment

186. **It is the opinion of the evaluation team that the four items currently listed as objectives would be better placed being referred to as outcomes (or Results) and that the existing four outcomes either be subsumed into these four objectives or reworded to become appropriate indicators at this level within the framework.**

187. At present the logical framework lists about 3 or 4 outputs per outcome, in addition to 4 to 6 indicators per outcome. In certain instances the indicator and the output are effectively the same thing, for instance under Outcome 1:

- **Output:** New Constitution includes Affirmative Action for gender equality in public sector
- **Indicator:** New Constitution with AA

188. And in other instances the Outcome and the output are remarkably similar, for instance under Outcome 2:

- **Outcome 2:** Women in decision making within the public sphere increase by 50% by end of 2007 and to at least 30% representation in these institutions by 2009
- **Output:** Increase by at least 50% of women in elected positions in 2007 compared to 2002.

189. We would recommend that in order for GGP to rectify this confusion associated with outputs and indicators two important steps need to happen. **One, determine why it is necessary to have both outputs and indicators** (we would argue only indicators are necessary) and then eliminate the existing overlap between outputs and indicators. **Two, use this process to prioritize which indicators will be measured.**
190. **At present, if the logical framework remains in its current form, GGP will need to measure 13 outputs and 21 indicators, 34 measures in all. And do so in a context where no baseline data exists. Moreover, some of these measures are fairly complex and will require enormous energy and resources in order to measure them fully.** We would suggest that 3 to 4 measures per outcome area, i.e. no more than about 12 indicators in total is usually sufficient for a programme of this nature.
191. It is also important to remember that indicators, as the definition implies, are about measurement. Indicators define and measure the goals of the programme. **They highlight for us the successful accomplishment of our intervention and they are usually a description of results, but they are certainly not the conditions necessary to achieve them.** Therefore the indicators have to be phrased in a manner that signals what is being measured and by when (typically indicators include the dimensions of quality, quantity and time). Whilst certain of the existing indicators in the GGP logframe are robust measures, a number of others are not and are simply too vague, examples include:
- Revised electoral laws for AA (Is there a target? If so what is it and by when?)
 - Local devolved funds' allocation support community women priorities (Again, is there a target? Which priorities?)
 - Number of women who benefit from AA (How will this be defined and measured?)
192. In other instances, the existing indicators in the GGP logframe are orientated towards actual activities (e.g. number of AA policies, number of 'op-eds', number of district plan and the like) and **do not signal the outcomes of such activities.** For instance, what will be the outcome of an 'op-ed' piece? Similarly, the outcome of AA policies is going to be what?
193. One final point about the indicators is that indicators must be specific about what is being measured and also be relevant to the outcome or result that is being measured. Whilst in many instances there is a strong link between the stated outcome and the measures, in one particular instance the link is a tenuous one at best:
- **Outcome 4:** Broad based support across the provinces and communities of Kenya reflect the acceptance of women's leadership and principles of non-discrimination and equality
 - **Indicators:** Number of 'hits' on GGP website and GGP Programme is branded and most people are familiar with what it means.

Assumptions

194. Assumptions in the logframe can be seen in the table below:

GGP Logical Framework		Comment
Outcome 1	▪ That Constitution will be reviewed prior to 2009.	These are appropriate assumptions for this programme

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ That 2007 elections are held. 	
Outcome 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ That Affirmative Action Policies will be passed within the Constitution before 2009. ▪ That AA/Quota policies are adapted by Political Parties for the 2007 elections. ▪ That enough women stand for elections in 2007 	These too are appropriate assumptions for the programme
Outcome 3	That increase in women's representation, strengthening of women as a key constituency and mass campaigns for gender equality and women's empowerment influence public policy	This assumption lies at the heart of the programme. If this assumption is incorrect it would negate the very essence of GGP. It is therefore not appropriate to have this assumption in the logframe, for the simple reason that if these gender focused activities do not shape public policy than either the programme must consider different activities and/or radically reshape the intervention it is engaged in.
Outcome 4	No assumption provided	An assumption is required here that would address any assumptions the programme has made with respect to the media.

Table 8: Logframe assumptions and comment

195. The table above has noted where the existing assumptions are appropriate and where they are not. The key point to remember about assumptions is that some sort of risk analysis must have been done which will allow GGP to manage the risks that may present themselves if these assumptions prove to be incorrect.

Risk analysis

196. No risk analysis exists. This is commented on elsewhere in the report; suffice to say that risk analyses are often regarded as irritating 'extras' that serve no useful purpose. The post-election violence, the effects of ethnicity, the failure to actually get more women elected, and so on should all point to the fact that a risk analysis is a key management tool that facilitates both a longer-term perspective and flexibility – both of which would (have and would still) benefit GGP.

Analysis

197. In summary, our review of the existing logical framework found the following:

- **At the Objective level** a single objective statement is needed in conjunction with a measurable indication as to how GGP will contribute to the key development policies in Kenya.
- **At the Purpose level** a single statement needs to be developed which refers to the final goal of GGP and thus also highlights the specific problem GGP is addressing.
- **At the Outcome/result level** there is confusion over the terms outcomes and outputs. At present there is overlap between these terms and also with the indicators. This is likely to create confusion in terms of implementation and could lead to duplication of activities.

- **The Indicators** in the GGP logframe largely comply with the accepted practice of indicator development, but there are also a number of indicators that are vague (and therefore cannot be measured) or are in fact activities and thus speak only to the outputs of the project but not the outcomes (at the result level one measures outcomes whilst at the activity level one measures project outputs). We also found too many indicators and would strongly recommend that they be prioritized and simultaneously reduced in number.
- **The assumptions** are mostly appropriate and speak to the risks the project faces, however an assumption is needed for Outcome 4.
- **At the activity level** the GGP logframe lists interventions at this level, which are reasonable and need not be modified.

198. Taking the above into account, we argue that **there are strategic benefits to be gained for GGP if it were to revise the existing logical framework**. Conversely there is a downside for the project if it were to retain the existing logical framework. The arguments are summarised below.

STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF REVISED LOGICAL FRAMEWORK	DOWNSIDE OF KEEPING CURRENT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
An objective that is clearly linked to the Vision 2030 allows the project to mobilise government and donor support in the future	If links are not made to Vision 2030 it may be difficult for the management of the project to justify their existence to important role players in Kenya and gain political protection, acceptability and so on.
Single purpose keeps project focussed and thus easier to co-ordinate and manage.	Multiple purposes disperse the focus of the programme, exacerbates confusion over roles and responsibilities and often leads to duplication of activities.
Clearly defined results (or outcomes) mean there is no ambiguity about whether results have been delivered or not.	Poorly defined results makes it difficult to assess the achievements or otherwise of the programme. If the programme is unclear about its impact it cannot justify its existence.
The better defined the project the more likely it will provide benefits to the women of Kenya	An unclear logical framework means management responsibilities are unclear and this will likely lead to poor decisions being made.
Measurable indicators facilitate effective reporting and thus ensure the programme is accountable.	Indicators that are not measurable leads to limited learning about progress, opportunities and problems and thus limited capacity to correct either strategy or implementation.
A revised logical framework will provide the foundations for an M&E system that will: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ensure that day-to-day decisions are data-driven, ▪ guide the overall strategy, give early warnings, ▪ provide a mechanism for systematic learning from experience, ▪ develop a ‘Culture of monitoring’, and ▪ thereby make a space for all voices to be heard and valued. 	Monitoring systems are developed in order to monitor what the project set out to accomplish. If the road map is vague and poorly constructed not only will the project probably get lost, but it will only discover this once it is too late.

Table 9: Strategic benefits of revising the logframe

199. Given the above comments the GGP logframe could be modified along the following lines:
- The **Overall Objective** is linked to Vision 2030 or equivalent
 - The **Purpose** is created out of an amalgamation of the four objectives
 - The **Result** areas remain as the 4 existing outcome areas – provided they address the points raised above in this regard.
 - The **Indicators** are reviewed and revised to eliminate the existing overlap with the outputs provided in the framework and reduced in number. All indicators must be measurable, with achievable targets (including targets that speak specifically to youth and those in the rural areas). Ideas for indicators could include:
 - At the **objective level** the indicators should be measured in terms of growth and development in Kenya, and must therefore remain those specified in the MGDS
 - At the **purpose level** the indicators should speak to high-level outcomes e.g. gender equality, non discrimination and women representation.
 - At the **outcome/ result level**, the indicators should speak to the outcome of the different activities under each result area, and should be of equality to some of the existing indicators such as % increase by 2009 in the number of women in leadership or % increase in funds allocated by key ministries to bridge gender inequality gaps by 2009
 - Once this exercise of reviewing and revising indicators has been completed then the new indicators will need to be linked to appropriate, valid and reliable means of verification (MOVs) as specified in the current *GGP Monitoring and Evaluation Plan* (August 2007).
 - The existing assumptions are retained except for Outcome 3, which requires rethinking in line with the comments made above.
200. We note elsewhere **the absence of baseline data** – a situation inherited by UNIFEM but not changed during its tenure – forcing us to question how knowledge-based decision-making can occur, when there is no substantive way of measuring progress. We have also noted elsewhere **the complete absence of a risk analysis**, which should be a core component of a strategic framework for a programme operating in as sensitive an environment as GGP.

The effects of a weak logframe – lessons from the field

201. **Without baseline data and needs assessments**, key contributory factors to the program’s success or failure may be missed. **In fact the whole intervention rationale is lost as it is not clear why UNIFEM and GGP partners choose to intervene in any particular location** and the nature of the intervention is *ad hoc* for it is **not premised on the identified needs of the community but potentially arbitrary factors**.
202. **Another consequence of UNIFEM’s non-standard logical framework approach is that there is no clear linkage between the GGP’s intended outcomes and the programme’s goal and objectives**. Activities are output based as opposed to being clearly and directly linked to the programme’s objectives and ultimately the goal. This raises the question of **whether the activities are being driven by the programme’s underpinning ideology or theoretical framework, or vice versa**.

203. **Unsurprisingly, partners have been unable to internalise reporting formats** and despite brief introductory trainings on M&E during the inception training and programme reviews, are still not reporting in the manner UNIFEM wants. Some partner reports reflect a lack of distinction between intended outputs and actual results. Others seem unable to customise their own projects so that they are able to show in what specific way their particular programmes contribute to the GGP goal. Due to the fact that there is no distinction made in the UNIFEM matrix between objectively verifiable indicators and ‘indicators’, several partners are reporting results without furnishing evidence.
204. Some partners seem to **confuse the fact that an activity has taken place with the intended impact of the activity and in some instances have not put in place a mechanism for assessing the impact of their activities**. The Young Women’s Leadership Institute (YWLI) for example reported having conducted a “*street bash*” and that there was “*increased awareness by the participants and communities on the importance of taking part in the electoral processes*” yet there is no indication of how this “*increase in awareness*” was measured. The “*street bash*” cost Kshs. 360,000 yet “*15 youth registered*” as voters! One could argue that Kshs. 24,000 per youth voter registered is rather dear. There is no indication of how many people were reached overall. There is also no data from previous years so one has no knowledge of whether these were more or less youth than normally register as voters when the ECK visits Machakos and whether the only difference is that these youth had fun whilst registering!
205. **The GGP’s weak M&E framework is coupled with a poor mapping strategy. Mapping was conducted purely on a geographical basis** – individual institutional strengths and capacities were not taken on board. Since no needs assessments were conducted, the nature of interventions could not account for identified needs in the community and were wholly dependent on the intervening implementing partner’s approach (other than where they had their own data). If the implementing partner was one that conducted needs assessments then they were quite clear on why they were intervening in a particular region and using the strategy that they had chosen – but if not, not. **The consequence is uneven implementation of the GGP that is not necessarily responsive to the needs of ‘beneficiary communities’.**
206. **There is no consistent strategic rationale for the choice of the particular constituencies in which GGP implementing partners are working.** The rationales vary from ‘we had been working in that area for a long time and wanted to continue working there’; to ‘we conducted a needs assessment and found that there was a need for this type of a programme’; to ‘this is an underserved area’; to ‘there were other organisations working in the areas we wanted to go to and UNIFEM (or AAK depending on the date) did not allow us to intervene in the area we wanted to go to’. Given that there is no standard requirement that interventions be informed interventions and that UNIFEM’s baseline data is highly limited, there is sometimes a mismatch between the needs of beneficiary communities and the nature of intervention greatly hampering the efficacy of the program. **These are very negative findings, emanating from fieldwork across the country.**
207. **UNIFEM’s own data on who is implementing what and where is also inaccurate.** In respect of Ikolomani, for example, there are meant to be three organisations on the ground (Caucus, FASI and the YWCA). In interview it emerged at least one (the

Caucus) had never been assigned to that region. Again the Caucus is listed for Shinyalu, in which it has never worked. The CPAK, working in Shinyalu, is not listed as doing so. The woman candidate in Marakwet East constituency is listed as being in Marakwet West. And so on. **These errors raise concerns about the efficiency of the programme's monitoring framework.**

208. There is an unstated assumption underpinning GGP that there is uniformity in the gender and governance needs of Kenyan communities, and that there is no specific technical capacity advantage acquired through years of undertaking gender and governance work. **Thus organisations with no demonstrable track record in the gender and governance sectors were implementing complex programmes with indeterminable results, alongside others with expertise who did deliver.** Quite unsurprisingly in at least one instance a region of the country which has always elected women parliamentarians was unable to produce even one in the first election where there was actually a programme in place to increase the numbers of women parliamentarians! Yet regions in which the programme was not being implemented and deeply entrenched patriarchal practises produced several women parliamentarians; which suggests strong contributory factors outside the programme. This should be cause for reflection, and possibly for concern.
209. Due to the challenges with respect to the first PFMA, it took over a year for the programme to roll out and even when it did the money was still coming in late according to partners, **resulting in what were originally one year activities being cut down to nine or even six months.** Partners also complained that the grant sizes were too small to achieve some of the kinds of results desired (though this is scarcely an original complaint). In one case, a partner noted that the grant amount was only sufficient for the mobilisation of 1,500 women to register as voters in a constituency with over 50,000 registered voters, and therefore anticipated that the ultimate impact would be extremely limited. Furthermore there was **no money allocated for monitoring**, this was a carry over of the period when AAK was the PFMA. Under that arrangement organisations applied as parts of coalitions and one organisation would be responsible for taking the lead vis-à-vis monitoring.
210. As evaluators we are sympathetic to the situation UNIFEM was placed in, having to take over as PFMA with work already happening, and make it happen faster and within budget. But that phase has passed now – the programme *must* pause, take stock, correct errors large and small, and only go forward when all role-players are confident that they have ‘got it right’.
211. At the community level, **mobilisers complained about insufficient funding for logistical needs.** Some geographical areas have serious logistical challenges. There is no road between Mwatate and Taveta for example, therefore it takes over 2 hours in a four wheel drive vehicle to cover an 80km distance and public transport in this area is extremely rare and costly. The road between Kakamega and Kisumu is 60km but again in an extremely poor condition and again a 2 hour drive in a four wheel drive vehicle. The North Eastern Province is vast and only one CSO was working in the area. In the Rift Valley the road from Eldoret to Kericho is over 200km. **GGP needs to plan and account for the kinds of developmental and logistical challenges partners outside of Nairobi have to contend with.**

212. Yet the historical marginalisation of these areas does present a **unique opportunity for gender and governance institutions** as has been illustrated by WOKIKE, due to the conditions of underdevelopment most of these regions are underserved. In NEP WOKIKE was the only governance CSO. In Taveta there are no governance CSOs on the ground, the same applies in most of Western Province. In the Rift Valley one of the enhancing factors identified by focus group partners was that the “*women’s organisations came to the ground.*” Even so there was a concern about continuity since the interventions were short-term and related to the election year. There was no guaranteed funding for the longer-term interventions that supported the GGP programmes such as the paralegal programmes run by individual CSOs.

External factors

213. The external factors that were identified as hindering progress include:
- An entrenched patronage and ethno-chauvinistic political culture
 - Personality-based politics
 - Cultural and religious barriers
 - Women’s poverty
 - Illiteracy and language barriers
214. Kenya’s political culture is patronage based and is not particularly concerned with equality or other citizens’ concerns. Women have limited access to these patronage systems. In some parts of the country citizens are rejecting this culture of politics, exemplified by the focus groups in the Rift Valley and Taveta, there isn’t yet a **critical mass of citizens moving towards an issue based politics**. As was noted by constituents in the Rift Valley:
- We realised that we were voting for men who took our money to Koinange Street, we thought that maybe if we vote for women they’ll bring the money back. Even in the home women always use their money for the family but men take theirs to the bars at the community centre.*⁴⁴
215. Secondly, **culturally entrenched patriarchal practises were an obvious barrier to women’s participation in governance**. Some examples include cultural practises that preclude women from speaking in public or on behalf of communities; or FGM and early marriage which disrupt girls’ education. **There is need to craft strategies that address cultural barriers to gender equality in governance structures**. These strategies need to take on the changing roles of women and men and emerging factors – for example, alcoholism was cited as a problem in several communities. In the focus groups, participants stated that alcoholism was causing a breakdown of communities and social structures – they identified men as being particularly vulnerable to alcoholism with women being left to bear the brunt of sustaining their families. In Taveta, it was observed that the increased presence of women in civic authorities had had a positive impact in this respect as they were apparently not as tolerant of brewing.
216. **Women’s poverty and lack of access to resources also had a negative impact on their lack of access to decision-making**. Poverty means that women who may want to run for public office lack the resources. It was suggested that there is need to incorporate an element that addresses women’s socio-economic status into gender and

⁴⁴ Koinange Street is Nairobi’s red light district.

governance programmes. GGP may not have to do this itself, but should facilitate engagement and debate with government structures about how to create a more level playing field. **Focus group participants felt that women's financial independence was directly linked to their ability to exercise their civil and political rights.** This is an aspect that would require greater investigation.

217. Finally there was a factor that emerged that hinders progress that is not clearly an internal or external factor. This is the issue of the type of awareness-raising and messaging that is provided regarding women's leadership. **There was a concern raised about generic and biologically deterministic messages that suggests that women are better leaders simply because of their biological attributes.** This may have a solid pedigree in feminist thinking, but does not encourage interrogation of the qualities of good leaders or good leadership.
218. There were concerns raised about the fact that now that there are increased leadership opportunities for women, male opponents exploit this by running 'decoy' female candidates against strong women candidates who they bribe to undermine the stronger women candidates' campaigns, and split the female vote. This creates a problem for community mobilisers, since under the GGP and given the UN, donor and CSO rules about neutrality, they are supposed to provide support for **all women** running for political office. They felt that there is need to have some criteria for the GGP to identify and focus on genuine and strong women candidates.
219. Illiteracy and language barriers were also barriers, a point that emerged in the workshop with implementing partners. The incidence of illiteracy in some areas is so high that conducting any civic training requiring functional literacy, is impossible. There was also a challenge in respect of entry points since the politics of the country is male dominated – hence a lot of hostility towards women's rights programmes. There were also reportedly instances where incumbent parliamentarians used their influence to prevent partners from undertaking their work.

Cross-cutting strategies?

220. The GGP Strategic Plan identifies five strategies/methods of work:
 - Advocacy and research based policy dialogue to reform institutional barriers that preclude women's access to governance.
 - Campaigns to change attitudes about the value of women's leadership.
 - Building capacities of women and strengthening their power of numbers as key constituency/voting bloc through organising, in principles of transformative leadership and in shaping decisions that will promote and protect women's human rights and security in their respective communities as leaders and as aspiring leaders.
 - Documentation of processes, lessons learnt and achievements and the dissemination of such knowledge.
 - Experimental activities to provide women with practical support to overcome institutional barriers to equal participation in governance, especially in politics.
221. The first and last strategies do not seem to have been utilised very much. Although there has been advocacy and policy dialogue under the GGP it is not clear to what extent it has been "*research based.*" This is one of the potential strengths that is not yet being exploited by UNIFEM and implementing partners. It is also not clear what

“experimental activities” have been engaged in to “*provide women with support to overcome institutional barriers*”. In essence the strategies and methods of work are excellent theoretically but do not seem to be being used let alone maximised.

Expenditure and outcomes

222. A quick look at **expenditure per expected outcomes** show that **the main area of expenditure was on media or means for increasing acceptance of women leadership**. The second largest spending was on **enhancing leadership capacities** of Kenyan women. Relatively **less was spent on legislative and policy reforms** – even though these are at the heart of transformed governance. Furthermore, it is apparent from all interviews that the programme paid more attention to parliamentary politics and glossed over local level or civic elections.
223. Many of those we talked to argued that some of the partners intended to focus on civic and local level issues but the mood of the nation saw them move away to parliamentary elections. Although flexibility is not a bad thing in itself, **changing course without focus leads to failure**. The programme appears to have nothing to account for with regard to civic or local level issues.

Expected outcomes and estimated budget allocation		
Expected outcome	Budget (US\$)	
Strengthen legislation, policy and institutional frameworks	188,105	9%
Enhance leadership capacities of Kenyan women	658,867	31%
Institutions’ accountability to women’s empowerment	340,603	16%
Increased acceptance of women’s leadership capabilities	958,041	45%
Total programme activities	2,145,616	100%

Table 10: Estimated budget by outcome (source: data provided by UNIFEM)

224. On the same note, there appear to have been no clear criteria for allocating resources to partners delivering different outputs. Our analysis of budget lines of implementing partners is shown in the accompanying table. **It is not clear what informed the allocation of budgets to the different outcomes.**
225. GGP II also appears to have **focused its attention on an event** – the 2007 elections – rather than absorb that event in an on-going process leading to transformed governance. The programme’s focus on the election meant that it **did not have a big picture**. An election is not a big picture unless one wants to focus on numbers to deliver to parliament. Because of the electoral obsession, we had many women candidates spread in different political parties including those where it was not possible to make a difference. In this regard, there was a tendency **to ‘spray and pray’** - a tendency to place many women candidates in different places and pray that it would result in something positive.
226. **The post-2007 election crisis requires that the programme begin with new forms of intervention.** The crisis was not necessarily triggered by arguments about a stolen election but by long-standing grievances including ethnicity, failed governance reforms, politics of exclusion and marginalisation of groups from power on ethnic

basis, competition over resources such as land, income inequalities, imbalances in regional development, and deepening poverty, among others. With such a broad array of causes of the post-election violence, **the programme has enormous space to be innovative and to move away from numbers.** Numbers of women in decision-making ought to be seen as a means rather than an end – and that end needs to be properly articulated and should guide how the next phase of GGP is shaped and what it does.

227. **A starting point should be support to initiatives that would lead to building an ideology-driven women's movement (beyond GGP).** This can be as simple as holding an on-going series of high-level public debates, lectures and seminars, gathering together decision-makers in and out of the women's movement to help start shaping a minimum package of agreed gender agenda items. But it should be accompanied by a bottom-up intervention that ensures women on the ground, as individuals and/or through their local structures, can engage with and help shape the terms and content of the debate. **Developing a common vision to which both young and old women leaders subscribe is critical in this regard.**
228. But such a movement must be radically distinct from past initiatives. It should not focus on numbers as an end – as is the case today – but should **focus on the comprehensive transformation of the state, its institutions and practise of politics. Eroding the basis of ethnic-based politics should be at the core of this movement.** GGP is not a women's movement in disguise – but its programmatic thrust and the work of its partners should be complementary to and supportive of the women's movement.
229. Related to this is the need to **connect gender struggles to other struggles for democratic governance in the broader society.** Struggles for accountable party politics, anti-corruption programmes and numerous other initiatives are of great significance in terms of gender and can add value if the programme were linked to them. Many of our respondents did indicate that they worked without reference to other initiatives and that GGP appeared de-linked from other governance programmes.

Financial management

230. The Terms of Reference for UNIFEM as a Programme and Financial Management Agent for GGP II required UNIFEM to disburse and account for donors' funds and advise partners on how to improve their financial management systems and procedures. The PFMA was required to provide financial backstopping to implementing partners in the area of financial reporting; formulation of requests; development of budgets in line with UN financial regulations; among others.
231. UNIFEM was required to undertake monthly spot checks on expenditure; provide semi-annual financial management statements to the DSC; and produce monthly financial status reports for each partner to the DSC.
232. The ToR for this evaluation requires us to assess the **value for money in relation to programme performance.** (More detailed financial analysis will presumably be undertaken by an auditor.) We note that this is an important aspect of any programme evaluation especially in relation to whether the programme is obtaining maximum

benefits from services provided through the PFMA. However, we also note that the PFMA has been in place for a very short time, disallowing any reasonable judgement beyond the immediate and short-term. **Value for money is better assessed over more time than UNIFEM has had as PFMA of GGP.**

233. Methodologically, a value for money analysis for a programme of this nature – national in scope and involving many partners; more than a cost-benefit analysis, involving qualitative and quantitative measures and conclusions – would require a separate evaluation rather than annexing it to a progress evaluation. Our recommendation at the outset is that the programme should commission a separate value for money evaluation if there is still a felt need for such information after our observations below. Such an evaluation should focus on the following:
- Economy of the programme – were things done at the best price?
 - Did the programme minimise the costs of doing business?
 - Was the programme doing things the right way?
 - Did the programme perform tasks with reasonable effort?
 - Did the programme do things right?
 - To what extent were objectives met using specified resources?
 - What does a cost-benefit analysis suggest?
 - Did UNIFEM provide value for money as PFMA (e.g. procurement, economies of scale, etc.)?
 - And so on.
234. Other parts of this report have attempted to address some of these issues but from a programmatic point of view. This section – bearing in mind the above caveat – discusses financial management aspects of the programme (from a programmatic perspective) and whether there was any value add. Of course such an undertaking is bound to generate misunderstandings. Financial management services in any programme are usually the subject of attacks, criticism and a site for cynics. Sometimes variables for value add are subjective and open to multiple interpretations. Others cannot be measured – they can only be described. What we discuss here therefore is an impression arising from our review of different documents and what different respondents told us.

Budget development and reporting

235. Our review of partner budgets shows that partners used different templates for developing their budgets. The budget lines are not standardised and there are variations in items being budgeted for. For instance, there are cases where some of the partners have budgeted for administrative costs while others have combined such costs with personnel costs. Still others identified such costs as institutional support costs, office space costs etc. We have identified cases where some of the budgets were in Kenyan shillings without a corresponding dollar line. We have also identified cases where the total costs in the funded proposal varied from the contract figure, without any explanatory note.
236. **The absence of a standard format for costing immediately opens spaces for uneven and inaccurate budgeting and creates opportunities for poor programme financial management.** It provides ‘errant partners’ with a considerable space for manoeuvring and possible abuse or mismanagement of funds. It makes monitoring of expenditure a difficult task. The programme must seek to fill these gaps. Future programme must be developed borrowing from lessons learnt in budget development

in this phase. **Future programmes must insist on identical formats and costs must be directly comparable across partners and thus open to analysis at programme level.**

237. We have also assessed the **timeliness of the reporting**. To do so, we circulated a simple questionnaire (in addition to the survey regarding programme issues) to implementing partners asking questions about contracting and disbursement of funds. Only 13 (of 32) partners completed this questionnaire. This response rate is not adequate to allow for generalisations on the efficiency of the programme. Table 11 shows the findings from this simple exercise, which we can regard as indicative if not representative.

Programme Activity				
Delay period	Application to contracting	Contracting to 1 st Instalment	Between 1 st Instalment & 1 st narrative submission	Between 1 st narrative submission 2 nd Instalment
No. CSOs affected				
One month	7	5	1	3
Two months	6	4	3	1
Three months		5	3	4
Four months		1	3	1
Five months		1	3	2
Six months	1		1	3
Seven+ months	2		2	2
Total CSOs	16	16	16	16

Table 11: Delay in programme activities

238. There were **delays between the period of applying for funds and contracting**. Six organisations experienced a delay of two months between the time they applied and the time they were contracted. Four organisations experienced a delay of about one month.
239. The period between contracting and receipt of first disbursement also witnessed delays. Four organisations experienced a delay of one month while another three had a two month delay. There are also some that waited for four months without the first instalment after they signed the contract.
240. **Delays between disbursement of the first and second instalment was significant**. We note elsewhere that a third of partners said that disbursement delays led directly to failure to implement activities. The time spent in accounting and subsequent submission of the first financial and narrative reports – for the first instalment – accounts for part of this delay. Even though this is the case, it is observed that some CSOs took over 6 months between submission of the first report and receipt of the 2nd instalment. **Several CSOs stayed without the 2nd instalment for over seven months from the time they received the first disbursement.**
241. Although this is a small sample size (a third of partners) from which we cannot make generalisations about timeliness of disbursements, **these delays should not have occurred in a programme that had only a lifespan of less than two years** (from the time UNIFEM took over from AAI-Kenya to December 2007). A delay of weeks

within such programme is costly in programmatic terms. Delays of six months comprise a quarter of the entire programme lifespan. It arrests pace of rolling out activities. It also has the effect of **demoralising service providers** many of whom may not be aware about the causes of delays in disbursements.

242. Some partners mentioned delays in disbursement of funds as one of the challenges they experienced. Asked whether UNIFEM paid the agreed funds at the agreed time, 41% said 'yes'. Most respondents (including PFMA and DSC members) point to cumbersome UNIFEM (i.e. UN) procedures as the main culprit. There have recently been moves to devolve some decision-making to the Kenyan UNIFEM office. **Speed of disbursement must be a contractual condition if UNIFEM is to remain as the PFMA: GGP III cannot begin in the knowledge that partners may be starved of funds for months due to cumbersome bureaucratic machinery.**
243. But the findings are disturbing on a different count. About 40% said UNIFEM staff never visited their offices for financial monitoring. A fifth (21%) said UNIFEM visited them annually (meaning only once in the life of this programme) and another 17% said UNIFEM visited them after every six months. These are disturbing findings because ensuring that donor funds are expended as per the budget requires not only review of returns but also physical spot checks. Moreover, **the ToR for the PFMA required UNIFEM to do monthly spot checks and provide partner financial reports on monthly basis. These requirements appear not to have been adhered to.** The goodwill and commitment of the PFMA are not in question; their capacity to perform contracted tasks on time and evenly across the programme, however, do seem to have been found wanting.

Programme costs

244. We have made an attempt to analyse the programme costs with specific reference to administrative costs and expenses for M&E. This is a core measure of **programme efficiency**. Internationally, **administrative costs** have been driven steadily downwards in order to ensure maximum expenditure on implementation. A decade ago, 13% - 15% of total programme costs was considered a reasonable (if slightly high) administrative overhead. Now, the ceiling is lower, often below 8%. In simple terms, a programme should be spending \$9 of every \$10 on implementation; the remaining \$1 can be spent on administration costs.
245. This sounds fairly easy, but of course generates intense debates about what items fall into the different categories. For example, is capacity building a deliverable or an administrative cost? What about M&E? And so on.
246. In addition, the lack of standardised budgets undermined the extent to which we can undertake a useful analysis: if everyone categorises things differently, costs them differently, and reports on them differently, trying to assess value for money becomes extremely complex.
247. **All we can really show is that the administrative costs varied considerably from one CSO to another.** This is an important finding in itself. There are no explanations for this. The figure below shows the variations between administrative costs among the 29 CSOs whose budgets we could analyse.

248. Over 20 CSOs had administrative costs of between 10% and 20%. At the extreme end of the scale, 2 of the CSOs had administrative costs of more than 40% - quite how this could have occurred is beyond our comprehension. **These are very high figures.** Barring errors in our analysis because of how the budgets are presented in the partner proposals, it does not look impressive at all – three-quarters of partners had administration costs in excess of 10%. Any programme by any implementing partner that has administrative or overhead costs exceeding 12% may be argued to be eating funds that should be expended on activities. These figures are for administration only – we have excluded M&E from the calculations, although a strong argument can be mounted that M&E, as a management tool, should indeed be included in the calculation.




Figure 4: Per cent administrative costs by implementing partners

249. Figures for M&E by different implementing partners are impressive at first sight.




Figure 5: M&E costs

250. The international norm for M&E costs is 1-2%, depending on the type of work being done (sample surveys, for example, always increase costs). 14 CSOs – half the partners - spent under 5% of their project funds on M&E while about seven CSOs spent between 5 and 10% of their funds on it. A small number of CSOs spent over 15% of funds on M&E. Depending on how you see the importance of M&E, these can be judged as ranging from bad to good, or good to bad. (See our section on capacity building for more on this.)
251. These figures underscore the fact that there was **no standard approach to monitoring and evaluation of activities by partners**. The importance of monitoring in a programme that did not have basic baseline data need not be stressed. **Programme review meetings appear to have been the main platforms of learning and sharing information.**
252. We conclude this section by repeating the fact that a number of key activities were not done the right way, including the development of budgets, use of standardised categories and costs, and the allocation of resources for administrative and monitoring support. The manner in which budgets were presented make it difficult to tell whether the programme was economical and whether donors got value for money, **but the indicative data we do have suggest that in addition to unevenness across budgets, the administrative costs of the programme were too high; and if M&E were to be included in the administrative costs, they would be excessive indeed.**
253. We now look at programme management, which includes a more detailed look at UNIFEM's role, and at both financial and progress monitoring.

Programme management

UNIFEM's strategic role

254. UNIFEM is the UN agency mandated to promote gender equality and women's human rights within the UN system and at country level. Drawn from this sectoral and issue specific mandate and global legitimacy, the strategic effectiveness of UNIFEM is evaluated against the extent to which it has provided solid, evidence-based policy advice and managed GGP based on its international experience, normative and human rights-based work and access to best practice; and has acted as a neutral broker and arbitrator. Moreover, dropped in at the deep end as PFMA, it should be noted from the outset that UNIFEM did well in keeping GGP II on track; our comments are focused on helping them do a better job in UNIFEM III.
255. The three critical roles of UNIFEM in this regard are **providing conceptual leadership, strategic co-ordination and capacity development**.⁴⁵ We at the outset however do recognize that two factors may have contributed to and mitigated UNIFEM's performance in this regard, namely the transitional processes from ActionAid to UNIFEM as PFMA, and the strategic and programmatic implications necessitated by the general elections held in 2007. The following analysis will therefore attempt to identify what may have been possible within these constraints,

⁴⁵ Adapted from *The Role of the UN in a Changing Aid Environment: Sector Support and Sector Programmes*, Position Paper of the United Nations Development Group, 8th February 2005

and also as an indication of what could be improved on in the future implementation of the programme; as well as commenting on what did (and did not) take place.

256. The assistance from UNIFEM was reported by the implementing partners in five areas: project formulation, strategic planning, training, monitoring and evaluation, information sharing and visibility (1 mention). It is notable that 3 of the respondents (who could mention more than one area in answering this question) said they had received no assistance at all.
257. In strategic planning, the implementing partners specifically mentioned information and discussions on the GGP Strategic Plan, while project formulation assistance included preparation of proposals and logframes, identification of thematic areas and target groups, mapping of priority areas and budget formulation. These are recorded engagements, not comments on the quality of those engagements.

Responses	Frequency
Project Formulation	12
Strategic Planning	7
Training	6
Monitoring and Evaluation	5
Consultations, Communication and Information Sharing	5
Exposure	1
None	3

Table 12: Assistance provided by UNIFEM (GGP partner survey)

258. **UNIFEM was able to engage donors in strategic dialogue with implementing partners**, resulting in the development of a strategic plan, which helped to shape the boundaries and scope of GGP. In particular the strategic plan was able to frame the GGP agenda from an outcomes perspective, and set out key programmatic strategies and partnership principles. It also undertook a mapping of the women aspirants and geographical mapping of the programme, to ensure that the programme resources were focuses on the priority targets and areas.

UNIFEM's strategic position

259. **We are concerned that UNIFEM does not seem to have maximised its wide range of technical expertise to provide analytical and policy support – in office or globally.** This is especially critical given that one key objective of the programme was constitutional, legal policy and institutional reforms for gender equality and non-discrimination. A thorough Kenyan-specific contextual analysis – at programme level - will contribute to policy dialogue and inform advocacy strategies and other programmatic interventions by implementing partners. For example it was pointed out during the programme's inception workshop that the lack of demographic data would hamper the mapping of constituencies where interventions would take place. **The programme appears to have operated in a knowledge-poor environment, without a thorough ground in local, context-specific analysis (including risk analysis), and without benefiting significantly from the international expertise that UNIFEM was expected to leverage.**

260. There does not seem to have been any **rigorous and systematic process of critical investigation and evaluation, theory building, data collection, analysis and codification related to the policy and practice in gender and governance**. The assumption was made that individual implementing partners had the capacity to undertake this analysis, and would do it, yet one of the key reasons that UNIFEM was chosen was to provide leadership in this respect, given its experience in this respect at national, regional and international levels.
261. The evaluation team may be overly positivist, but we do believe that **policy and practice interventions which are informed by systemic evidence and robust analysis are more likely to produce better outcomes**, and effective utilisation of evidence in policy and practice can help policymakers identify the problems, understand their causes, develop appropriate policy solutions, improve policy implementation, and monitor strategies and performance.
262. The fact that UNIFEM is a UN body is both an advantage and disadvantage. **There were partners who felt that UNIFEM's role has now become that of an implementing agency in the Kenyan governance sector and that as a UN agency it enjoys unique access to donors and therefore a competitive advantage based on which it is now competing with local women's rights organisations working in governance**. This is a worrying sentiment, that needs to be responded to with dialogue and transparency.
263. Participants told us they feel that as a UN agency, UNIFEM is somewhat removed from hurly-burly daily political realities and therefore not fully cognisant of political dynamics; yet a gender and governance programme is an inherently 'political' project, needing more than technical programming skills. The UN's need to remain 'neutral', in the eyes of many participants, prevents it from being able to provide the necessary overtly political support that a PFMA for a governance programme should be able to. It could just as easily be argued that UNIFEM's neutrality is a key asset in a polarised Kenya.
264. Finally, as a UN agency, UNIFEM enjoys an unexploited strategic advantage that could see it facilitate state/non-state partnerships to realise a more conducive environment for a gender responsive governance system. **The advantages that could be realised for women's rights organisations from having UNIFEM as a PFMA have not really been exploited and need to be brought out more in future.**

Strategic co-ordination

265. The strategic coordination role of UNIFEM arises from its perceived international legitimacy and neutrality. **UNIFEM was able to convene and manage critical meetings and processes with the implementing and donor partners in a highly politicized environment**, to ensure and verify that the programme addressed strategic gender issues in governance. This is a positive finding.
266. Given the high level of trust between UNIFEM and the government, and the ability of UNIFEM to broker space for government/CSO dialogue and engagement, UNIFEM does not appear to have brought together the implementing partners from civil society with government and other decision-makers, in policy development and in the implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the programmes. This would have the effect of broadening the ownership and visibility of GGP and enhancing

implementation of the sector-wide initiatives. **If UNIFEM remains PFMA in a future GGP III, it must utilise its own strategic positioning – as well as international networks – to considerably greater effect than was possible during GGP II.**

Capacity development

267. One of UNIFEM’s key successes was in the numbers it reached in capacity building (notwithstanding concerns about quality). UNIFEM was able during the evaluation period undertake training in implementing partners’ financial and programme management systems; in result- based programme management; and monitoring and evaluation capacity. The above-mentioned **capacity building initiatives** were continuous throughout the period under review, in terms of dedicated and content-specific training sessions, and also in terms of refresher sessions during the programme review meetings. This is a very positive finding.

268. The range of capacity building events attended by GGP partners is reflected below.

Capacity building	Frequency
Financial Management	11
Result Based Management	11
Monitoring and Evaluation	11
Reporting	9
Project Management	7
Rights Based Approach	4
Computer training	1
None	3

Table 13: Training events organized by UNIFEM (GGP partner survey)

269. For example, 9 in 10 respondents told us they had received technical assistance and the same number had been trained by UNIFEM as part of GGP, and all said it had been useful. These are very positive findings.




Figure 6: UNIFEM capacity building (partner survey)

270. Building financial management capacity has long been both a priority and a challenge among Kenyan CSOs. UNIFEM appears to have performed very well in this area, however. Three-quarters (72%) of respondents told us they had been provided with training in financial procedures and financial management capacity support, respectively. **Again, this is an extremely positive finding.** But it needs to be seen in the context of financial management, for example 40% of respondents told us they were never visited for financial management spot checks, and a further 21% said these happened on an annual basis. (Though we did not ask about telephonic or e-mail communication, which may have balanced this picture.)
271. Financial monitoring, like standard M&E, relies on a cycle of reporting and communicating – not one-way traffic from organisation to UNIFEM. Submission of financial reports seemed to be either every 6 months (35%) or every 3 months (59%) (the remainder were uncertain). The reasons for these differences are not clear, and a **standard approach** is a requirement, given the now apparent uneasiness between the various actors (particularly organisations with differing budget sizes) within GGP. There appears to be a fairly uneven picture in this regard. Four in ten (41%) respondents told us they received **feedback on financial reporting** on a quarterly basis; 22% said they heard every 6 months – but 15% said they never received feedback on financial reporting.




Figure 7: Provision of financial capacity building by UNIFEM (GGP partner survey)

272. M&E is an area that has been strengthened after staff were brought in, albeit rather late in GGP's lifespan. We have already noted that capacity building efforts were undertaken. There are two additional comments to make. One, repeating a point made above, is that M&E is a cycle of communication that runs continuously – not from bottom to top, but in a virtuous cycle. Again, as with feedback on financial monitoring, we find a **clear difference in progress-related M&E between (and among) reporting by partners and feedback from UNIFEM's M&E office.**

273. Firstly, there is a split between the 71% who report to UNIFEM on a quarterly basis, and the 25% who told us they are required to submit progress reports on a 6-monthly basis. (3% told us they only report annually, which is clearly not possible, and the remainder were uncertain.) Even if these responses are ‘wrong’ – i.e. if UNIFEM expects more regular reports – this is what partner organisations understand their responsibilities to be, suggesting that **communication around M&E is lacking**.
274. Equally telling is the wide range of responses regarding feedback from UNIFEM about GGP as a whole. Respondents cover a wide range from the 33% who say they have never heard feedback about GGP as a programme, to the 4% who say they hear every month and 22% who say they hear every quarter. **These kinds of differences cannot be sustained for long, without feeding into intra-organisational inequalities and hostilities.**




Figure 8: Frequency of progress reporting (GGP partner survey)

275. Finally, it is important that UNIFEM moves **to bolster the ‘E’ in M&E**. M&E is frequently reduced to activity-level reporting – we have already noted that this occurred among some GGP partners – but it is clearly able to be far more than that. Evaluations by partner, thematic area and/or geographic site, which can be on a small scale, not only help inform management decisions, they also help build knowledge funds, and in this particular instance would have been a way of building baseline data.
276. **A more proactive stance is also needed.** For example, UNIFEM does not have (or could not provide us with, anyway) numbers of women in leadership positions in any of the spheres and sectors mentioned in the strategic framework. This includes the civil service, students unions, CSOs and others as well as MPs, Cabinet members, Permanent Secretaries and the like. **It is difficult to understand firstly why such data has not been collected; and, secondly, how progress or impact can in any way be assessed if it is not being compared against targets.**
277. M&E seems to be on track in a formal sense – capacity building has happened, procedures are in place – but it is also working in the dark (as the programme is) as

long as it lacks baseline data or target data against which to measure progress. **More proactive data gathering, far more consistent application of procedures and improved communication (from UNIFEM to partners and vice versa) will all help M&E take a major step forward, to the benefit of the entire programme.** We were informed that UNIFEM is in the process of developing a global electronic database, that will collect sex-disaggregated quantitative data in its areas of focus.

278. There is a need for **needs assessments** to identify what capacity building is required, and ensure that partners get what they need, not merely take what is offered. There also needs to be more intensive technical advice and follow-up by UNIFEM, for implementing partners identified as still have capacity gaps after training

Response	Frequency
Refresher/More training and skills	17
Core Funding/Administrative costs support	12
Personnel/Staffing	8
Comparative Experiences/Exchange Visits	5
Equipment	4
Effective use of media/outreach activities	2
Grassroots networks	2

Table 14: Capacity needs of GGP partners

279. Two observations were noted with respect to the capacity building initiatives by UNIFEM. It emerged that some implementing partners still experienced **capacity gaps** especially in understanding and distinguishing the key concepts in **results based management**, with these implementing partners reporting on activities rather than on outputs and outcomes. This finding points to differing capacity needs among the implementing partners and requires UNIFEM to undertake thorough capacity assessments, to guide future training and customise delivery methods for the various implementing partners.
280. It also seems to have taken UNIFEM some considerable time to **build its own capacity to manage the GGP programme**, with a number of key personnel only joining fairly recently. This may mean that GGP III will run more smoothly, but it is crucial that in any programme, PFMA's are able to demonstrate that capacity will be mobilised at the date of appointment, and that the duration of the programme is not used to source and train up internal capacity.
281. **UNIFEM's specific sectoral focus and comparative advantage gives rise to the expectation of specialised or advanced gender-specific capacity building in the programme, especially on the links between gender and governance.** However, this appears not to have occurred. Again it appears that the assumption was made in this regard that the implementing partners had capacity, and UNIFEM's role seems to have been limited to programmatic technical expertise, provision of documentation and links to relevant websites. This is an area where implementing partners would have benefited from **UNIFEM's global and regional collaborations and networks in terms of learning platforms, knowledge transfer, exchange visits, and more structured networking and information sharing.**

282. This is a **key lost opportunity** – basic PFMA functions can be carried out by any number of structures, whereas UNIFEM has sector-based and international advantages it seems not to have utilised. Performing in these areas must be a contractual requirement if UNIFEM remains as PFMA; this would not be onerous, as it would simply require UNIFEM to play to its strengths.

Partnership

283. The current GGP partners are a consortium of eight donors, UNIFEM and thirty-two CSO implementing partners. The donor partners provide financial support and oversight over GGP to ensure that the programme delivers outcomes in a harmonized manner. UNIFEM provides programme and financial management to GGP, while the implementing partners undertake interventions aimed at achieving the GGP objectives. The programme’s objectives, strategies and partnership principles in the GGP strategic plan were discussed and agreed to by all partners, and guide their respective roles and responsibilities. In addition a memorandum of understanding among the donors, and terms of reference for UNIFEM also guide the relationship between and amongst the donor partners and UNIFEM.

284. The centrality of gender equality among donors has made harmonisation easier. But the programme has faced a number of challenges, including the rather sudden departure of ActionAid from the role of **PFMA** and the equally rapid entry of UNIFEM into that role. We are not questioning the decision, merely pointing out that changing PFMA in mid-stream is never going to be easily done, and the programme should be viewed accordingly.




Figure 9: 'Who decided on the thematic/geographic area, target group?' (GGP partner survey)

285. And the **donors** need to ensure that partner selection is left to the PIU based on robust capacity assessments. Early interventions in this area – objections by the then PFMA are reflected in DSC minutes – created ripples of discontent that placed stress on partnerships throughout the programme, and the issue was still being cited in some interviews held by the evaluation team.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ See the DSC minutes of 12/06/06 for the robust exchanges between the then PFMA and donors.

286. But we should not over-state the issue. The preceding graph makes it clear that while the donors played a role in identifying thematic areas, target groups, geographical location and so on, it was **generally a very small role**; partner organisations overwhelmingly feel that they were responsible for deciding what they did, where, and with whom. UNIFEM was clearly more active in these key areas. **Donors are seen to have played a positive and constructive role.**

Stakeholder involvement

287. In the annexures we provide a summary of the implementing partners’ target groups, which ranged from voting members of the public, including men, women and youth; women parliamentary and civic aspirants community mobilisers; leaders; institutions such as Parliament; political parties and the media. The main criterion used in selection of stakeholders was the implementing organisation’s previous history and experience in working with stakeholders to engender governance and to achieve the objectives of GGP. There seems to have been reasonable – though far from universal - involvement of beneficiaries in the implementation of the projects, though slightly less in the planning phase.




Figure 10: GGP Beneficiaries/Target Groups Participation

288. Central to the partnership strategy is harmonisation, collaboration and accountability for the achievement of sustainable results. This is reflected in the funding modalities, the programme’s reach in terms of selection criteria of implementing partners and mapping of intervention areas, structured mechanisms for regular dialogue and communications between the partners and the partnership principles. While there have been key outputs in these areas, there have also been a number of challenges.

Dialogue and communication mechanisms

289. Structured dialogue and communication among the partners took place through the partner programmatic and review meetings, donor steering committee meetings, the establishment of a programme mailing list and website and establishment of a

communication strategy for information sharing among partners, including media visibility of partner activities.

290. Dialogue was however constrained by lack of **trust and competition amongst implementing partners**, which was mainly occasioned by the transition from funding through coalitions to funding of individual organisations and the resultant capacity differences between the big and small (in terms of size and resource envelope) implementing partners, as well as the desire to perform and show results in mapped constituencies, leading to efforts by implementing partners to outdo each other. This was exemplified by the inability of partners to agree on standardised community mobilisation strategies, which the majority were implementing.




Figure 11: Partners' engagement and networking

291. The data in the table show a worryingly high level of mistrust among GGP partners. This self-evidently needs to be challenged and resolved **if the programme is to operate as a programme rather than a set of discrete, competing, projects.**

Response	Frequency
Suspicion/Competition/Lack of solidarity	11
Ineffective Communication/Information sharing/Co-ordination	8
Mapping challenges	6
Late/Differing times of funding	5
Differing institutional mandates/capacities	3
No objective criteria for funding/favouritism of some partners	3
Tight time frames for implementation	2
No dedicated staff/funds for networking	2
Political linkages of some partners	1

Table 15: Challenges re engaging with GGP partners

292. The results of effective dialogue and communication are illustrated by the media implementing partners, who were able to work effectively together to develop a common communication and media strategy, with each media partner complementing the others activities. These included capacity building of and support to key media

actors on gender and governance issues, development and maintenance of a GGP website, and the provision of documentation and development of print and audio-visual media programmes with key messages on gender and governance. Even though the media partners were also able to implement activities with other GGP partners, the capacity differentials among partners and lack of trust did impact on the media strategy especially with regards to communicating and giving visibility to implementing partner's activities.

Funding modalities

293. The donors have made good their commitments to contribute to a basket fund for the GGP by signing a joint financing agreement, and disbursing funds to UNIFEM. UNIFEM's financial procedures require that individual donors sign bilateral contracts with UNIFEM, which has led to disbursements at varying times depending on the respective donors' approval procedures. This, combined with UNIFEM's own bureaucratic financial procedures, in turn also contributed to a delay by UNIFEM in disbursements to implementing partners, which is **the weakest link in the programme's partnership**. There has recently been a devolution of financial approvals subject to a limit of US\$ 100,000 to UNIFEM's regional office. This enabled UNIFEM's quick response especially to implementing partners requests to hold urgent meetings during the election campaign period.
294. Money can never flow fast enough, and unhappiness over the speed of disbursements is predictable. But the UN procedures do appear to have been extremely cumbersome (one assumes this will improve with the devolution of some decision-making to the Kenya office) and was raised by well over half of all respondents as the key weakness of the programme. **A third told us that the main reason for not implementing key activities was slow disbursement of funds.**




Figure 12: 'Were PFMA disbursements received on time?' (survey of GGP II partners)

295. If this is the case – that the PFMA is unable to disburse funds and the result directly and negatively affects the programme – then GGP faces a fairly **fundamental problem**, given that financial disbursements are a key part of being a capable PFMA. This requires UNIFEM to carefully scrutinise the procedures, to see if and how they can be improved.

296. One proposal from partners was that a **flexible or contingency fund** be created to deal with such emergencies such as occurred during and after the 2007 election. If this occurred, expenditure under this Fund should be subject to the limits that UNIFEM’s regional office can approve, and subject to well defined and agreed criteria as to which interventions will qualify for support under the Fund. Given the UN’s response to the post-election violence, this may be a superfluous recommendation – the UN can do this already - other than to ensure that (as UNIFEM advised) all partners share a definition of what constitutes an emergency. Expenditures will still subject to UNIFEM’s financial procedures. Such a fund will become critical as the programme moves towards more policy and advocacy oriented interventions.
297. There are two angles to the issue of **delay in disbursements**. First was delay by UNIFEM in disbursement of the first instalment after the implementing partners were contracted, and second, the delay in disbursement of subsequent instalments. The delays in the first scenario were largely caused by the protracted decision-making processes by donors in the transition from ActionAid, coupled with UNIFEM’s own bureaucratic procedures. This conclusion has been reached after an assessment of the following timelines provided by UNIFEM to explain the delay:

Milestone	Date
Implementing Partners identified and approved by Action Aid	March 2006
Donors decision not to Renew Action Aid’s contract as FMA	July 2006
Formal Communication of donors decision and engagement of UNIFEM as PFMA	August 2006
Commencement of disbursements of funds from various donors to UNIFEM	September 2006
Contracting processes and assessments of implementing partners by UNIFEM	Sep – Dec 2006
First disbursements to implementing partners (after inception workshop)	November 2006
Engagement of programme staff by UNIFEM	Jan –Feb 2007

Table 16: Disbursement delays (source: UNIFEM)

298. In effect the turnaround time for disbursement of the first instalments using UNIFEM’s procedures is three months (September – November 2006), and in our opinion this is **an inordinately long period**. Since the main cause seems to be UNIFEM’s contracting and assessment procedures, the delays must be minimised and procedures planned and fast tracked as already recommended. Implementing partners did contribute to the delays in the second scenario, by not properly following the required reporting procedures and delays in responding to requests or clarification sought by UNIFEM. Nevertheless the **ripple effects of the delay in disbursing the first instalment continued throughout the programme implementation period**. UNIFEM acknowledges in its report to the DSC that there were also delays on their part in recruiting a programme financial manager, which also have contributed to the delays on its part in reviewing financial reports and disbursement of instalments.
299. The team also experienced difficulties accessing detailed financial information on implementing partners from UNIFEM, which suggests UNIFEM may not be fully meeting its obligations, especially in collating expenditure profiles and preparation of

monthly financial status spreadsheets with respect to each of the implementing partners; or if they are, there can be no reason for not sharing these with the evaluation team. Given the large number of implementing partners, this may also point to **capacity gaps in UNIFEM** in this respect, and the need to bring on board additional finance staff.

300. Another problem cited by the implementing partners in financial management was the **inflexibility of UNIFEM’s financial procedures**, as set out below. UNIFEM needs to proactively work to resolve the issues raised above. If not, **there is little justification for their role as FMA**, although their programme management role is a different matter.

Strengths	Frequency	Weaknesses	Frequency
Pooling and no duplication	5	Delays and bureaucracy	14
Checks and controls	5	Inflexibility	6
Adequate funding/according to needs	4	Inadequate funding	4
UNIFEM’s flexibility and Responsiveness	3	Inadequate staffing at UNIFEM/delay in feedback	3
Simplified reporting	3	No funding for administrative costs	3
Timely disbursements	2	No bilateral funding	3
Inclusiveness	1	Differential funding	1
Technical assistance	2	Collection of cheques from UNIFEM	1

Table 17: Perceived strengths and weaknesses of UNIFEM financial arrangements

301. On the more positive side, there is little evidence that procedures – i.e. what UNIFEM required of partners – were considered difficult to apply and only in a tiny number of cases was there any conflict between UNIFEM and partner financial procedures. **Harmonisation between PFMA and implementing partners re financial procedures seems advanced**, a very positive finding.




Figure 13: Harmonisation of financial procedures

302. We should be clear: **UNIFEM's role is generally appreciated and the staff well-liked, but its procedures are very strongly disliked.** This imbalance needs to be evened out if UNIFEM is to remain as PFMA.

The programme's reach

303. The implementing partners were initially selected on the basis of their national as well as local outreach, and their competence verified by institutional assessments undertaken by the PFMA. It is however not clear what the respective competencies and roles of the national and local partners are. It was also not clear whether a national implementing partner was working in all constituencies, or was implementing strategies targeting actors at national level. **There is a need to better map out national and local partners and their areas of strategic focus** in terms of policy and grassroots gender-based interventions. The geographical reach, while covering a substantive number of constituencies, also registered differentials in the thematic foci, mainly as a result of the competencies and capacity gaps of implementing partners working in those constituencies.
304. There is thus also a need to **map the geographical areas to ensure that all areas are covered by appropriate implementing partners in terms of identified local level activities.** In this context it may be appropriate to include a determination as to whether or not individual organisations should continue implementing stand-alone programme activities at local level, or whether there is need to have a consortium of such organisations jointly implementing activities in particular regions for greater impact. **This underscores the need for a thorough context analysis.**
305. It is beyond our scope of work to evaluate future options with any rigour. Nonetheless, it is clear that GGP II is a polyglot of national and local partners, differing in scope, scale and workload. This unevenness may have been built in by design, but we find little logic to it. Comparative analysis of programmes such as the National Civic Education Programme (NCEP) suggest that grouping smaller local CSOs and networks into consortia, with umbrella NGOs managing the consortium, can be extremely successful, as well as building indigenous capacity rather than that of – in this case – UNIFEM. **We strongly recommend that the institutional arrangements for GGP III be very carefully considered before the programme begins; specifically, the comparative advantage of the current model and of the NCEP (or other) model should be assessed for both efficiency and effectiveness.**
306. **Closer collaboration with government departments** (gender, finance, planning and other relevant ministries), national institutions for women and gender equality, women's CSOs and networks, **and other gender equality and human rights experts needs to be initiated**, for reasons of their specific mandates and roles in national planning and development, and to ensure fulfilment of the gender equality commitments made by Kenya. **Partnerships need to extend to other rights-based agencies**, not just within the programme and its donors and managers. This will not only address the issue of partner outreach if the programme is to move towards actualising gender equality through gender responsive decision making, but will also contribute towards **alignment and harmonisation of the programme with national priorities.**
307. A future priority for GGP III, in our view, **has to be holding government accountable for delivering substantive gender equality as well as formal gender**

equality – not doing government’s work for it, but making government do its own work. GGP would then play the role of strategic partner as well as critical monitoring of performance, and mobilising women in particular and communities in general to demand their rights of government. Partnerships with government and related agencies, as well as other rights-based programmes, will be crucial if such a role is effectively to be played.

Application of agreed principles

308. GGP was not only implemented in an intensely political context, but is also inherently political in the sense that it addresses the right to participation and the engendering of power relations. It intervenes in electoral contests. It was therefore critical to develop principles to ensure effectiveness, impartiality, and accountability on the part of partners in the implementation of the programme. More specifically, the principles governing programme management were detailed in the Terms of Reference for UNIFEM, and also in the GGP strategic plan. This assessment of UNIFEM’s programme management is taken in full cognisance the transitional context and difficulties occasioned by the change over from ActionAid to UNIFEM during the evaluation period, which significantly impacted on UNIFEM’s performance.

Programme management

309. UNIFEM’s programme management responsibilities were the contracting of implementing partners, strategic analysis, planning and programme design, development of the implementing partners’ programme management systems and procedures, and undertaking reviews and asset tracking under the programme. Contracting of partners was undertaken based on UNIFEM’s standard contractual guidelines, although the actual selection of the partners to be supported had already been undertaken by Action Aid. Four new partners were identified by UNIFEM based on a gap analysis, although it was not clear what method of and criteria for selection were used for the additional implementing partners.




Figure 14: Identification of GGP partners (GGP partner survey)

310. Organisational and institutional assessments were undertaken by UNIFEM before contracting, and assistance given in proposal development, especially preparation of the project logframes and activity plans, which must accompany the contract. The quality of these inputs has been assessed elsewhere in the report.

311. Given the logistical and time frame challenges posed by the taking up of a new role of PFMA and the general elections on which most of the programme activities were pegged, **UNIFEM's performance was very positive in the circumstances.**
312. A second weakness that is emerging is **an apparent limitation of the organisational and institutional assessments by UNIFEM**, which have been proved not to have been robust enough given the capacity gaps noted in some implementing partners. For example it was evident after an analysis of the proposals and reports submitted by some partners that in some cases while the project design was well conceptualized and designed, their reports by did not correspond to the outputs and indicators in the project proposal. This leads us to conclude that such partners did not have capacity to implement the projects. The reverse was also noted - some very poorly conceptualised proposals and yet perfect reports in terms of analysis and progression from outputs to outcomes. While this could be an indication of effective capacity building of a partner, it also gives rise to the possibility that external assistance may have been sourced to write the reports. **In-depth verifiable capacity assessments of implementing partners** should be non-negotiable.
313. Finally, concern was raised by some partners, and the team also observed, that **the GGP programme manager needs to be more in charge and more visibly in charge of the programme**; she currently appears not to be optimally utilized. While we acknowledge the fact that programme management is a joint effort, the GGP Programme Manager's position and responsibilities require that her leadership and contributions are more visible.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)

314. A number of M&E-related observations have been made throughout this report, particularly in the section dealing with the logframe and its consequences in the field. UNIFEM's responsibilities with regard to M&E are to develop an M&E system and tools, capacity build on M&E and Result Based Management, monitor implementation through field visits and regular meetings with implementing partners and report to the DSC on achievement of objectives against the outcomes in the GGP Strategic Plan.
315. UNIFEM has developed tools to guide the partners in the preparation of their progress and final narrative reports and undertaken capacity building of implementing partners on RBM (see elsewhere for analysis of the quality of these exercises). It has also undertaken two review meetings with the partners during the evaluation period, undertaken a joint field visits with the donors and presented a programme report to the DSC which reports on the results achieved between October 2006 and March 2008. It also developed a monitoring and evaluation plan.
316. We have the impression of a disjointed effort in M&E – lots of activity, but basic issues have not been addressed, and the quality of the logframe, the lack of baseline data or data gathering to fill the knowledge gaps and so on, all combine to paint a very uneven picture of M&E.
317. The outcomes that are being monitored are different from those in the GGP strategic plan or in partner logframes. It is not clear when they were reformulated, but the “new” outcomes are in the Monitoring and Evaluation Plan dated August 2007 and

were also discussed in the RBM training held in September 2007. The two documents are the same word for word, which raises questions to what extent there was partner input into the formulation of the monitoring plan.

318. Even though the “new” outcomes are in our opinion SMARTer, our confusion is further compounded when **implementing partners in the final reports that were submitted from December 2007 are still reporting against the “original” outcomes**, outputs and indicators.
319. There is no M&E system that exists that comprehensively describes the scope of M&E, the tools and mechanisms that will be required, how information will be gathered and organized, reflection processes and events, communication and reporting and the capacity, management information systems needed and respective partner responsibilities for the M&E to be effectively undertaken. While this may have been delayed by the circumstances under which UNIFEM became the PFMA, it should have been a priority once the necessary personnel were on board. The Monitoring and Evaluation Plan that has been developed exists in a vacuum, and the effects can be clearly seen in UNIFEM’s report to the DSC against the plan, where there are clear limitations in obtaining the relevant information to measure performance against the indicated indicators.
320. For any effective outcome monitoring there must be **baselines against which the targets in the performance indicators are set**. In many of the indicators and results cited no such baseline data was provided, therefore the tools and mechanisms served a limited purpose to measure progress towards achievement of the outcome.
321. UNIFEM has financial and narrative **reporting obligations** to the DSC, as well as an obligation to disseminate the results of GGP to the DSC and stakeholder in the wider public. Some members of the DSC noted that there is need for improvement in the financial reporting in terms of clearer presentation of the financial reports. Dissemination of the GGP narrative report on achievement of results has not been undertaken, having been recently submitted to the DSC. UNIFEM in consultation with partners needs to discuss and implement a **dissemination strategy** before implementation of the next phase of GGP commences, so as to provide a platform for more effective engagement with key stakeholders.

From principle to integrity in programme management and implementation

322. The GGP programme has had a number of (sometimes heated) discussions regarding **integrity** in particular pertaining to **the principle of conflict of interest**. It is commendable that the programme has sought to take on board these issues, as they are some of the core issues that bedevil Kenya’s political culture. There is need for an examination of how this discourse – practicing what you preach, in essence - can be deepened. This is the true test of whether or not the **values of transformative leadership** have been internalised by GGP partners and stakeholders.
323. There is also a need **for the discourse pertaining to diversity to be advanced within the GGP**. The women’s movement and relevant actors – UNIFEM and donors included - are no more immune to the issues of ethnic chauvinism and patronage than any other actors operating in Kenya. There is therefore a need that all partners involved in the GGP at all levels not only espouse but also be seen to practise integrity and live out the partnership principles.

324. The notion of **civil society institutions as public goods still does not seem to have been internalised** – hence the tensions around the idea that such an institution must not only be non-partisan but also seen as such. Some of the conflict of interest issues that were cited as having arisen included the fact that several institutional heads in GGP implementing institutions sought elective public office and yet were unwilling to relinquish their positions within their CSO.
325. Implementing partners argued that civil society has acted as a sort of “*incubator*” for leadership in Kenya and that it is discriminatory to expect that civil society “*nurtures*” alternative leadership but does not seek to occupy these leadership positions. What was not grasped was the fact that as a public good a **CSO that is ostensibly non-partisan cannot be seen as being accessible to only one political constituency**. This is an issue that will need to be continuously worked on.
326. Finally, two challenges have presented themselves with regard to partnership principles. One has been the **reconciling the political ambitions of key personalities in organizations implementing the programme**, with the organisation’s ability to impartially implement future programme activities. The second has been **ensuring the integrity of the programme** after partner members declined to resign from implementing organisations having declaring their interest and vying for political office. The obvious risk in the above two scenarios is that of using GGP to further personal political interests.
327. In our opinion it is non-negotiable that a governance programme should ensure the highest level of transparency and accountability internally, that it also advocates for and demands from its target groups and beneficiaries. **The programme should in future make such conflict of interest and integrity issues specific contractual provisions with attendant penalties in the event of breach.**
328. Both of these have contributed to partners questioning **the partnership approach** – because it can only work when the rules and responsibilities are equally shared, and seen to be so. We have already seen that reporting requirements and information flows are unevenly experienced by GGP partners, which can only serve to make these later differences more pronounced, and more strongly experienced.

UNIFEM’s value add

329. In the time it has been the GGP PFMA, UNIFEM has **recorded some key achievements. First, it has been able to bring together organisations working towards a common purpose of gender equality in governance, in a highly politicised and ethnicised Kenyan society**. The women’s movement was one of the first casualties of this polarisation and this has been no mean feat to achieve.
330. Second, **the issue of women in leadership has gained visibility** as a result of UNIFEM’s strategic direction and engagement with implementing partners, and high-level policy engagement with donors.
331. Thirdly UNIFEM has **infused professionalism** into the management of the programme arising from its technical and programmatic capacity and competence, and capacity building initiatives. It has undertaken far more capacity building around

financial procedures and management, for example, than other, far better resourced governance programmes (such as GJLOS). It is better regarded than FMAs usually are – they are commonly first in line for complaints and unhappiness – and has slowly built up monitoring (if not evaluation) capacity. The views of partners regarding UNIFEM’s value add appears below.

Response	Frequency
Technical Support/Expertise	18
Funding/Financial Support	8
Capacity Building	8
Pooling/Convening Partners and Networking	6
Coordination of programme	5
International credibility and linkages/Visibility	3
Transparency and Accountability	2
Advocacy	1
Flexibility	1

Table 18: Value added by UNIFEM

332. UNIFEM promised **results-based and knowledge-based management and decision-making**. Training in some areas has occurred, but for example to baseline data has been collected, and as far as we can gather, no evaluations (at site/project/thematic/other level) have occurred. Field visits are important, but they do not substitute for – they complement – evaluations by independent, external experts. These are also ways of building up baseline and progress data. Without this happening, it is difficult to understand what information is being used to make key programmatic decisions.
333. The positive developments on the strategic and technical front have largely been at **national level**, and in this respect it is difficult to distinguish UNIFEM from an equally competent local FMA or PFMA. UNIFEM has **not been able to fully harness and exploit its international and regional networks and experiences**, to provide the additional value that only a UN agency can provide.
334. Finally, we should note that some respondents questioned UNIFEM’s role on the basis of its UN credentials (i.e. that these were a negative, not a positive). **Some partners questioned the choice of a UN agency as a partner for a political programme**. The UN’s nature, they argue, does not allow it to engage in overtly political processes. Yet the GGP requires overtly political interventions, for example through supporting individual women candidates.
335. Secondly they argue that the UN approach is programmatic and not political, yet a governance programme requires both programmatic and technical political skills. Gigiri (UN Headquarters) is seen as too far removed from the dynamics of Kenya’s political realities to grasp the needs of a governance programme.
336. Finally, having UNIFEM as a PFMA has led to a conflict between its role as a lead UN agency on women’s rights and those of national implementing organisations. This has led to a situation where UNIFEM is now competing as an implementing agency with national implementing agencies, rather than complementing their initiatives. Some respondents argued that as a UN agency, UNIFEM is a donor agency and

enjoys comparative fundraising advantages and proximity to donors. Yet UNIFEM lacks the technical capacity and know how of the local terrain to deliver on local women's rights concerns. They perceive the current situation as being one in which UNIFEM is now attracting away much needed funding for local institutions operating in the governance and rights sectors. We do not have sufficient information to know how widespread or deeply held these views are, but on-going dialogue is an important response.

Sustainability

337. Sustainability is a very broad issue – ranging far beyond financial matters – and we have touched on some of these such as ownership, relevance and so on. Some additional points are raised below.
338. At local level in Sotik, for example, the women were very proud of the late Honourable Lorna Laboso who was the first Kipsigis woman to ever be elected to Parliament and a beneficiary of GGP initiated projects.⁴⁷ When Lorna declared her candidacy for the Sotik seat the women turned out in huge numbers to participate in the ODM primaries, which had never happened before. The women coined a slogan “*Chemarind, the one who wears a skirt*” and as they went to vote for her they were chanting “*Chemarind.*” Instances of very high levels of ownership and sustainability are to be found within GGP.
339. But given the fact that no baseline surveys and or needs assessment were undertaken, **there is no guarantee that GGP interventions are consistent with beneficiary priorities or demands.** Although there was a general felt need for a gender and governance programme, there has been a challenge in respect of customising the programme in respect of *local needs and concerns*.
340. The gender and governance challenges in Taveta, for example, are particular. It has had a woman MP for two consecutive terms and development committees are now registering an almost 50/50 balance; but it is a geographical area where there are no governance CSOs on the ground even though the entire community faces disenfranchisement in respect of property rights. This is different from Ikolomani. Ikolomani has a legacy of male leadership and no governance programme interventions until the GGP-funded intervention, which was small. The programme in Ikolomani would need to focus on awareness-raising to ensure buy in before addressing other components; in Taveta it is another league altogether.
341. Yet the GGP design **did not adequately take on board these types of local differences.** Even within a single region there may be vast differences, for example Funyula and Butula constituencies within the Western Province have a long history of women in leadership and have consistently sent women to Parliament as far back as the 1970s. The gender and governance needs in these two constituencies may therefore not fit the same profile as those in Kakamega District yet they are all in the same province.

⁴⁷ Honourable Lorna Laboso, the member of parliament for Sotik Constituency and Assistant Minister for Home Affairs, died in a aeroplane crash on Tuesday 10th June 2008, a fortnight after we visited her constituency.

342. In the constituencies where there had been a long history of gender and governance interventions (not under the GGP) such as Sotik or where there had been consecutive elections of women, there was **ownership of the programme mandate although not of the GGP itself**. This is due to the fact that there was an appreciation of the benefits of having women in decision-making. As noted earlier, women leaders were perceived as having delivered and there was therefore a positive attitude towards women in leadership and general GGP concerns. **However, there is a need to institutionalise programme gains in such locations so that they are experienced beyond the individuals who have spearheaded the activities.**
343. **Partners and beneficiaries are not yet at a stage where they could continue this programme if donors were to withdraw** and most were of the opinion that the aspirations of the GGP require concerted long-term interventions. These should be taken seriously. Partners may have a vested interest in the programme continuing, but it is nonetheless absolutely correct for them to note that **gender equality is only to be won through long-term, consistent work**. This is particularly true given that this is a programme that seeks to deal with attitude change in a hostile environment. Since the core necessary legal reform is constitutional, which has proven to be controversial in Kenya, the program goal will not be achieved in the short term.

Lessons and strategies

344. We have identified a whole series of key lessons in the text of this report, which reappear at the end as recommendations, and are not repeated here. A couple of additional items appear below.
345. In all the constituencies we visited where women or women friendly candidates had been elected, **there had been a partnership between the youth and women to ensure the election of candidates sympathetic to their needs**. Youth (we were told) are better educated and therefore better exposed to progressive discourses. Young men are the ones often used to perpetrate violence against women standing for elective office, so targeting them and instead fostering alliances with them worked to women candidates' advantage.
346. **Manifestos for women candidates** were developed and used by GGP partners. This gave constituents an opportunity to understand the candidates' visions and in one case – Taveta – had become an excellent accountability mechanism and opportunity to showcase concrete results.
347. **Long-term consistent interventions** were also effective. The lesson is to start early and keep financing programmes that are working. Changing gender attitudes and power relations will take a long time in Kenya as elsewhere in the world. There is a need for the GGP to identify **institutions with a strong track record in the gender and governance sector and cultivate their strengths**.
348. The GGP also has not formally sought **partnerships with other governance sector programmes**. Yet where other governance sector programmes were present or where individual implementing partners twinned with them the results seemed to be better.
349. **GGP needs to conduct research on gender and governance and collect baseline data so that the programme's interventions are informed by Kenyan and local**

realities. One cannot have effective interventions in the absence of well-researched information about local dynamics.

350. The **fora for women candidates** such as the networks that emerged out of ECWD's programmes, as well as support for mobilisers for women candidates, also worked. As was stated by mobilisers we spoke to "*...in politics you have to first persuade the voters then you must nurture that vote and consistently return to make sure that you still have it.*" There is a need for **constant monitoring** in a programme that seeks to ensure access to decision making in electoral processes.
351. **The one strategy that did not work was the mapping strategy.** The follow up steps that were recommended by the consultant, such as going to the ground to test the theory and also conducting a mapping based on organisational capacities and individual niches were not followed. Thus - as had been predicted by the consultant - there were geographical areas in which no organisation with skills in outcome areas was intervening.
352. To summarise, the strategies that were employed by partners that seemed to have worked included:
- Twinning youth and women constituencies and campaigns
 - Having manifestos for women candidates
 - Having a consistent long term intervention in an area
 - Support for strong institutions with a track record for delivery and technical know-how in the gender and governance sector
 - Partnering the GGP with other governance programs
 - Having informed interventions
 - Fora for women candidates to support each other
 - Supporting mobilisers for women candidates
 - Mentoring of smaller organisations by larger more experienced organisations.

Conclusion

353. Reaching straightforward conclusions after a complex study is not simple, and often can be simplistic. We can summarise our findings as follows:

<i>Item</i>	<i>Conclusion</i>
<i>Relevance</i>	Absolutely relevant but need to balance representation and governance (what are the numbers of women <i>for</i> ? Who do they answer to?) Needs refining to better reflect local context and dynamics
<i>Efficiency</i>	Adequate Administration costs very uneven across partners Better budgeting, far better financial monitoring needed
<i>Effectiveness</i>	Good in some areas, bad in others Governance work is weak and patchy Election-related work good Has something of an identity crisis that needs resolution
<i>Performance</i>	As above, good in some areas, not in others
<i>Management</i>	UNIFEM in a difficult position as late PFMA – has done well in the circumstances Weaknesses include RBM, M&E, financial monitoring Strengths include capacity building, managing complex programme in volatile context Has not yet added UN/internal value
<i>Sustainability</i>	Poor Little if any financial sustainability No baseline data or local needs assessments so unclear if locally sustainable

Table 19: Conclusion summary

354. **The idea of a gender and governance programme is very relevant to Kenya today. However the Gender and Governance Programme (GGP) is poorly conceptualised and designed.** Kenya faces an acute challenge in respect of addressing the numbers of women in decision-making. Any programme on gender and governance in Kenya must therefore be unabashedly committed to addressing the issue of women's representation in decision-making in its own right.

355. **But numbers are a means to an end.** Due to the entrenched nature of Kenya's patriarchy and the fact that all attempts to institute affirmative measures have been resisted by Kenya's legislature, addressing women's representation in decision-making **requires a focused and simultaneously multi-faceted strategy.** This must take on board previous challenges that have arisen in the course of seeking to address the issue of women's representation, as well as **linkages to broader governance questions and accountability to a Kenyan women's movement.** The strategy must be well researched and grounded in sound data about women's access to leadership.

356. A key issue in relation to gender and governance in Kenya is that of **the hostile constitutional, legal, policy and institutional framework.** The GGP acknowledges this issue but treats it as if the only aspect of this particular problem

is the question of affirmative measures (all indicators for objective 1 are related only to affirmative action). There is therefore a need to **re-conceptualise the objectives of the GGP to take on board both the issues of numbers and the hostile policy and legal framework** – with holistic and well thought-out strategies for addressing both these problems. These two problems are interrelated and are at the heart of gender inequality in Kenya’s governance system.

357. The GGP’s monitoring and evaluation framework is also very poor. Basic elements of programming were not built into the GGP such as baseline data and needs assessments. **Comprehensive baseline data is key to effectively designing appropriate interventions in any development context.** As a consequence of the absence of baseline data and given the lack of indicators at all levels except outcome/output, it is difficult to say whether the GGP is on course or not. One of the concerns raised by informants was that although there were many lessons that had been shared about the GGP there had been an unwillingness to listen and learn.

358. **UNIFEM has had some advantages as a PFMA, however, they have not brought their immense advantages to bear on this programme.** Firstly although they have only been PFMA for a year they were the technical advisory support unit for the programme from its inception. Given the resources that UNIFEM has vis-à-vis monitoring and evaluation, it is of concern that that they were apparently unable to detect the problems vis-à-vis the programme’s M&E framework. They also trained smaller, less resourced institutions in a purported results based management approach that has key flaws.

359. Fundamentally given the gravity and scale of challenges in respect of gender and governance in Kenya anyone working at as senior a level as the key financial management agent for the largest gender and governance programme in the country needs to have a full and unquestionable commitment to addressing the problem of gender inequality in Kenya’s governance sector. Passion and commitment are needed, alongside technical competence. **It is important that GGP find a ‘champion’ to lead the programme and keep it on track.**

360. Yet the scale of polarisation in the country also poses a very serious problem in respect of any institution playing the role of PFMA in respect of any governance programme in Kenya. **The fractured nature of the country’s women’s movement as well as the general problems of corruption and ethnic based discrimination that bedevil all political movements in the country place existing national institutions in a rather precarious position.** Principles of equality (not just in respect of gender but also ethnicity and political affiliation) and integrity must be integrated, strongly institutionalised and operationalised at all levels in respect of any governance programme operating in Kenya today.

361. **UNIFEM has acquitted itself relatively well in respect of this issue,** through for example trying to institute mechanisms to address the issue of integrity. Issues of diversity and political sensitivity still need to be deepened and there does seem to be potential for addressing the other governance concerns within the institution. In respect of the DSC, it is not clear whether or not there is an appreciation that these are concerns that need to be addressed in structuring a gender and governance programme not just at the levels of implementing partners and the PFMA but also themselves.

362. **In conclusion does Kenya need a gender and governance programme today? Unquestionably. Is the GGP that programme? Not yet. Could the GGP be that programme? Yes, if it was revised to address its design and conceptualisation weaknesses. Should UNIFEM continue as PFMA?** This is less clear – it needs to bolster capacity, become far better acquainted with local realities and contexts, play a far more proactive role, and considerably improve financial and performance M&E. It may need to take overtly political actions, which a UN body is not well-positioned to do – but it is well-positioned to facilitate dialogue with GoK institutions and programmes.

Appendices

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- Towards transformational leadership and governance in Kenya – Oct 2006 to Mar 2008
- GGP partner's review meeting – Sarova Panafric Hotel 5th to 7th Feb 2008

- Report of first quarter gender and governance partner's programme review – held on 21st Mar 2007 at Panafric Hotel
- TOR Programme and financial management – GGP II – Aug 2006
- Women Parliamentary Aspirants workshop (5th May) UNIFEM and GGP partners “after action” review meeting 22nd May 2007
- LPAC of GGP II proposals using the new strategic plan – 24th July -18th Aug 2006
- Report of the GGP II partners inception workshop
- Report on results based management skills building workshop
- Report on Partners Review Meeting
- CSOs work plans and contracts
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B: Instruments

(These have been slightly re-formatted to save space)

B1: Donor questionnaire

Gender and Governance Program (GGP) evaluation

Donor questionnaire

We have been commissioned to evaluate the Gender & Governance Programme. As part of a multi-method evaluation, this questionnaire is part of our survey of the attitudes of development partners to the programme itself, as well as broader governance-related issues.

Please answer the questions as fully and frankly as possible. We will NOT quote anyone by name or organisation: the confidentiality of individual responses is assured.

When completed, please e-mail to david@s-and-t.co.za

A.

Date: _____

Name of respondent _____

Name of Organisation _____

Position of Respondent: _____

B:

1) What word or words (adjective) come to mind when you hear the name ‘Gender & Governance programme?’

2) From where you sit, do you regard the programme as largely successful, unsuccessful, or a mixture?

Successful 1

Unsuccessful 2

Mixture 3

3) Why do you say that?

4) What do you consider the most important lessons learnt from the programme?

1. _____

2. _____

5) Did your organisation provide funds for GGP?

- Yes 1 (Go to Q6)
No 2 (Go to Q8)

6) If yes, what was total financial contribution to the programme? (Give in USD)

7) Why did you choose to support GGP II?

8) In your view, what are the key achievements of GGP II this far? (at most three)

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

9) What are the key failings of GGP II?

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

10) What have been the challenges of implementing GGP II?

1. _____

2. _____

11) In your opinion, are the objectives of GGP still relevant?

1. Yes

2. No

3. Don't know

12) How, if at all, would you revise the objectives of the programme? (at most 3)

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

13) How often did you meet the implementing partners?

1. Monthly

2. Quarterly

3. Every six months

4. Never

14) How often did you conduct field visits?

1. Monthly
2. Quarterly
3. Every six months
4. Never

15) In your opinion, how well is the programme managed?

1. Very well
2. Well
3. Not very well
4. Very poorly
5. Don't know

16) If your answer to 10 above is 'not very well' or 'very poorly', what are your concerns about the management of the programme? (at most 2)

1. _____
2. _____

17) What been the key lessons learnt in having UNIFEM as the PFMA for the programme?

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____

18) What best practises that have emerged out of implementing this programme?

1. _____
2. _____

19) What recommendations would you give for a future programme?

1. _____
2. _____

Thank you. Please save this as a Word file and e-mail to david@s-and-t.co.za

B2: Partner survey

EVALUATION OF THE GENDER AND GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME

NB: Everything in this questionnaire is confidential. No individuals will be identified in the analysis.

BIODATA

- 1. Name of organization _____
- 2. Date _____

Part One:

- 3. Which GGP thematic area are you working in?
 - I. Strengthen legislation policy and institutional frameworks
 - II. Enhanced leadership capacities of Kenyan women
 - III. Mainstream institutions committed to gender equality and governance
 - IV. Increased public acceptance of women in leadership

- 4. Were you involved in the design and planning of the Gender and Governance Programme (GGP)?
 - Yes 1
 - No 2
 - Don't know 3

- 5. How would you describe the key objective of GGP in your own words?

- 6. Please describe the projects your organization is implementing under the Gender and Governance Programme using the matrix in Annex I (at the end of this questionnaire)

- 7. Did you complete all of your GGP activities as planned?
 - Yes 1 (go to Q10)
 - No 2 (go to Q8)
 - Don't know 3 (go to Q10)

- 8. Which activities planned for 2004 -2007 under the GGP have not been implemented?
 - 1
 - 2
 - 3

- 9. What were the reasons for non-implementation (per activity)?
 - 1
 - 2
 - 3

- 10. What were the key factors contributing to successful implementation of GGP activities by your organisation? (internal or external) List top 2
 - 1
 - 2

- 11. What have been the main challenges/constraints faced during the implementation of the activities? List top 2
 - 1
 - 2

12. Did UNIFEM pay your organisation the agreed amounts at the agreed time?

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	3

13. Has anyone in your organisation been trained in financial procedures by UNIFEM?

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	3

14. Have you received any assistance in financial management from UNIFEM?

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	3

15. Are you able to apply the financial procedures required under GGP?

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	3

16. Do the UNIFEM financial procedures conflict with your internal financial procedures?

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	3

17. How often, if ever, do you submit financial reports to UNIFEM?

Monthly	1
Quarterly	2
6-monthly	3
Annually	4
Other	5
Never	6

18. How often, if ever, does UNIFEM give feedback on finances?

Monthly	1
Quarterly	2
6-monthly	3
Annually	4
Other	5
Never	6

19. How often, if ever, do UNIFEM staff visit your offices for financial monitoring?

Monthly	1
Quarterly	2
6-monthly	3
Annually	4
Other	5
Never	6

Part II

20. What do you consider to have been the 2 key achievements of your GGP funded project?

- 1.
- 2.

21. Do you think you have been successful, unsuccessful, or a mixture in your GGP work?

- | | |
|--------------|---|
| Successful | 1 |
| Mixed | 2 |
| Unsuccessful | 3 |

22. Please explain your answer:

23. How many GGP activities did you plan to carry out?

24. And how many did you in fact carry out?

25. What have been the outputs of your GGP project?

Total number meetings held: _____

Total materials produced: _____

Total women reached directly: _____

Total women reached indirectly: _____

Total men reached directly: _____

Total men reached indirectly: _____

26. *How* have women benefited from the activities you have implemented?

(a) Directly?

(b) Indirectly?

27. How have men benefited from the activities you implemented?

(a) Directly?

(b) Indirectly?

28. What have been the results/changes brought about by the activities you have implemented under the GGP? Please give examples.

(a) At individual level?

(b) At community level?

(c) At national level?

29. Did you achieve positive changes that were not planned, but just came about anyway?

- Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 3

30. Use a scale of 1-5 (1 being Very Effective, 2 being Fairly Effective, 3 being Neither Effective or Ineffective, 4 being Fairly Ineffective and 5 being Totally Ineffective). Please tell us to what extent your GGP projects have been effective in achieving the following objectives to enhance women's participation and leadership:

							N/A
(a) Constitutional Reform	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
(b) Legal Reform	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
(c) Policy Reform	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
(d) Institutional Reform	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
(e) Capacity building of women	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
(f) Positive images of women in leadership	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
(g) Increasing knowledge of women	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
(h) Increasing options and choices for women	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	

31. Which aspects of your project do you think had the most impact on your beneficiaries, and which the least?

(a) Most impact and why?

(b) Least impact and why?

32. What measures have you put in place to ensure the projects results are sustainable?

33. How can you improve impact?

Part III

34. What do you consider to be the key challenges facing women in Kenya in participation in leadership and governance?

35. How if at all did the projects you implemented under GGP address these challenges?

36. Does your GGP funded project contribute to achieving your organisation's strategic plan?

- Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 3

37. Does your GGP funded project complement or conflict any other projects being undertaken by your organisation?

- Complement 1
- Conflict 2
- Both 3
- Don't know 4

38. Who decided on the project thematic area, geographic location and target group (you can give more than one answer)?

	Thematic area	Geographic location	Target group
We did	1	1	1
UNIFEM	2	2	2
Donors	3	3	3
Other	4	4	4
D/know	5	5	5

39. Which strategies used in the project were found to be –
(a) Effective? Please explain.

(b) Ineffective? Please explain.

40. What other key focus areas should be included in GGP to enhance women's leadership and participation?

41. Which other key actors/beneficiaries should GGP target?

42. Does GGP reflect the real needs of women in Kenya today?

- Yes 1
- No 2
- Don't know 3

Part IV

43. How was your organisation identified for support under GGP?

- We applied 1
- EPPP/GGP approached us 2
- UNIFEM approached us 3
- Donors approached us 4
- Other (please explain) 5

44. What assistance if any did you get from UNIFEM during the project's design and formulation?

45. Did the project beneficiaries /target groups participate in **planning** the project?
Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 3

46. Did the project beneficiaries /target groups participate in **implementing** the project?
Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 3

47. Are structures are in place for effective engagement of all the partners in GGP?
Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 3

48. What are the challenges faced in engaging effectively with the other GGP partners?

49. Has participating in a GGP funded project assisted you with interaction and networking?
Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 3

50. Please give details of any activities in the programme you are implementing in collaboration with any other organisation?

None 1

51. Has UNIFEM been able to adequately fulfil its mandate in GPP?
Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 3

52. What value, if any, does UNIFEM add to GGP?

53. Have the donors adequately fulfilled their GGP responsibilities?
Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 3

54. What value, if any, do donors add to GGP (apart from funds)?

55. What capacity needs do you have in implementing projects supported under the GGP?

56. How, if at all, have you addressed the capacity gaps?

57. Did UNIFEM provide technical assistance in the implementation of projects under GGP?

- Yes 1
- No 2
- Don't know 3

58. Have you or your organisation/institution received any training under GGP?

- Yes 1 (go to Q59)
- No 2 (go to Q62)
- Don't know 3 (go to Q62)

59. What training did you/your organisation receive?

60. Was the training useful?

- Yes 1
- No 2
- Don't know 3

61. What recommendations would you make about future training under the GGP?

62. What are the strengths of the current funding arrangements in GGP?

63. What are the weaknesses of the current funding arrangements in GGP?

64. What suggestions can you make to improve the funding arrangements?

65. How frequently, if ever, do you submit project progress reports to UNIFEM?

- Monthly 1
- Quarterly 2
- 6-monthly 3
- Annually 4
- Other 5
- Never 6

66. What challenges (if any) do you face when reporting to UNIFEM?

67. How often, if ever, do you receive GGP-wide monitoring reports?

- Monthly 1
- Quarterly 2
- 6-monthly 3
- Annually 4
- Other 5
- Never 6

68. Has UNIFEM evaluated (or commissioned an evaluation) of your project?

- Yes 1
- No 2
- Don't know 3

69. Does GGP 'feel' like a big programme, or do you feel like it is just a set of individual projects under an umbrella?

- Programme 1
- Projects 2
- Both 3
- Don't know 4

70. What key lessons have been learnt from the implementation of your GGP funded project?

1 _____

2 _____

71. What are the best practises that emerged out of implementing your GGP funded project?

1 _____

2 _____

72. What recommendation would you give for future implementation of GGP?

B3: Local-level beneficiaries questionnaire

EVALUATION OF THE GENDER AND GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME

Date _____

A.

73. Name of Respondent: _____

74. Gender: (1). Male (2). Female

75. Name of organization

76. District

77. Constituency _____

B.

78. Have you heard of the Gender and Governance Programme (GGP)?

(1) Yes

(2) No

Proceed with Q87 if answer to Question 1 is "Yes"

Proceed with Q79 if answer to Question 1 is "No"

79. What words come to mind when I say GGP? How do you feel about the programme?

80. Do you know the objectives of the programme?

81. Are these objectives appropriate for where you live and work? What do you think the objectives of the programme should be?

82. What specific activities have been undertaken under the GGP in this area?

83. Did the GGP activities bring about any change in your area? Please describe these for me:

84. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being Very effective, 2 being Fairly Effective, 3 being Neither effective or Ineffective, 4 being Fairly Ineffective and 5 being Totally Ineffective) to what extent has GGP been effective in achieving the following objectives to enhance women's participation and leadership in this area?

(a) Constitutional Reform	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(b) Legal Reform	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(c) Policy Reform	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(d) Institutional Reform	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(e) Capacity building of women	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(f) Positive images of women in leadership	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(g) Increasing knowledge of women	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(h) Increasing options and choices for women	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

85. What are the weaknesses of GGP?

86. What recommendations would you give for future implementation of GGP?

C.

87. Which (other) programmes or organizations in this area, if any, are addressing women's participation in leadership and governance? – please provide brief description of who they are and what they do:

88. What have been the key achievements and key failings of these programmes or organizations?

Achievements:

Failings:

89. What do you consider to be the key challenges that women in this area face with regard to participation in leadership and governance?

90. How can the challenges be effectively addressed (for each challenge identified)?

91. What opportunities exist that can be used to promote women's leadership and participation in this area? Where should the focus be, and on whom?

92. What activities should be carried out by a programme to enhance women's leadership and participation in this area?

93. Who could effectively implement such a programme in this area? And who couldn't?

B4: Focus group guideline

EVALUATION OF GENDER GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

Introduction by the Facilitator:

1. Good morning/afternoon ladies and gentlemen
2. Researcher then introduces himself/herself and asks participants to introduce themselves.
3. Thanks the participants for coming; and assures them that their presence is very important.
4. Stresses that the aim of the session is to discuss and to hear everybody's opinion. There is no right or wrong answer, just your views, and those are what we want to hear.
 1. Everything you say is confidential. We are doing groups like this all round the country, and our report will merely say that 'some people felt this' or 'some people felt that' – you will not be identified by name. All comments you make in this discussion will be confidential. After the introductions the discussion will be tape-recorded (*if that is the case*). The reason for this is for the investigators to review the discussion later.
 2. The tapes will be destroyed after being reviewed by the investigators.
 3. I want this to be a group discussion so you do not have to wait for me to call on you. Please stop me if I change the subject and you have something to add.
 4. I am interested in all your ideas, comments and suggestions. Please feel free to participate even when you disagree. We would like as many points of view as possible.

The Facilitator states the Purpose of the session:

We will be discussing participation by men and women in governance within your community. In other words, we want to talk about what roles women and men play in how your community is run, the rules, and so on.

The Facilitator then takes the group through the following topics

1. What is gender equality? How do you feel about gender equality in Kenya today? [NB: Facilitator must give accurate definition if participants don't know what gender equality is]

Have there been any improvements regarding the following:

- Women's participation in politics?
- Opportunities for women to become leaders?
- Attitudes towards women leaders?
- Laws and policies to promote women leadership?

Why do you think this is the situation? [Probe for each item]

What skills do you think women need to become leaders?

Would you accept a woman as President, for example? How would you feel about that?

2. Problems faced

- What are the main problems that still need to be addressed in the above areas, that is in-
 - Women's participation in politics?
 - Opportunities for women to become leaders?
 - Attitudes towards women leaders?
 - Laws and policies to promote women leadership
- How can the problems be addressed?

2. Let's talk briefly about what is happening on the ground.

- Which organisations if any have been active in your community in enhancing women's participation in leadership? What do they do?
- How did the community benefit?
- What has the community been able to do as a result of the activities undertaken by the CSOs? How have your lives been changed by the activities
- What improvements can be made by the organisations in their activities for future programmes?

4. Changes made by women leaders

- Do you know of women leaders in your community or nationally? Do you admire any of them? Why?
- Why have they succeeded in getting leadership positions?
- What have been important contributions made by these women leaders?
- What have been their weak points and failings?
- Have they made it easier or harder for other women to follow?
- How do you think women in leadership positions can be made more effective?
- How can women in leadership promote gender equality?
-

End of session

The Facilitator closes the session by thanking all participants for sparing the time to participate. Inform them that their comments have been most useful.

C: A note on sampling

Constituencies to visit

This is a primarily qualitative study (beyond the survey of implementing partners) and so results will be indicative, not representative. Sampling has nonetheless been approached fairly rigorously, given the political situation and the way it and GGP intersect. In selecting constituencies for field visits, we have paid attention to regional diversity and social-cultural diversity; party politics and affiliation, as well as the number of GGP partners in a constituency. The latter is important so that we get maximum return on the field visits.

But we have also selected control sites. These are sites where GGP was not active, but women stood for election or did not, and succeeded or did not. (The areas are also politically representative.) The reason is to find what impact GGP has by contrasting it with areas where no GGP partners are working and yet women are standing, and being elected, and/or not standing or not being elected – are there strategies we can learn, are there additional barriers we have not considered, and so on. This will also be a proxy baseline, allowing us to compare with non-GGP sites. Using the above criteria, we have selected

- 2 constituencies that did not have GGP partners or elected women MPs. These are Kinangop (central) and Muhoroni (Nyanza)
- 3 constituencies that had GGP partners in the area and had women elected as MPs (no data on civic seats). These are Dagoretti (Nairobi), Taveta (coast), and Sotik (Rift Valley)
- 2 constituencies where there were GGP partners but no women were elected Dujis (N.E), and Ikolomani (Western)⁴⁸
- 2 constituencies with no GGP partners but had women elected Eldoret South (R.Valley), and Kathiani (Eastern)

This variety of constituencies, we hope, will provide a rich set of contexts within which to appraise progress towards achieving GGP objectives

<i>Province</i>	<i>Constituency</i>	<i>Rationale</i>	<i>GGP organisation(s)</i>
Central	Kinangop	No GGP and no women elected	None
Coast	Taveta	GGP & woman elected	COVAW ⁴⁹
Eastern	Kathiani	No GGP and woman elected	None
Nairobi	Dagoretti	GGP & woman elected	CCGD, WPA-K
North Eastern	Dujis	GGP & no women elected	Womankind
Nyanza	Muhoroni	No GGP & no women elected	None
Rift Valley	Eldoret South	No GGP & woman elected	None
	Sotik	GGP & woman elected	ECWD & Caucus
Western	Ikolomani ⁵⁰	GGP & no woman elected	YWCA, Caucus & FASI

⁴⁸ Due to logistical problems encountered with the relevant implementing partner (FASI) we did not visit Ikolomani, instead we visited Kakamega. Kakamega District constitutes two constituencies (Lurambi and Shinyalu) both of which theoretically had several GGP institutions working in them.

⁴⁹ The GGP matrix on this constituency is wrong: the organisations on the ground in Taita and Taveta districts are actually COVAW and the Caucus and it is the Caucus that has a presence on the ground in Taveta District and Constituency.

⁵⁰ Please see above. We did not go to Ikolomani, instead we visited Kakamega. It emerged that the Caucus had not been assigned to Ikolomani, as stated in the GGP matrix.

D: List of respondents

Meryem Aslan	UNIFEM
Violet Asante	Programme Officer FASI
Abdullahi Mohammed Abdi	Finance manager, WOMANKIND
Fumni Balogun	UNIFEM
Ursula Bahati	UNIFEM
Moe Siv Catherine	Royal Norwegian Embassy
Fatuma Omar Buno	Chairperson, WOMANKIND
Hubbie Hussein	Executive Director, WOMANKIND
Flora Tera Igoki	Parliamentary Aspirant, ODM-K
Elizabeth Jacobsen	Royal Norwegian Embassy
Prof. Wanjiku Kabira	WPA-K
Thiongo Kagicha	AWEPA
Faith Kasiva	Executive Director COSAV
Wambui Kanyi	CCGD
Anne Kirugumi	WPA-K
Anthony Maina	Programme Manager, WOMANKIND
Margaret Mbugua	WPA-K
Linet Miriti-Otieno	UNIFEM
Patricia Munayi	Netherlands Embassy
Josephine Mwangi	Sida
Njoki Ndung'u	Former MP, Secretary General Safina party
Praxedes Nekesa	CCGD
Mary Njeri,	Deputy Director ECWD
Hon. Sophia Abdi Noor	Nominated Member of Parliament
Anne Njogu	CREAW
Peter Ocholla	Program Officer, Caucus
Fred Ochieng	UNIFEM
Deborah Okumu	Executive Director, Caucus
Irene Oloo	League of Women Voters
Abdullahi Omar	Project co-ordinator, WOMANKIND
Kepta Ombati	Youth Agenda
Gladwell Otieno	Governance Expert, Executive Director AFRICOG
Muthoni Wanyeki	Kenya Human Rights Commission
Mary Wandia	Action Aid International (Africa)

Focus groups

- Group 1: GGP partners
- Group 2: youth
- Group 3: media implementing partners
- Group 4: Muhoroni constituency
- Group 5: Kinangop constituency
- Group 6: Kathiani constituency
- Group 7: Dagoretti constituency (CCGD)
- Group 8: Dagoretti constituency (WPA-K)

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION PARTICIPANTS

Garissa FGD 1 (7 men and 6 women)	Mobilisers and community members (GGP (Womankind))
Garissa FGD 2 (7 people participated in this FGD, 5 women and 2 men)	CDF members/workers, NCEP co-ordinators, etc.
FGD 1 Eldoret South (9 participants (5 women & 4 men))	Aspirants, mobilisers election mobilisers of a successful female parliamentary candidate, women CSO leaders
FGD 2 Eldoret South (7 participants (3 women & 4 men))	
FGD 1 Sotik Constituency	Local election mobilisers of a successful female parliamentary candidate who were trained by GGP partners (ECWD and Caucus)
FGD 1 Sotik Constituency (8 participants, 1 woman and 7 men)	Councillors, civic aspirants, CDF Committee members
FGD 1 Kakamega (10 people participated, 7 women and 3 men)	Elections observers from CSOs including one from an early GGP implementing partner (CJPC)
Taveta Constituency FGD 1 (8 participants: 2 men and 6 women)	Women's group leaders and mobilisers
Taveta Constituency FGD 1	Election mobilisers of a successful female parliamentary candidate, who were trained by a GGP partner (Caucus)

INCEPTION MEETING PARTICIPANTS

NAME	ORGANISATION
Akifeza Grace Ngarbirano	CAI
Caroline Teti	CAI
Kamthambi Kinoti	YWLI
Dr. Angie Dawa	ABANTU
Lidiah Kunya	CMD-K
Susan Mwachi	CMD-K
Rahab Muiu	ACEGA
Isabel Ndoho	ACEGA
Dommia Yambo	DTM
Mathews Ocharo	Federation of Women Groups
Priscilla Waithera	Tunda la Roho
Dr. Jensang Hutchinson	ECWD
Thiong'o Kagicha	AWEPA
Josephine Wandago	LKWV
Peter Ochola	C.W. Leadership (The Caucus)
Elizaphan Ogechi	Christian Partners Development Agency
Susan Kariuki	Youth Agency
Wangechi L. Wachira.	CREAW
Rebecca Kitana	WPA-K
Margaret Muchunu	MYWO
Eunice Mwambi	MYWO

Lydia Wangari
Munila Amolo
Gilda Gakii
Peter Onudi
Asenath K. Nyamu

Bridge Africa
WSPK
RCDA
RCDA
RCDA

E: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference

Evaluation of the Gender and Governance Programme II (GGP)

1 background

1.1 Governance Context

Kenya is situated in eastern region of the African continent and covers a total area of 582,646 km². The total population of Kenya was estimated at 32 million, as at 2005, with a growth rate of 4.2 per cent in 2005. About 80% of Kenya's population live in rural areas and are dependent on agriculture and livestock production. Agriculture dominates the country's economy accounting for 25 per cent of the GDP, employing about 67 per cent of the labour force and accounting for 70 per cent of export earnings.

Kenya has committed globally, regionally and internationally to empowering women and reducing gender inequalities in all sphere of life. The country's ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its periodic reporting on the same is a firm commitment for the country's legal commitment to women's human rights and especially related to governance. In addition, Kenya was among the few countries globally that took leadership for the global effort on women's empowerment, as it hosted the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies on Women, in 1985 and effectively participated in the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women, in 1995. The country thus expressed its commitment to taking actions towards addressing women's issues as it relates to the 12 critical areas of concern, including women in decision making.

At the regional level, Kenya fully participated in the development, negotiation and adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on Women's Rights in Africa, 2004. Efforts are underway for the country to ratify the same instruments and take internal measures for compliance. As a member of the East African Community (EAC) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, the country has been actively involved in the development of a gender and community development framework, within the EAC and the adoption of a Gender Policy for IGAD. Therefore the country has positively committed severally to women's issues. However, the same is not fully reflected in the baseline indicators on the status of women in 2002.

Although women make up half of Kenya's voting population, they have been systematically under-represented in political institutions and have had little say in the formulation of public policy choices and priorities⁵¹. According to the electoral commission of Kenya, of the 14, 294, 732 million voters in the last general

⁵¹ For further details, refer to the Gender and Governance Programme Document

elections in 2007, 47.2 % (i.e. 6,736,072) were women. Despite the considerable size of the women vote, representation of women in competitive and elected positions in 2002 was dismal. For instance, of the 1,035 candidates presented for the National Assembly (parliament), in 2002, 44 were women; while only 382 women comprised the 7,010 candidates presented as civic candidates. The 9th parliament had only 9 elected and 9 nominated women in parliament in a parliament of 222 members.

1.2 The Gender and Governance Programme (GGP)

The Gender and Governance Programme in Kenya is an innovative response towards promoting women's human rights in governance. The Millennium Development Declaration and Goals, 2000, places gender equality as goal to be achieved by 2015. The Millennium Development Goals sets a 50.50 target of women's presentation in parliament as an indicator of achievement of this goal. At the same time Goal 8 provides for global partnership, thereby calling on the donors, the UN agencies, NGOs and other actors to collectively contribute towards achieving the MDGs. Operationalizing the Millennium Development Goals, especially within the OECD countries has further been reinforced by the Paris Principles on Donor Coordination and Harmonisation. Joint programme and collective focus on strategic results for sustainability and impact grounded on ownership and coherence is at the core of this effort.

In 2001 a consortium of donors came together and evolved a partnership of cooperative support to a network of over 18 organisations with the goal of engendering the political process in Kenya through the Engendering Political Participation Process (EPPP I). The key goal of EPPP I was to support the creation of an enabling environment for women's effective participation in Kenya's 2002 elections. In partnership with, and with the insights from EPPP I partners, a group of donors developed the Gender and Governance Programme in Kenya, with a duration period of 2004-2009. The Goal of the Gender and Governance Programme is to ensure focused, coordinated, and long-term support towards women's enjoyment of human rights and participation in democratic governance.

The Gender and Governance Programme is being implemented by a broad range of organisations which have agreed to work together in order to pool methodologies and experience, and avoid duplication. At the end of the first phase of the Gender and Governance Programme managed by Action Aid International Kenya, several reviews and assessments were undertaken, and the Donor Steering Committee (DSC) decided to review the terms of reference for a new Programme and Financial Management Agency. The DSC also resolved to have UNIFEM manage the Gender and Governance Programme phase II from August 2006 through to the elections in December 2007 on behalf of the contributing donors to the GGP.

1.3 GGP Funding Arrangement:

GGP is a joint basket funding by the Royal Danish, Netherlands, and Norwegian embassies, DFiD, Sida, CIDA-GESP, Spain and Finland. The donors have signed a Joint Financing Agreement (JFA) which provides a framework for donor support to GGP phase II. UNIFEM acts as the Programme Finance Management Agency (PMFA) while there are 32 implementing partners working in 188 constituencies' country wide. GGP falls within the UNIFEM's broader programming system that is guided by a Multi-Year Funding Framework (MYFF), with the current one

covering the period 2004-2007. The MYFF has three main elements that include a strategic results framework that identifies four goals that UNIFEM seeks to support; an organizational effectiveness framework, and an integrated resources framework in response to national priorities. The MYFF therefore, provides strategic direction for enhancing UNIFEM's development and organizational effectiveness, with indicators for tracking progress.

2.0 GGP OBJECTIVES

The overall goal of GGP is to transform leadership and governance at all levels in Kenya in order to deliver on poverty reduction, access to basic needs and equality between and among persons.

The key objectives of the GGP II are:

- To support Constitutional, Legal, Policy and Institutional reform for gender equality, non-discrimination and the equal participation of women in all governance structures in Kenya.
- To increase options, choices and capacities for Kenyan women in order to enhance women's organizing, leadership, influencing and participation for gender equality, human rights and democratic governance.
- To strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities.
- To strengthen the knowledge and capacities on women CSOs on gender and governance and positioned them to spearhead & transform policies, programmes and resource allocation as well as provide empowerment support actions to women in Kenya.

2.1 GGP II Expected Outcomes:

The following were the expected outcomes from the GGP II:

- Institutional reforms provide space for women and provide affirmative action and quota systems for women that ensure at least an increase by 50% of women in critical decision making positions by end of 2007 and towards at least 30 % representation of women in decision making by end of 2009
- Increase of women, including young women, women living with disabilities/HIV/AIDS, women in marginalised communities, e.g. women pastoralist, in all levels of decision making (Parliament, Cabinet, Statutory Commissions/ Boards, Judiciary, Permanent Secretaries, Local Devolved Funds, Local Authorities, Police, Political Parties, Student Union Bodies and CSOs), with the public sphere increase by 50% by end of 2007 and at least 30% representation in these institutions by 2009.
- Governance decision making in Kenya reflects increased resources to National priorities based on gender analysis of key needs, opportunities and challenges and supports women's social and economic security and protect overall women's human rights
- Broad based support across the provinces and communities of Kenya reflect the acceptance of women's leadership and principles of non-discrimination and equality.

3.0 PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

The overall goal of this evaluation is to assess the progress towards the achievement of the expected results following the implementation of the activities during phase II of the programme so that lessons are learned to guide future programming and institutional arrangements for the GGP.

This evaluation specifically aims to:

- Assess progress made towards the achievement of planned results, the continuing relevance of the programme, mechanisms to ensure sustainability, institutional arrangements, and potential for replication of the initiative;
- Draw lessons learned from the programme; and
- Make recommendations on modifications of the project and its implementation to ensure achievement of planned results.

4.0 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

Assess **performance** of the Programme in regard to:

- the extent to which (progress towards) the programme achieved its stated objectives - effectiveness (the results achieved both qualitative and quantitative);
- Whether the objectives, outcomes, outputs and indicators were clearly adhered to as stated in the programme document;
- Assess if the indicators used (if any) were specific, measurable, attainable relevant. (this should be done against validity, reliability, sensitivity, simplicity, utility and affordability)
- the optimal transformation of inputs into outputs - efficiency; and the timeliness of the inputs and outputs;
- Assess the value for money

The **success** of the Project will be assessed in regard to:

- Results expected as linked to outcomes spelt out in Programme Document and linked to the strategic plans of the GGP implementing partners
- Progress towards the achievement of outcomes
- Factors contributing/hindering achievement of the results
- Strategic positioning of UNIFEM as PFMA, key UNIFEM contributions including outputs and of technical assistance (e.g. advocacy, networking)
- Assess the partnership strategy, formulation, performance and outreach (e.g. between UNIFEM and partners, amongst partners, UNIFEM & Donors, donors and partners etc.)
- Assess the direct and indirect benefits to women organizations
- Determine whether or not there is consensus among UNIFEM actors that the partnership strategy designed was the best one to achieve the outcomes.
- Whether the programme was implemented as designed.
- Review cross cutting strategies used to enhance programme effectiveness.

Assess the **Relevance** of the Programme in regard to:

- Consistency of programme with the Kenya country context (political, social and economic).
- Ownership and congruency of the programme to the partner mandates and strategic direction.

- Technical adequacy of programme to address the issues identified in the programme document.
- Potential for replication of strategies.
- Complementarity of programme with other similar initiatives supported by other donors.
- Relevance of the programme to identified beneficiaries and users of the results.

Evaluate the **Sustainability** of the programme

- Consistency with beneficiary priorities and demand.
- Support of programme by local institutions and integration with local social and cultural conditions.
- Satisfaction of local ownership requirements.
- Participation of partners in planning and implementation of interventions.
- Financial/programmatic capacity of partners to sustain the programme results from the intervention when donor support has been withdrawn.
- Extent to which steps have been taken to ensure that activities initiated by the Programme will be completed and continued on cessation of donor support.

Review **Partnership Principles** of the programme

- Assess the choice of stakeholders and reasons for their involvement.
- Review the extent the programme contributed to capacity development and the strengthening of Partner institutions and programmes.

Programme Management Modalities

- Has UNIFEM adhered to partnership principles (selection of partners, technical assistance to support capacities of partners, monitoring and evaluation, management of programme inputs, outputs, results etc, financial management of programme, support to the Donor Steering Committee etc) identified in programme document and terms of reference of UNIFEM as PFMA?
- How has UNIFEM and implementing partners adapted the GGP principles to ensure integrity in programme management and implementation?
- What is the value addition for using UNIFEM as PFMA as opposed to contracting an independent FMA?
- Assess the effectiveness of the GGP organizational arrangements (strengths and weaknesses; proposal approval processes, DSC link with PFMA, Monitoring of project, reporting requirements, quality and usefulness of the reports)

Lessons learned

- What are the lessons learned or can be drawn from the implementation of the programme so far?
- What strategies have worked and not worked and why?
- What are the unplanned results (positive or negative) from the implementation of the Programme?

5.0 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

- Literature review through revisiting various reports existing at UNIFEM, Donors and partners offices. The literature review should also include but not be limited to other relevant documents including GGP programme document, Strategic plan, partner review meeting reports and progress reports to donors.

- Review of materials produced by GGP II partners – including Information Education and Communication (IEC) materials; manuals; website content etc.
- Direct observation by visiting supported organizations in the intervening areas and conducting interviews and focus group discussions. Key informants for the evaluation will include implementing Civil Society Organizations and donors, women’s groups and individual women who benefited directly and indirectly from the programme as well as UNIFEM staff in Nairobi. Sampling can be applied in selection of sites to be visited for meetings with beneficiaries.

6.0 EXPECTED DELIVERABLES

The following will be the deliverables by the consultants:

- Evaluation inception report containing
 - Interpretation of TOR
 - Design of evaluation
 - Work plan
 - Evaluation tools
 - Sampling frames
- Programme site visits
- Participation in feedback of results with DSC, PFMA and partners
- Evaluation report (first draft for discussion followed by a final report). The consultant should submit four hard copies and two soft copies (in CD ROM) of the final report.

7.0 EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation team will be composed of a coalition of 3 consultants with an identified team leader, who should be an international expert, and who possess the following combination of skills and expertise:

- *At least 10 years experience in conducting evaluations, with post graduate degree in law, social sciences, development studies etc and with formal research skills.*
- *Knowledge of issues concerning governance, women’s human rights and gender equality specifically in the area of democratic governance,*
- *Familiarity with the relevant context in Kenya,*
- *Experience in evaluation, especially rights, gender and results-based evaluation;*
- *Facilitation skills and the ability to deal with multi-stakeholder groups; and*
- *Excellent communication skills and the ability to write succinct and focused report*

The Evaluation Team Leader will be responsible for the timely submission of the expected products.

7.1 Roles and Responsibilities

The role of the evaluation team is to prepare the evaluation design, identify appropriate evaluation tools, carry out the evaluation and prepare the evaluation report as well as any interim reports as required by the terms of reference. The evaluators should reflect the values of emphasis on the importance of gender analysis, an understanding of the rights-based approach to development and a commitment and skill in participatory methods when working with communities and the project partners.

8.0 EVALUATION TIMEFRAME

The evaluation is expected to take place for no more than 35 day between April and May 2008. The evaluation location and partners will be identified during the inception meetings with winning bid, DSC and UNIFEM.

9.0 management Arrangements and follow-up

Embassy of Norway and UNIFEM will support the evaluation and will designate a focal point for the evaluation and any additional staff to assist in facilitating the process (e.g., providing relevant documentation, arranging visits/interviews with key informants, etc.). Embassy of Norway and UNIFEM will ensure that the report submitted by the evaluation team satisfies the TOR fully. They will also ensure that the evaluation results are disseminated strategically. UNIFEM and the Embassy of Norway will develop an appropriate dissemination strategy (if required). Embassy of Norway and UNIFEM will also make sure that evaluation recommendations are considered and that agreed actions are implemented and monitored.

10.0 PROPOSED FORMAT FOR THE EVALUATION REPORT

Section	Content
Title Page	Title Page to include name of programme being evaluated, geographical location of the programme, dates of evaluation and name(s) of evaluators. Acronyms and definition of terms to be provided on separate page, which follows the title page.
Executive Summary	A summary of the report which highlights key findings pertaining to outcomes, recommendation, insights
Introduction	Overview <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Introduction to the document ▪ Reasons for Evaluation ▪ Scope and focus of evaluation ▪ Expectations of evaluation
Description of initiative to be evaluated	Context and rationale <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overview ▪ Background of initiative ▪ Expected outcomes ▪ Management ▪ Achievements ▪ Performance measurement information ▪ Monitoring ▪ Assessments
Evaluation Design	Overview of design <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Methodology with rationale for gender sensitivity, participation, result orientation and rights based management. • Key questions • Sources of data • Method of analysis
Evaluation Findings and Analysis	Findings with regards to results as per the TOR (focus on the performance, success, relevance, sustainability, partnership Principles and management modalities) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Special attention should be paid to changes in lives of women and progress towards gender equality • Voices of women should come through strongly in the presentation of findings • Insights
Lessons Learnt	With regard to: operations, to bringing change in the lives of women, to relations and equality between men and women. Include any boxes with real life stories.

Conclusions and Recommendations	List these with emphasis on results that are rights based Constraints, challenges and opportunities
Appendices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • References • Statistical results (if any) • Stories • Samples of instruments • List of categories of meetings held • List of respondents • Samples of media coverage of programme • Terms of Reference

F: GGP partners objectives and target groups

Implementing Partner	Project	Project Objective	Target Group
Women Political Alliance-Kenya	Expanding women's participation in governance Structures and consolidating Women's gains.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ensuring women's proposals are retained in the minimum/comprehensive reforms. ▪ Promoting women's representation in parliament by supporting 18 women parliamentary aspirants. ▪ Increasing women's representation in twenty identified local authorities targeting 30% women's representation. 	<p>Parliamentary and political parties.</p> <p>Women.</p> <p>Women, local authorities.</p>
Collaborative Centre for Gender and Development	Empowering women and transforming institutions to open up space and enhance women's participation in decision making.	Ensuring focused , coordinated and long term support towards women's enjoyment of Human rights and participation in democratic governance.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy makers • Women leaders • Women • Communities • General public
Education Centre For Women in Democracy (ECWD)	GGP II	<p>Objective II: To support constitutional, legal, policy and institutional reform for gender equality, non-discrimination and the equal participation of women in all governance structures in Kenya.</p> <p>Objective II: To increase options choices and capacities for Kenyan women in order to enhance women's organizing leadership, influencing and participation for gender equality, human rights and democratic governance.</p> <p>Objective III: To strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities.</p> <p>Objective III: to strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities.</p> <p>Result 3: Governance decision making in Kenya reflects increased resources to national priorities based on gender analysis of key needs , opportunities and challenges and supports women's social and economic security and to protect overall human rights.</p>	<p>Political party decision makers and officials.</p> <p>Like minded organisations.</p> <p>Constitutional review committees and all other affiliated structures.</p> <p>Women parliamentary aspirants.</p> <p>Women parliamentary and civic aspirants.</p> <p>19 women parliamentary aspirants in 18 constituencies.</p> <p>45 civic aspirants per 3 constituencies in 18 constituencies.</p> <p>Gender Civic Educators to create awareness on women aspirants and other governance/ human rights issues.</p> <p>Gender Civic Educators.</p> <p>Five (5) members from each of the Central Planning units of 10 key Government Ministries.</p>
ABANTU for Development	Gender and Governance: Closing the Gap	<p>To support constitutional, legal, policy and institutional reform for gender equality, non-discrimination and the equal participation of women in all governance structures in Kenya.</p> <p>To increase options choices and capacities of Kenyan women in order to enhance women organising leadership, influencing and</p>	<p>Political parties and leaders.</p> <p>Women leaders and aspiring leaders.</p> <p>Media both print and electronic.</p> <p>Community mobilisers.</p> <p>Women Youth and Men voters.</p>

		<p>participation for gender equality , human rights and democratic governance.</p> <p>To strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities.</p> <p>To strengthen the knowledge and capacities of women CSOs on gender and governance and positioned them to spearhead and transform policies , programme and resource allocation as well as provide empowerment , support action to women in Kenya.</p>	
AWEPA	<p>Voter Education for Youth.</p> <p>Voter Education for Women.</p>	<p>Improve the effectiveness of women and youth MP's in leading transformative change.</p> <p>Strengthen partnerships between youth and women MP's and civic society, media and private sector.</p> <p>Significantly increase the number of women and youth who register and vote in the 2007 Kenya election.</p> <p>Document and create models of the successful approaches taken in the above efforts.</p> <p>Strengthen the voice of women in the electoral process, ensuring that their key concerns and solutions are articulated and taken into account in the electoral process and in the actions and decisions of the subsequently elected governing bodies.</p> <p>Significantly increase the number of women representatives elected to parliament and local councils in the 2007 Kenya election.</p> <p>Significantly increase the number of women who register and vote in the 2007 Kenya election.</p> <p>Document and create models of the successful approaches taken in the above efforts.</p> <p>Improve the effectiveness of women MP's in leading transformative change.</p>	<p>The youth, 18-35 years.</p> <p>All eligible women voters, young and old.</p>
African Woman and Child Feature Service.	<p>Branding and message development exercise.</p> <p>Correspondents workshops.</p> <p>Profiling of women aspirants.</p>	<p>Branding GGP II to get the governance agenda onto the social and political agenda.</p> <p>To create knowledge on gender and governance issues within media coverage and portrayal.</p> <p>To mainstream gender in the media.</p>	<p>Media, women's organisations UNIFEM, political leaders and the public.</p> <p>Editors and media policy makers.</p> <p>Media, Kenyan public, women's organisations and aspirants/candidates.</p>
Youth Agenda	<p>Youth Empowerment Consortium (GGP I)</p> <p>GGP II</p>		<p>Youth and women.</p> <p>Young women.</p>
Community Aid International	<p>Gender Governance Programme II</p>	<p>To increase options, choices and capacities for Kenyan women in order to enhance women's organizing, leadership, influencing and participation for gender equality,</p>	

		<p>human rights and democracy governance by 2008. To strengthen positive image of women in leadership within communities by 2008.</p>	
<p>Christian Partners Development Agency (CDPA)</p>	<p>Alternative leadership Program (Oxfam Novib)</p> <p>Alternative Leadership Project (Ford Foundation)</p> <p>Gender and Governance Project.</p> <p>National Civic Education Programme II (Kenya National Civic Education Programme)</p> <p>Voter Education. (UNDP)</p> <p>Youth Empowerment on Development and Leadership.</p>	<p>To expand the alternative leadership programme in Vihiga district. To create gender awareness within the project area. To sensitize communities in the project area on good governance and advocacy for their rights. To remove restrictions and obstacles on community participation in accountability governance and development. To increase the number of NAs at the district, division, location and sub location levels. To convene leadership performance and service delivery hearing. To integrate the alternative leadership project in other CDPA components. To increase options, choices and capabilities of Kenyan women in order to enhance women's leadership for influencing and participation for Gender equality Human rights and Democratic governance. To strengthen the policy and institutional frameworks like the Gender Commission and Gender Department. To ensure gender equality and women's participation in political party processes. To increase options , choices and capabilities of Kenyan women in order to enhance women's leadership for influencing and participation for gender equality , human rights and democratic governance. To foster maturity and increased public awareness for active participation in governance issues. To improve public understanding of nation building , democracy , human rights , constitutionalism and good governance. To enhance political tolerance and maturity. To increase awareness on gender, HIV/AIDS and environment as crosscutting issues. To create awareness on the importance of elections. To ensure free and fair elections. To sensitize on good governance and ways of promoting it. The project goal is to realize</p>	<p>Women, men.</p> <p>Women, Youth, men.</p> <p>Women.</p> <p>Electorate. People with voters cards.</p> <p>Young women, young men.</p>

		economically, socially responsible and development conscious in the society.	
Rural Community Development Agency.		Increasing women in participation of governance at all levels and promoting women's human rights.	Women and youth (young women), council of elders and political parties.
Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organisation.			
The Caucus For Women's Leadership.			
The League of Kenyan Women Voters.	GGP II	To enhance the capacities, options and choices for Kenyan women, to effectively participate in leadership and decision making through systematic mobilization and capacity building.	Women aspirants both parliamentary and civic
The Women's Shadow Parliament-Kenya (WSP-K)			
Federation of Women Groups.	EPPP	To examine obstacles which women face in political processes in Kisii. To enhance the capacity of women leaders to participate effectively in elective politics and take leadership roles. To strategize on effective and efficient methodologies of winning elections. To provide civic education to the lowest level of community	Women leaders and possible women leaders. Community mobilisers both men and women. Opinion leaders.
	GGPII	To support constitutional, legal, policy & institutional reform for gender equality, non-discrimination & the equal participation of women in all governance structures in Kenya. To increase options, choices & capacities for Kenyan women in order to enhance women's organizing, leadership, influencing & participation for gender equality, human rights & democratic governance. To strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities.	Women leaders & parliamentary/civic aspirants. Opinion leaders. Community mobilisers both men and women. Political party officials.
African Centre for Empowerment, Gender and Advocacy (ACEGA)		Enhancing leadership capacities of Kenyan women. Increased acceptance by the public on women in leadership.	Women leaders and aspiring Women leaders. Community leaders. General public. Religious leaders.
The African	e-governance for	To strengthen women's participation	Women leaders, gender

Centre for Women, Information and Communications Technology (ACWICT)	Gender equality.	in governance and political processes through the use of information and communication technologies.	advocates.
Association of Media Women in Kenya.	Creating Awareness of the Gender and Governance Programme & Soliciting Support for Women Leadership for Democratic Governance in Kenya through Media	To strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities	Women
Gender and Development Centre. (GADECE)	EPP GGP I GGP II	Voting women into leadership Inclusive participation of women in governance Increase women's choices and options and capacities to improve their organizational, leadership and influencing skills to participate effectively in the democratic governance	Women Women Women
National Council of Women of Kenya (NCWK)			
Womankind Kenya	Gender and governance programme	To research and advocate for policy reforms support institutional gender equality, non discrimination and the equal participation of women in all government structures To increase options and capacities for NEP women in order to enhance women's organizing, leadership and participation for gender equality, human rights and democracy To strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities To strengthen the capacities and knowledge on women CSO on gender and governance and position them to spear head and transform policies, programs and resource allocation as well as provide empowerment support action to local women	Women, youth, men Women, general public Women, youth and men Religious leaders, youth, women
Young Women's Leadership Institute (YWLI)	GGP Phrase II	To promote the participation of youth at all levels of governance and democratic processes To mobilize support for women at all levels of governance	The Youth Women, more so younger women (18 – 35 years) General Public
Development Through	Production and dissemination of	To support Constitutional, legal, policy and Institutional reforms for	

<p>Media (DTM)</p>	<p>episodes of Together on the Move (TOTM) TV talk show Video documentation of the activities of the GGP partners as well as those outside the programme but connected to the achievement of its objectives. The footage was collected for key purposes among them; as a way of capturing the lessons of the programme for posterity, used for the making of news features as important components for he TV talks Under the DANIDA support aimed at up-scaling media activities which ends in September 2008, The production of additional TOTM episodes, GGP jingle, The woman’s space and media liaison through which DTM engaged with KTN for two newslines episodes, translation of the 2 PSAs into 8 languages for FM radio stations</p>	<p>gender equality, non-discrimination and the equal participation of women in all governance structures in Kenya. To increase options, choices and capacities for Kenyan women in order to enhance women’s organising, leadership, influencing and participation for gender equality, human rights and democratic governance. To strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities. To strengthen the knowledge and capacities on women CSOs on gender and governance and position them to spearhead and transform policies, programmes and resources allocation as well as provide empowerment support actions to women in Kenya. To promote mature, gender responsive public discourse on the issues of gender, governance and women in decision-making. To develop a comprehensive GGP Brand that will be recognisable by all critical stakeholders in Kenya. To communicate activities supporting Gender and Governance Programme in Kenya. To transform the media to promote results for gender equality, particularly in governance at all levels. To raise the profile of women candidates at all levels contesting elections in 2007 through appropriate communication strategies To strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities. To promote mature, gender responsive public discourse on the issues of gender, governance and women in decision-making. To develop a comprehensive GGP Brand that will be recognisable by all critical stakeholders in Kenya. To communicate activities supporting Gender and Governance Programme in Kenya. To transform the media to promote results for gender equality, particularly in governance at all levels. To promote mature, gender responsive public discourse on the issues of gender, governance and women indecision-making.</p>	
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		<p>To develop a comprehensive GGP Brand that will be recognisable by all critical stakeholders in Kenya</p> <p>To communicate activities supporting Gender and Governance Programme in Kenya.</p> <p>To transform the media to promote results for gender equality, particularly in governance at all levels</p>	
Siaya women and Youth Network for Development	GGP II	<p>To increase options, choices and capacities for Kenyan women in order to enhance women's organizing, leadership, influencing and participation for gender equality, human rights and democratic governance.</p> <p>To strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities.</p>	<p>Women leaders.</p> <p>Women.</p> <p>Community.</p> <p>Young Women</p>
Young Women's Christian Associate			
Bridge Africa	GGP I GGP II	<p>Gender Equality and Women's Participation in Local Governance</p> <p>Strengthening Parliamentary Initiative for Gender Equality</p> <p>Enhanced leadership capacities of Kenyan women</p> <p>Increased public acceptance of women in leadership</p>	Women
Mothers' Rural Care for Aids (MORCAO)	GGP II	<p>Enhanced leadership capacities of Kenyan Women</p> <p>Increased public acceptance of women in leadership</p>	<p>Community</p> <p>Women aspirants both young and old</p> <p>Political party leaders</p>
Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW)	Gender and Governance programme	<p>To support Constitutional, Legal, Policy and Institutional reform for gender equality, non-discrimination and the equal participation of women in all governance structures in Kenya.</p> <p>To increase options, choices and capacities for Kenyan women in order to enhance women's organizing, leadership, influencing and participation for gender equality, human rights and democratic governance</p> <p>To strengthen positive images of women in leadership within communities.</p>	<p>Women, Members of parliament ,political parties and the government , KEWOPA, Parliamentary committees</p> <p>Women , youth and men</p> <p>Women , youth and men</p>
Family Support Institute	The number of women elected to parliamentary and civic positions increase by 10% in 2007		<p>Women leaders, male leaders, adult women and men, young women and men</p>

Annexure G: Group work – Evaluation of GGP II workshop at Jacaranda Hotel (24th June 2008)

The evaluation findings were presented to a workshop of partners and stakeholders in late June 2008. As part of the workshop, participants brainstormed together how GGP III should look, in light of the findings and recommendations of this evaluation. Their inputs – largely unedited - are included here for the interest of the reader.⁵²

Purpose

- To engender governance institutions by ensuring equal participation of both women and men in all leadership structures and ensuring the involvement of all citizens through framework and programmes
- Entrenching gender equity in all governance structures and process by 2012, i.e. political, corporate, etc.
- Reform governance system to respond to the women's agenda
- Holding the government accountable for gender equality

Strategy

- Enhancing capacity and creating space for women leaders at all levels of government such as civic activity, CDF – a bottom up approach, through mobilization and training.
- Creating a data base for purposes of profiling women leaders access leadership sectors, not necessarily political
- Lobbying and advocacy at local levels to ensure gender sensitive structures to push women's agenda at national level
- Mobilization and sensitization at grass roots level
- Media and ICT to publicise and create the images among women
- Awareness raising about existing legal issues/bills/acts etc.
- Monitoring implementation of legislation.
- GGP as “watch dog”
- Strengthening empowerment especially towards youth and women re poverty
- Baseline survey – evidenced based
- Linking with on-going reform agendas
- Strategic partnerships
- Media
- Advocacy and lobbying
- Linking with the rights based approach
- Knowledge sharing/documentary
- Engage in constitutional, electoral, legal, policy and institutional reforms for equality
- Monitoring, implementation and compliance of gender response policies
- Lobbying and advocacy for policy reforms
- Engagement with media/media strategy to disseminate information
- Creating linkages and partnerships at different levels, institutions beneficiaries

⁵² Participants were in groups but we have grouped together their responses under the four headings provided – programme purpose, strategies, work on the ground, and institutional arrangements. There is inevitable duplication, items could be moved to other sections and so on, but we have left them as they were submitted.

- Capacity building – for institutional implementers, grassroots mobiliser on issues e.g. the Kriegler Commission, constitutional issues, national reconciliation
- Capacity for devolved governance. – structure to respond to women’s issues
- Mentorship – integrated dialogue

Local practice

- Partnerships among partners, donors, PFMA
- Lobby and advocacy at local levels
- Conflict resolution and management
- Trainings and mobilization
- Establish data bases
- Use of print and electronic media
- Partner forums/meetings
- Engage in constitution review mechanism
- Engage in political process currently going on e.g. Kriegler commission, reconstruction and reconciliation, GJLOS and land reform process
- Entrench GGP in Sector (political and legal) reforms
- Mainstream 30% representation in government structures
- Build a data base for women leaders (in parliamentary and civic positions)
- Ensure mechanism of accountability among women leaders from across the board
- Working with parliament, judiciary
- Youth groups
- Women organizations
- Faith based organizations
- Elders in various communities
- Administrations
- Local authority
- Media
- CDF/other devolved funds
- Executive/all ministries
- Workshop with policy makers, provincial admin, local admin, civic leaders, grass root leaders, cultural institution (community leaders)
- Focus group discussion
- Educate the right holders/duty bearers accountable on gender issues.

Institutional arrangements

- Partners leading forums
- Develop a women’s agenda
- Committee for donors, PFMA and partner representation
- Strengthened feed back mechanisms for information
- As suggested by the evaluation, need a direct link between donors/implementers by having donors do regular field visits to understand the environment/field.
- We highly recommend and propose the structure/recommendations from the evaluation team.