

**Mid-Term Evaluation of the Integrated Programme for
Women in Politics and Decision-Making (IPWPDM)**

Evaluation Report

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June 2011

List of Acronyms

| | | |
|----------|---|---|
| AusAID | - | Australian Agency for International Development |
| CEDAW | - | Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women |
| DV | - | Domestic Violence |
| ESI | - | Estimated Sustainable Income |
| GE | - | Gender Equality |
| GMPTL | - | Grupo Das Mulheres Parlamentares de Timor-Leste |
| GoTL | - | Government of Timor-Leste |
| GRB | - | Gender-Responsive Budgeting |
| GRC | - | Gender Resource Center |
| IEC | - | Information, Education and Communication |
| INGO | - | International Non-Government Organization |
| IPWPDM | - | Integrated Programme for Women in Politics and Decision-Making |
| MAFF | - | Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries |
| M & E | - | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MDGs | - | Millennium Development Goals |
| MDG-F | - | MDG Achievement Fund |
| MoE | - | Ministry of Education |
| MoH | - | Ministry of Health |
| NDP | - | National Development Plan |
| NGO | - | Non-Government Organization |
| NSC | - | National Steering Committee |
| PERWL | - | Programme for Enhancing Rural Women's Leadership |
| PM | - | Programme Manager |
| PME | - | Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation |
| PMT | - | Programme Management Team |
| PSC | - | Programme Steering Committee |
| RBM | - | Results-Based Management |
| SEPI | - | Sekretaria Estada Promosaun Iguualidade |
| TOR | - | Terms of Reference |
| ToT | - | Training of Trainers |
| UN | - | United Nations |
| UNDEF | - | United Nations Democracy Fund |
| UNDP | - | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNEG | - | United Nations Evaluation Group |
| UNIFEM | - | United Nations Development Fund for Women |
| UNMIT | - | United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste |
| UNTAET | - | United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor |
| UNV | - | United Nations Volunteers |
| UN Women | - | United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women |

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I. Context of the Evaluation

A. Overall Context

1. Development Context

As part of the process leading towards international recognition of the country's independence in 2002, the Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) began to set up its state institutions and adopted policies for governance. A Constituent Assembly was elected in 2001, which worked for the ratification of the Constitution in 2002. The constitution mandates the election of a President and members of the National Parliament, empowers the Prime Minister to lead the government, and stipulates the functioning of the judicial courts. Election-related enabling laws were also passed in 2004 and 2006 which set the rules for local-level elections (i.e. the election of village chiefs and councils), and national elections (i.e. the election of the president and the members of the national parliament).

Subsequently, national elections in Timor-Leste were completed in 2001 and 2007, while village-level (i.e. suco) elections were held in 2004-2005 and in 2009. In general, the national elections were concluded by international observers to have been free and fair. Voter turnouts in these exercises were also assessed to have been high. However, the municipal elections which were scheduled in 2010 did not push through because its enabling law was not passed. The physical and human resources at the level of the municipalities were also perceived to be inadequate; on the whole, it is believed that the national government concluded that it was not yet time to establish the municipal-level structures and as such, the municipal elections were postponed to 2013. Earlier, there was also an episode of internal strife which occurred in Timor-Leste in 2006-2008, which resulted in overall political instability.¹

In mid-2002, the GoTL adopted a National Development Plan (NDP) which set out the country's direction and strategies for the next 20 years. The approach taken in the plan is pragmatic and two-fold: in the short-term, basic enabling legislation and institutional development will be pursued, with an intention of accelerating the pace of social and economic development in the longer-term period. The development financing strategy underlying the plan is also based on the two-phase scenario: donor support will primarily be relied upon in the immediate period, while internal revenues expected mainly from the oil and gas industry is expected to build up over time.

The financial data presented in Table 1 indeed show that as the local economy (and its ability to raise domestic revenues) is still being developed, much of the government's incomes have come from donors and the Petroleum Fund. Recurrent government expenditures have also formed a large part of the spending pattern, with smaller albeit increasing allocations for capital expenditures, including those spent for the building of roads and other basic facilities. The amounts of capital spending (at least until 2009) also appear to have been inadequate to serve the needs of the country's 442 sucos.²

Further, concern has been raised in the current period on the sustainability of the development financing strategy which is basically dependent on depleting resources. Recent drawdowns from the Petroleum Fund which were beyond the accepted norm have also caused some apprehension in the development community.³

¹ In 2006, there was a resurgence of intra-military and mob violence in the country which necessitated the deployment of stabilization forces from Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal. The crisis led to a change of the Prime Minister in 2007. Also, in 2008, former military personnel attempted to assassinate the President and Prime Minister of Timor-Leste.

² The data show that a total of US\$303 million were spent for capital expenditures from the period of 2002 until 2008, which imply that less than US\$1 million have been invested for each suco over this period.

³ The Petroleum Fund operates as a trust fund held by the GoTL in behalf of its people. Revenues from the oil and gas industry are credited to the fund, and withdrawals by the GoTL to fund the state budgets are likewise authorized. In 2009 and 2010, it was reported that withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund were US\$100 million more than its Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI). This point was emphasized in the latest [2011] Human Development Report.

Table 1. GoTL Revenues and Expenditures, Selected Years (in US\$ millions)⁴

| | 2002 | 2007 | 2009 |
|----------------------|------|------|------|
| <u>Expenditures</u> | | | |
| Recurrent | 50 | 188 | 438 |
| Capital | 11 | 54 | 243 |
| <u>Revenues</u> | | | |
| Domestic | 25 | 49 | 91 |
| (External) Financing | 36 | 193 | 590 |

Source: 2010 State Budget and Consultant's Estimates

2. Gender Context

In Timor-Leste, significant progress has been made to promote gender equality, protect women from abuse, and strengthen the women's NGOs. The 2002 Constitution itself recognizes gender equality as among the fundamental rights in Timorese society. The 2002 NDP also contains a clear agenda and programme for gender equality. In 2002, the GoTL ratified the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the *Sekretaria Estadu Promosaun Igualdade* (SEPI) or the Office of the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality was created in 2007. Finally, the Law Against Domestic Violence was passed in 2010.⁵

Several of the women's NGOs in the country are also organized under the Rede Feto network. Rede Feto was organized in 2000, when the first national women's congress in Timor-Leste was held. It has 18 member-organizations and has been active in articulating the perspectives of the organized women in the country in various forums and consultative mechanisms.⁶

Still, there are continuing gender issues in Timorese society. One of these is the underrepresentation of women in the political life and public governance of the country, despite the fact that the working age population (i.e. age 20-64) and the proportion of eligible voters are split almost evenly between women and men.

There have been few women (2% of the total elected) who were elected as suco chiefs in 2004-2005 and even in 2009. While 28% of the suco council members elected in 2009 are women compared to 19% in 2004-2005, these would seem to be due to the mandatory allocation of seats for women under the election law. At the national level, while the number of women in the national parliament has been steady at 26%-29% over the past two electoral cycles, it is believed that these have been influenced by international and national advocacy and a quota system which was adopted in 2007.⁷ Further, the proportion of women in the executive positions has been marginal: only 15%-23% of the ministerial positions were tasked to women (compared to the target of 30% women in total civil service positions), while it was only recently that a woman was appointed to a secretary of state position

⁴ The figures for 2002 and 2007 are actual data reported in the 2010 State Budget, while the 2009 data are per the budget proposed for that fiscal year.

⁵ Section 16 (Universality and Equality) and Section 17 (Equality Between Women and Men) of Title 1, Part II of the Constitution declared that *No one shall be discriminated against on grounds of (among others) gender, and Women and men shall have the same rights and duties in all areas of family, political, economic, social and cultural life.*

⁶ Since the 1st congress held in 2000, Rede Feto reported that a 2nd and 3rd congress were held in 2004 and 2008.

⁷ The UN Mission in Timor-Leste pushed for inclusion of women representatives in the 2001 Constituent Assembly, which served as the first national parliament until the 2007 elections. In the 2007 elections, a quota system was adopted in which one woman out of 4 candidates in a party list was required.

[Table 2]. In its latest [2008] CEDAW Report, the GoTL also reported that only 22% of its civil service positions are being performed by women, which is below the target of 30%.⁸

Table 2. Selected Electoral and Governance Data

| | Number of Women | | Proportion of Women | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|-------|---------------------|------|
| | 2004/2005 | 2009 | 2004/2005 | 2009 |
| <u>Local Level</u> | | | | |
| Suco Chiefs | 7 | 10 | 2% | 2% |
| Suco Councils | 1,342 | 1,379 | 19% | 28% |
| | 2001 | 2007 | 2001 | 2007 |
| <u>National Level</u> | | | | |
| Members of Parliament | 25 | 18 | 27% | 28% |
| Ministers | 2 | 3 | 15% | 23% |
| Secretaries of State | 0 | 1 | 0% | 11% |

Sources: UNDP, DGSU, IPWPDM Programme Document, Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership, GoTL Website, PERWL Final Evaluation Report

The known factors for the disadvantaged position of women in politics and public governance in Timor-Leste are: (a) an overall culture of patriarchy which is prevailing in the country; (b) a lack of confidence and capacities by women; (c) absence of affirmative action policies by political parties; and (d) inability of women to compete with men in civil service positions in terms of academic credentials and work experience [CEDAW 2007 Report].

The international community and the women's organizations in the country have earlier on sought to correct this gender imbalance by advocating for the adoption of affirmative action policies during the incipient stages of nation-building. It was reported that strong lobbying by the UN and the women's groups resulted in the appointment of women to ministerial positions in the interim national council, and subsequently, the inclusion of women in the Constituent Assembly of 2001. Advocacy activities are also believed to have led to the integration of an overall gender equality framework in the 2002 Constitution, and the adoption of gender quotas in the 2009 (local) and 2007 (national) electoral laws.⁹

In order to foster women's participation in these affairs, capacity-building initiatives for potential women leaders also commenced within this period. The then UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) and the then UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) launched political

⁸ SEPI commented that 28% of civil service positions were occupied by women as of date, quoting the Comissaria do Funsau Publica.

⁹ It was reported that the interim national council had rejected a proposed 30% quota for women in the Constitutional Assembly which was convened in 2001. Hence, the UN lobbied directly to the political parties to include women in their candidates' lists.

training sessions for prospective women candidates to the Constituent Assembly. In response to the 2004-2005 local elections, UNIFEM also implemented the Programme for Enhancing Rural Women's Leadership and Participation in Nation-Building in Timor-Leste (PERWL) from 2004 until 2007. Over 1,200 village-level women-leaders were reported to have been trained under this PERWL Programme.

B. Programme Context

1. Programme Background and Features

Taking off from the experiences in the PERWL Programme, UNIFEM developed a succeeding programme entitled *Integrated Programme on Women in Politics and Decision-Making (IPWPDM)*. Unlike the PERWL Programme which was focused at the level of the districts, the IPWPDM likewise included interventions at the national level, primarily through the establishment of a *Gender Resource Center (GRC)* lodged at the National Parliament, and another project entitled *Gender Mainstreaming in Line Ministries* which featured the deployment of gender advisers in selected GoTL ministries.¹⁰ Local-level interventions nevertheless continued through two projects which were intended to support the suco elections in 2009. The first one was funded by UNDEF and covered four (4) districts: Oecussi, Ermera, Viqueque and Lautem. A second one was later funded by AusAID, and it was supposed to be carried out in another set of five (5) districts: Dili, Liquica, Manatuto, Baucau and Aileu [Table 3]. The IPWPDM is also designed for 7 years, from 2007 until 2013.

The programme is distinctly comprised by four projects, two of which were focused on the district-level, while the other three were national-level projects. Aside from these, the IPWPDM was also augmented by cost-sharing agreements on the whole programme itself. The total amount granted to the programme is around US\$2.3 million. There were four donors which contributed to the programme/project funds [Table 3].¹¹

¹⁰ National-level activities were also carried out outside these two main projects, through activities supported by the cost-sharing agreements and the *2007 National Election Capacity Building Project*.

¹¹ Four component projects were covered by separate project documents, while the cost-sharing agreements were supported by the programme document itself. The staff clarified that there was also a preliminary project called *2007 National Election Capacity Building Project* which was the precursor for the *Gender Resource Center Project*. The national-level projects are being regarded as such because the project activities and effects associated with these are not limited to any district/s.

Table 3. Summary Data on the IPWPDM

| Component-Projects | Scope | Time Frame | | Fund Received (US\$) | Donors |
|---|---|------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | | Planned | Actual | | |
| <i>Gender Resource Center</i> | National | 2008-2011 | 2008-2011 | 324,273 | AusAID |
| <i>Gender Mainstreaming in Line Ministries</i> | National | 2007-2010 | 2007-2011 | 383,114 | Irish Aid |
| <i>Enhancing Women's Role in Timor-Leste Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Nation-Building</i> | Districts of Oecussi, Ermera, Viqueque, and Lautem | 2008-2010 | 2008-2010 | 261,000 | UNDEF |
| <i>Enhancing Women's Leadership and Participation in the Suco (Village) Council</i> | Districts of Dili, Liquica, Manatuto, Baucau, and Aileu | 2009-2010 | 2009-Present | 186,217 | AusAID |
| Cost-Sharing Agreements | National National | 2007-2008 2007-2008 | 2007-Present 2007-Present | 353,090 667,781 | Norway Irish Aid |
| <i>2007 National Election Capacity Building</i> | National | 2007-2008 | 2007-2008 | 87,500 | UNDEF |
| | | | | 2,262,975 | |

Source: Project Documents and Reports

2. Key Activities and Timelines

Through the *Gender Resource Center (GRC) Project*, a physical center was established at the premises of the national parliament in Dili which houses the offices of the group of women parliamentarians being supported by the project (i.e. the *Grupo das Mulheres Parlamentares de Timor-Leste* or GMPTL) and the project staff, as well as a meeting room where the GMPTL members hold consultations with various women's groups and their other constituencies. The GRC Project also supported the capacity-building of the GMPTL members through study visits, technical assistance in gender-responsive budgeting, public relations, and overall staff support. This project will operationally end in May 2011.

Five (5) Gender Advisers were posted in four (4) GoTL Ministries (i.e. MOH, MOE, MAFF, SEPI) under the *Gender Mainstreaming in Line Ministries Project*. These advisers helped the ministries in carrying out gender assessments, in developing gender-responsive plans of action, establishing gender units and capacitating the gender officers, and in conducting gender trainings among the ministry staff. This project ended in February 2011.¹²

¹² Irish Aid nevertheless continued to support the deployment of gender advisers in SEPI, the Ministry of Economy and Development, and the Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management through another project.

As earlier stated, the two district-specific projects were intended to support the 2009 suco elections. As such, their projects designs included both pre-election and post-election activities. Pre-election activities involved the conduct of information campaigns on the newly-enacted suco electoral law, the training of district facilitators who were expected to deliver the training courses to beneficiaries, and the actual conduct of transformative leadership training seminars to candidate suco chiefs and suco council members. Post-election activities also mainly featured the provision of functional training seminars to those who have been elected as suco chiefs and their suco council members. Still, it should be disclosed here at the onset of this report that these activities went full cycle only for one project (i.e. the UNDEF-funded project). For reasons that will be discussed later in this report, the other project (i.e. the AusAID-funded project) was not implemented as planned and had few activities undertaken. The UNDEF-funded project ended in 2010, and a no-cost extension of the AusAID-funded project was granted until June 2011.

Aside from these project-specific activities, several activities that are related to the programme goal were done. The key efforts at this level are the advocacy activities and monitoring of the 2007 national elections, the dissemination of a study on the feminization of poverty, and the strengthening of women's wings among the political parties in Timor-Leste. There are related on-going activities which are associated with the balances of the cost-sharing agreements with the Norwegian Government and Irish Aid, which imply that these agreements are still current.

The programme portfolio also included a project called *2007 National Election Capacity Building Project* which was also funded by UNDEF. This was a precursor to the *Gender Resource Center Project*.

3. Objectives and Expected Results

Based on the programme document, the goal of the IPWPDM is to promote gender equality in democratic governance. It aims to: (a) promote women as viable and responsible candidates; (b) promote women's participation through transformative leadership in politics and the communities; (c) ensure effective contribution and participation of women elected officials in decision making; (d) enhance understanding, contribution of and benefits for elected women officials, of gender mainstreaming and the transformation agenda [sic]; and (e) enhance the knowledge and skills of elected women and men representatives at the municipal assembly and suco council.

The expected results from the programme are stated in the Results Framework which has been appended to this report [Annex B]. There are separate Results Frameworks for the programme and the four projects.

4. Manner of Implementation

The programme as a whole is being implemented by UNIFEM/UN Women. Except for the *GRC Project* which was co-implemented with UNDP, the projects under the programme and the activities charged to the cost-sharing agreements are being directly implemented by UNIFEM/UN Women. UNIFEM/UN Women hired two project staff for the *GRC Project* (one Coordinator and one Media Officer), and employed the five gender advisers who did the work for the *Gender Mainstreaming Project*. However, the actual conduct of activities related to the two suco election-related projects and the 2007 national elections were coursed by UNIFEM/UN Women through several NGOs. The Rede Feto network had particularly been the main implementer for the two support projects for the suco elections in 2009 [Table 4].

Table 4. Programme Target Groups and Implementers

| Component-Projects | Target Groups | Implementers |
|---|---|---|
| <i>Gender Resource Center</i> | Members of Parliament | UNDP, UNIFEM |
| <i>Gender Mainstreaming in Line Ministries</i> | MOH, MOE, MAFF, SEPI | UNIFEM |
| <i>Enhancing Women's Role in Timor-Leste Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Nation-Building</i> | Women Candidates and Elected Women | Rede Feto ¹³ |
| <i>Enhancing Women's Leadership and Participation in the Suco (Village) Council</i> | Women Candidates and Elected Women | Rede Feto |
| Cost-Sharing Agreements | <i>Undefined</i> | <i>Various NGOs</i> |
| <i>2007 National Election Capacity Building</i> | <i>Political Parties, Candidate and Elected Members of Parliament</i> | Caucus Feto Iha Politica and KOMEK NGOs |

Source: Project Documents and Reports

5. Status of UNIFEM/UN Women

In July 2010, UNIFEM was merged with three other units within the UN System to form the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women). This step was taken as part of the UN Reform Agenda, and particularly to address the challenges of inadequate funding and the lack of a single driver to direct UN activities on issues pertaining to gender equality.

In Timor-Leste, the UN Women Office is continuing with the implementation of the programmes and projects under the former UNIFEM. The operating structure of UN Women is also the same as the previous UNIFEM: the local office in Timor-Leste is under a sub-regional office based in Bangkok, and its headquarters is located in New York City. The management system in UNIFEM/UN Women is centralized: approvals and decisions are taken in the Bangkok and New York offices.

Nevertheless, it was reported that there are on-going efforts to decentralize the operations of UN Women in Timor-Leste. This process has started with the upgrading of the Country Programme Manager position to a senior rank. A first mission for a risk assessment was also done in April 2011, although the results of the assessment are still unknown as of this date.

¹³ Rede Feto implemented the suco support projects through its NGO-members.

C. Details About the Evaluation

1. Objectives and Approach

The objectives of the mid-term evaluation were to: (a) evaluate the results achieved to date, and likely to be achieved by end-2013; (b) assess the strengths, as well as the weaknesses and limitations of the programme and projects; (c) evaluate how and to what extent the various projects are articulated, and how they complement each other; and (d) provide information, lessons learned, and recommendations for the remaining period of the IPWPDM.

The mid-term evaluation followed a formative and stakeholder approach. It was forward-looking, and was generally aimed at improving the second half of programme implementation. It sought to help achieve the results expected from the intervention.

A stakeholder approach was also followed in the evaluation. Aside from UN Women, the various implementers, beneficiaries, other UN Agencies, and donors were consulted and involved in the exercise. A Stakeholders Group for the evaluation was also created.

2. Scope of the Evaluation

The mid-term review covered the inputs, activities and results within the time frame of 2007-2010. In assessing the results, the work also considered the potential achievement of results until 2013.

The assessment was based on the standard criteria of Relevance, Coherence, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability. The guide questions for each criterion are indicated in Annex C.

3. Methodology Being Applied for the Evaluation

The work was performed by an International Consultant with assistance from an Interpreter contracted for the evaluation, and key UN Women Staff.¹⁴

A Stakeholders Group was organized for the purposes of the mid-term evaluation. The Stakeholders Group served as a collective mechanism for the involvement of the stakeholders in the exercise. Comments and corrections on the draft evaluation report were coursed through this group.

Information for the evaluation were collected through document reviews, interviews, and group discussions with the project/programme implementers, beneficiaries, donors, and other interest groups. To the best extent possible, these information were subjected to triangulation (i.e. consideration of varied perspectives from the implementers, beneficiaries, donors, and other interest groups, as well as from the data and opinions forwarded in the documents). Interviews and group discussions were aided by questionnaires and guide questions. Validation of the information presented in this report was done through the comments and corrections by the Stakeholders Group. However, the consultant had the final decision as to how the evaluation report was revised.

In the collection of information, the evaluation consulted with key persons from the national-level institutions that are involved in the programme particularly the GMPTL, the Committee on Gender Equality, SEPI, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and Rede Feto. Separate meetings with the donor agencies (i.e. Irish Aid and AusAID), as well as with other UN Agencies and the UNMIT were also held. Field visits were also held in Baucau, Ermera and Liquica. In these visits, consultations with elected women suco chiefs, some of their council members, and a local facilitator were held. Elected women suco chiefs from Viqueque were also consulted by the evaluation in Dili, where a general assembly of the suco chiefs was convened. Candidates for the suco chief position and council members in Dili and Ermera were also consulted [Annex D].

¹⁴ The original plan was to form an Evaluation Team composed of 1 International Consultant and 2 National Consultants, but the recruitment of the national consultants was not successful.

II. Findings and Analyses

A. Relevance of the Programme

1. Alignment with the National Development Plan (NDP)

The baseline [2002] gender issues in Timor-Leste are thoroughly discussed in the NDP, and the strategies and programmes that will be taken to address these issues are present in the document. Among these is the issue of “*women’s participation in leadership and decision-making*” which is part of the sub-section on the country’s political development plan. It is clear from the document that the GoTL intends to work on achieving gender balance in the country’s public governance system, as the plan includes the “*Accomplishment of targets for the participation of women in the public service, parliament, rural councils, defence and security forces and diplomatic service*” among the key development indicators of the plan.¹⁵ Since IPWPDM activities are aimed at increasing women’s access to leadership and decision-making through the national parliament and the suco councils, it is clear that the programme being evaluated is aligned well with the national plan.

There are also two action programmes stated in the NDP which matches the IPWPDM interventions. These are the programmes on “*Capacity building for women’s participation in leadership and decision making through training in order to stimulate skills for decision making, negotiation, politics and other leadership areas*” which is being addressed through the suco-support projects and also in the national parliament through the GRC Project, and on “*Ensuring gender balance through recruitment, elimination of constraints and discrimination against women and integration of gender issues in all laws, programs and policies*” which corresponds to the IPWPDM national-level component-projects [Table 3].¹⁶

2. Relevance of Programme Results to the Advancement of Gender Equality in Timor-Leste

The programme goal defined in the Results Framework is *To promote gender equality in democratic governance*. This is being operationally done by increasing and enhancing the participation of women in the national parliament and the suco councils, and the adoption of gender equality plans in the target ministries. The programme’s intent to achieve this goal is helping advance the gender equality objectives of the GoTL as stated in the NDP (as discussed in the preceding section).

Some of the outcome and output statements of the programme (in the current version of the Results Framework) also appear to be clearly related to the gender equality agenda in Timor-Leste, as articulated in the NDP and as implied in the CEDAW Report [Annex B]. In particular, Outcome 1 (i.e. *Gender aware and effective women are elected into decision making positions in national level state institutions and at the municipal and suco or village councils*) is linked to the indicator adopted in the NDP (i.e. *Accomplishment of targets for the participation of women in the public service, parliament, rural councils, defence and security forces and diplomatic service*), while Outcome 2 (i.e. *Elected women leaders at the national, municipal and suco levels are able to influence a gender responsive rights-based agenda for women*) is leading towards the GoTL’s commitments to CEDAW.

There are also several outputs which are logically associated with the GE Agenda in the NDP and its action programmes (i.e. Outputs 1.1, 1.3, 2.2, 2.4, and 2.5). At the same time, it is difficult to establish the same relevance in the other output statements because of flaws in their formulation and other weaknesses in coherence (see Part B – Coherence of the Programme).

3. Contribution to the Advancement of CEDAW and the MDGs

After the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was ratified by the GoTL in December 2002, an initial state report was prepared in 2004-2006 and presented to the 44th CEDAW Session held in July 2009. Among other findings, the report acknowledged that there is still discrimination against women in terms of decision-making in Timor-Leste, despite the progress that have been made since the country’s independence, as indicated by the number of women in parliament and in civil service. Particular mention was made on the fact that

¹⁵ Page 112 of the NDP.

¹⁶ Page 119 of the NDP.

there were only 7 (out of 442) women suco chiefs (and 22 women aldeia chiefs) at that time. According to this report, the contributing factors to this form of discrimination against women are: (a) the political tradition and the overall patriarchal culture; (b) their low level of education and high illiteracy rate; and (c) their limited time for political participation due to domestic responsibilities.

Based on this baseline situation and perspective, it can be stated that the IPWPDM is contributing to the implementation of the CEDAW in Timor-Leste by increasing the chances for women to become suco chiefs and suco council members through the training of women-candidates. The causes of political discrimination are also partly being addressed by the programme through public promotion of the concept of “women in politics” which is being addressed to both men and women audiences. It also appears that the IPWPDM strategy is to help enhance the capacity of elected women in the sucos and the national parliament, which will raise their chances of success and thereafter feed into the public consciousness a realization that Timorese women (apart from men) can also be effective political leaders. Hence, the programme has strategic potential to contribute to the creation of a sub-culture which will counter the long-held political tradition dominated by men.

Aside from this aspect of addressing the issue of political discrimination in the country, there is also an indication that the IPWPDM is contributing to the elimination of gender discrimination in the civil service of Timor-Leste. In at least one ministry consulted by the evaluation, it was evident that the action plan is to hire more female teachers and ministry employees, as a result of an earlier assessment done which showed that there were gender gaps in these dimensions. The informant from the ministry attributed this effect to the interventions of a gender adviser who was posted to their ministry as part of the gender mainstreaming project under the IPWPDM [Table 3].

Further, the programme is linked to the achievement of the MDGs in Timor-Leste, particularly Goal 3 (i.e. Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women), as one of the indicators set for this goal is the “*Proportion of seats held by women in the national parliament*”. Through advocacy activities that were done with women’s groups and other similar initiatives, the programme has partly contributed to the continued presence of women in the 2007 parliament. The recent policy decision to increase the quota for women in the 2012 parliament can also be partly attributed to the programme, through the GRC Project.¹⁷

4. Contribution to Local Capacity-Building

It is apparent that the target groups reached by the evaluation are convinced about and have an understanding of the basic concept of gender equality, as it is applied in their situations as members of the national parliament, as ministry staff, as elected suco chiefs and elected suco council members, and as suco candidates who did not win the 2009 elections. Some women-informants have clearly articulated that they have a role in their communities aside from their traditional roles in the household (e.g. “not just in the kitchen”), while some of the male-informants did not seem to have reservations about using the terms “gender” (i.e. *jeneru*) and “women” (i.e. *feto*) in their language. As such, it can be stated that there are capabilities being built among the target groups at the level of their understanding about gender equality. What is not clear however, is how much of this understanding was brought about by the current programme and how much of it was built up from the previous interventions by UNIFEM and other women’s groups, as there were several informants who said that they have attended the transformative leadership trainings of UNIFEM way back in 2004 or 2005 (i.e. during the previous PERWL Programme) or have attended other trainings from the women’s NGOs (e.g. Rede Feto and Alola Foundation) and SEPI.

The building up of local capacities related to the technical knowledge and skills on gender equality is showing varied results among the target groups. This is evident from the actions of the women-parliamentarians who called for an analysis of the 2010 state budget from a gender perspective (which is associated with the interventions on gender-responsive budgeting) and also the gender equality plans now being followed by the ministries (which is most probably due to the work of the gender advisers earlier on posted there).

¹⁷ The lobbying work done to increase the quota of women in the party list of candidates from 1:4 to 1:3 was coursed through the GMPTL, which as reported earlier, is being assisted by the programme through the GRC Project. On May 3, the evaluation attended a consultation meeting between Rede Feto and the GMPTL about the quota which was then still a proposal. This meeting was held at the GRC Conference Room.

On the other hand, this type of capacity-building is not yet visible at the level of the sucos. While all the suco councils consulted said that they have already developed their community plans, the quality and gender-responsiveness of these plans will still have to be ascertained. It also turns out that most of the sucos are currently getting some basic technical training (i.e. roles of the suco council members) and have asked for further assistance from the programme on this and other needs. It is highly likely that the gap between the development of skills and technical capacities between national (i.e. the parliamentarians and ministry personnel) and suco-level (i.e. the women suco chiefs and council members) is due to differences in the project designs. Technical and skills upgrading activities are manifestly emphasized in the GRC and Gender Mainstreaming Projects, and these were delivered by project staff and gender advisers. Comparatively, the two suco-related projects were focused on IEC activities and promotion of the concept of transformative leadership, and had lesser post-election interventions. Service delivery for these projects was also different, as the activities were coursed through an NGO (i.e. Rede Feto).

5. Responsiveness to Changed Needs and Situations in the External Environment

The programme design was largely inspired by the previous efforts done by UNIFEM and UNTAET at the national level of politics in Timor-Leste since 2001, and the experiences of UNIFEM from the PERWL Programme which was related to the suco elections held in 2004/2005. It appears that the overall strategy adopted for the IPWPDM programme was also carried over from the previous strategies employed by UNIFEM/UNTAET and the PERWL Programme. These strategies are: (a) *Adoption of gender quotas* – Based on the documents, there has been a push for “affirmative action policies” since 2000 when the interim council was formed. In real terms, this has taken the form of mandated gender quotas in the parliament and in the suco councils, aside from the calls for the political parties to adopt a gender agenda; (b) *Public promotion of a gender agenda for the elections* – The concepts of women in politics and transformative leadership were the main advocacies in the elections of 2001, 2004/2005, and 2007. Many of the activities under this strategy took the form of huge trainings for a wide audience; (c) *Working with NGOs* – UNIFEM has had an extensive history of working with and strengthening women’s NGOs in Timor-Leste, and this strategy was adopted from its experience in other countries; and (d) *Training of Trainers* – Training of women-leaders was done at the early stage of UNIFEM operations in Timor-Leste. Also, local trainers developed under the PERWL Programme delivered training services to candidates and elected officials at the sucos.

The final evaluation report on the PERWL Programme [2007] concluded that it “has served as a model”, and this was most probably the reason why its features found its way into the present-day suco support projects under the IPWPDM Programme. Some minor modifications were nonetheless made on the current intervention: these were (a) *Lesser geographical outreach* – The previous PERWL programme had intended to cover all 13 districts in Timor-Leste, and its final evaluation recommended to trim this down into a lesser scale. Operationally, this was why the suco support projects were focused in only four (4) and five (5) districts; and (b) *Updating and adaptation of the training manual* – Also in compliance with the recommendations of the final evaluation, the training manual on transformative leadership was updated and translated into four local dialects of Tetum.¹⁸ Based on the programme document, UNIFEM had apparently also been part of the overall approach of adopting “affirmative action policies” in the context of Timor-Leste. As will be discussed later on in this report, several of these strategies are the underlying factors for the progress of the IPWPDM Programme, and its future direction.

There was no technical inception done for the programme which could have updated its understanding on the context in which it will be implemented, including the needs of the beneficiaries. This could have been a crucial activity, especially because the programme document was done first, and the project documents were done later. Still, there were operational adjustments made by the programme to the current needs of the target groups. These needs and the responses made by the projects to address these needs were done in the course of the preparation of the project-level work plans. Yearly planning in the GRC and Gender Mainstreaming Projects involved consultations with the GMPTL as well as with the ministry focal persons, and this process allowed the matching of needs with the activities and budgets pre-specified in the project documents, as well as some flexibilities

¹⁸ According to the final project report submitted to UNDEF, the module on transformative leadership was translated into four distinct dialects of Tetum: *Fataluko* (in Lautem); *Tetun Terik* (in Viqueque); *Mambae* (in Ermera); and *Baiqueino* (in Oecusse).

owing to delays, arising demands, and budget changes. For the suco support projects however, application of the same approach was not found by the evaluation: the pre-election activities seemed to have generally followed the pattern set out in the project documents, and the post-election trainings were understood to have made use of the pre-existing training modules which were developed under the PERWL Programme.

Operationally, the programme had also adapted to changes in the overall situation in Timor-Leste by re-aligning the affected activities and resources to other activity and budget lines. These were particularly done in the context of the changes brought about by the cancellation of the municipal elections (which were expected to take place in 2010), and the new rule introduced in the 2009 suco elections which prohibited political parties from fielding candidates in the suco positions.

There is one major gap in the relevance of the IPWPDM Programme, and this is the absence of any intention that will respond to the needs of the upcoming 2012 national elections. The programme plan (document) had obviously been focused only on the 2007 national elections and had not forwarded any idea about the interventions for the elections next year. The coming national elections would be interesting, particularly in view of the new quota system which has only recently been reportedly approved by the parliament.¹⁹

B. Coherence of the Programme

1. Coherence of the Programme Structure

As earlier reported and shown in Table 3, the IPWPDM Programme is made up of four distinct component-projects, two omnibus cost-sharing agreements which supported a number of smaller activities identified in the programme document (e.g. Inter-district discussion foras between national and locally elected female leaders and supporting the National Women's Congress and its Platform of Action), and one preliminary project. Based on the activities and objectives indicated in their respective project document, there are three component projects that are directly linked to the overall theme of women in politics and decision-making. These are: (a) the *Gender Resource Center (GRC) Project*, which is aimed at building the capacities of women-parliamentarians so that they can become effective women-leaders in the national parliament of Timor-Leste; (b) the first suco support project in four districts (entitled *Enhancing Women's Role in Timor-Leste Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Nation-Building*) which sought to enhance the participation of women in the 2009 suco elections and develop the capacities of elected women suco chiefs and council members; and (c) the second suco support project (entitled *Enhancing Women's Leadership and Participation in the Suco (Village) Council*), which was basically a replication of the first suco support to five other districts. The *2007 National Election Capacity Building Project* is also a logical part of the programme although it served as a precursor to the development of the overall programme.

There is also potential synergy between the suco support projects with the *GRC Project*, and the national activities covered by the omnibus cost-sharing agreements [Table 3]. The synergistic effects expected from these interventions justify the programme approach which was adopted for the IPWPDM. These possible synergistic effects were however not developed because of the absence of a programme-level management system.

On the other hand, based on the evaluation's reading of the project document and reports, as well as the discussions with the ministry focal points, the *Gender Mainstreaming in Line Ministries Project* does not appear to be thematically linked to the IPWPDM Programme [Table 3]. It turned out to be a standard capacity-building project which will neither lead to changes in the political representation of and leadership by women, nor changes in decision-making in the target ministries. Based on the explanation provided, it appears that this project was treated as part of the programme because it was being funded by the same donor (i.e. Irish Aid) which supported the programme through a cost-sharing agreement.

¹⁹ The evaluation was informed that the national parliament had agreed to raise the gender quota in the list of candidates of each political party that will participate in the 2012 elections to 1 woman for every 3 candidates, from the current quota of 1:4.

Also, there is a gap in the programme structure brought about by the absence of project-level frameworks for the two cost-sharing agreements [Table 3]. There being no project documents and results frameworks for the activities being charged to the cost-sharing contributions of the Norwegian Government and Irish Aid, it would be difficult to establish the links between these activities to the programme outputs.²⁰

2. Quality of the Results Framework

A Results Framework was developed for the programme. The said framework defines the programme results (i.e. goal, outcomes, and outputs), as well as the activities associated with the achievement of these results and the indicators for some results. The actual framework included in the programme document is appended in this report as Annex B.²¹

With reference to the OECD definitions and the concept of cause-and-effect relationships underlying the Results Chain Concept, the evaluation notes the following weaknesses and gap in the framework:

- (a) *Some outputs have effectual or consequential relationships to the outcomes* - Outputs 1.1 and 1.3 are merely consequent factors for the attainment of Outcome 1;
- (b) *At least one output statement is actually an activity and not a result* - Output 1.2 is an activity and not a result;
- (c) *Some outputs are redundant and could serve as the outcome themselves* - Outputs 2.2 and 2.4 could have the same intentions and could be the same as Outcome 2;
- (d) *One outcome may actually be an output* - Outcome 1 may not qualify as an outcome because it is a requirement (i.e. the “cause”) for the achievement of Outcome 2. This is the weakness created by dividing the programme into the pre-election and post-election phases; and²²
- (e) *The link between the project-level results framework with the programme results framework is not clear* - There are separate project documents from the programme document, and there are separate results frameworks of the projects and the programme. The documents do not provide the logical relationships between the project outputs and outcomes, with the programme outputs and outcomes.²³

In addition to these, there are no outcome indicators stated in the results framework. The number of indicators for the outputs also varies widely, from 2 to 9.

3. Reasons for the Weaknesses and Gaps

It appears that the programme and project documents (together with their corresponding results frameworks) were developed starting in 2006 and 2007. According to the staff, the programme document was prepared first and it was forwarded to the target donors. However, there were only two donors (i.e. the Norwegian Government and Irish Aid) who committed to programme-level funding, and the amounts expected from them were short of the programme requirements. At that time, there were also opportunities for project-level funding from other donors, and these led to the development of separate project documents for the four component projects recognized under the programme.

The programme and project documents, as well as the results frameworks for these, were made by the then staff and consultant of UNIFEM in Timor-Leste, who were also involved in the implementation of the previous PERWL Programme. It is believed that the concepts of RBM, programming, and results-oriented planning were not yet discussed in UNIFEM and in Timor-Leste at that time. It also

²⁰ There are no project documents specific to the 2 cost-sharing agreements with Irish Aid and Norway. The programme document itself was appended to the signed cost-sharing agreements.

²¹ The evaluation understands the programme “goal” to be the long-term impact of the programme.

²² The programme design emphasized the need for interventions before, during, and after the elections. This intention seemed to have influenced the original version of the Results Framework.

²³ Comments on the project-level frameworks are no longer included in this report which was focused at the programme level.

turns out that the programme and project documents passed through the UNIFEM regional and head offices where these are presumed to have been reviewed (through the Project Approval Committee). However, except in the case of one project in which the results framework was later on revised through the initiative of the donor, there are no known activities in which the results frameworks were reviewed and improved.²⁴

4. Challenges in Implementing the Programme Design

It is not clear how the programme objectives and results can be achieved because of its structural flaws. As earlier reported, there are separate project-level results frameworks from the programme results framework and their links are not known. There were also activities being implemented under the omnibus cost-sharing agreements which are not rationalized under a distinct project (i.e. a set of activities).

A second challenge is the timeframe of the projects vis-à-vis the programme. The component projects had a timeframe of only three years or less whereas the programme was planned to run over a seven-year period. Most of the component projects have already ended, while the IPWPDM is only supposedly on its mid-term of implementation [Table 3].

A related challenge is the inability to reach the programme budget. The original budget estimated for the whole programme was US\$6 million, while the actual funding received from the component projects and the cost-sharing agreements was only around US\$2.1 million [Table 3].

The different funding modalities was also a problem in implementing the programme as designed because only two donors provided omnibus funding for the whole programme, while two other donors provided support only to specific component projects. The timing of the funding commitments also created difficulties in programming, as funding approvals were based on the individual donor schedules. This resulted in disparate work plans for each approved project and cost-sharing agreement.

5. Variances in Implementation

According to the programme document, the IPWPDM Programme will be implemented by UNIFEM through a Programme Management Team (PMT) led by a Programme Manager. However, it was reported that there has been no Programme Manager since December 2009, after the post was vacated. The former Country Programme Manager of UNIFEM in Timor-Leste explained that this was due to the limited funds raised by the programme. Due to the absence of a Programme Manager, the former Country Programme Manager had taken on the role of Programme Manager. After the former Country Programme Manager left the UNIFEM/UN Women Office in Timor-Leste in 2010, the National Coordinator has been trying to perform the programme management function.²⁵

Also, the programme document states that there will be a Programme Steering Committee (PSC). It turned out that this committee was not convened and made functional. It was explained that the UNIFEM/UN Women Office in Timor-Leste did not receive a copy of the approved programme document from their regional office and headquarters. As such, they said that they were not sure of the final arrangements for the programme, including the need to convene the PSC.

There is also a section in the programme document about a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Plan which was supposed to be developed in the inception phase. According to the staff, no such M&E Plan was made. It also turned out that there was no real inception of the programme.

²⁴ The staff reported that the results framework for the UNDEF Project was revised, although this was done 6 months before the end of the project.

²⁵ It was explained that the remaining funds were enough to cover only 6 – 8 months in 2010. Hence, it was decided to hire a consultant in place of the Programme Manager, but the hiring process for the consultant had not been successful.

C. Effectiveness of the Programme

1. Achievement of Outputs and Outcomes

a. Overall Pace of the Programme

Using the expenditure rates as proxy indicators for the level of implementation of project activities, it turned out that most of the projects under the programme portfolio are nearing completion, given an overall expenditure rate of 92% as of May 2011 [Table 5].²⁶

Table 5. Expenditure Rates, as of May 2011

| | Fund Received (US\$) | Expenditures (US\$) | Expenditure Rate |
|--|----------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Irish Aid Contribution (for the <i>Gender Mainstreaming Project</i> and the <i>Cost-Sharing Agreement</i>) | 1,050,895 | 1,023,081 | 97% |
| Norwegian Contribution (for the <i>Cost-Sharing Agreement</i>) | 353,090 | 345,655 | 98% |
| AusAID Contribution (for the <i>GRC Project</i>) | 324,273 | 303,657 | 94% |
| UNDEF Contribution (for the <i>Enhancing Women's Role in Timor-Leste Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Nation-Building Project</i> and the <i>2007 National Election Capacity Building Project</i>) | 348,500 | 328,686 | 94% |
| AusAID Contribution (for the <i>Enhancing Women's Leadership and Participation in the Suco (Village) Council Project</i>) | 186,217 | 71,166 | 38% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>2,262,975</i> | <i>2,072,245</i> | <i>92%</i> |

Source: Consultant's Estimates based on Financial Reports and Atlas Data

However, there is a significant delay in the implementation of activities related to the second suco support project (funded by AusAID) which has an estimated expenditure rate of 38% [Table 5].

²⁶ This measurement method is derived from the Results Chain concept (i.e. Inputs ► Activities ► Outputs ► Outcomes ► Impact). It asserts that: (a) a delay in the delivery of the financial inputs will also delay the conduct of activities, and therefore, the outputs; and (b) because the outputs are supposed to lead towards the outcomes, non-achievement of any output will place the attainment of outcomes (and the impact) at risk.

The reasons cited for the delay in project implementation are:

- *The Lengthy and Time-Consuming Management System in the UNIFEM/UN Women Structure* – It is generally known and acknowledged that the conduct of affairs in UNIFEM/UN Women in Timor-Leste takes a lengthy period of time. This is due to the centralized set-up in the agency, in which quality-control and decision-making functions are done in the regional office in Bangkok and in the New York headquarters.

As earlier reported and shown in Table 5, the suco support project funded by AusAID is the delayed project in the programme menu with an expenditure rate of 38% as of May 2011. According to the donor, support was given to this project in anticipation of the work needed for the 2009 elections. As such, the funds were reportedly made available three (3) months before the elections. However, the final agreement between UNIFEM/UN Women and AusAID was reported to have been signed by UNIFEM/UN Women only a week before the elections. It is believed that this was because the agreement had to pass through the regional office, and then the head office for final approval. There was another agreement between UNIFEM/UN Women and the implementing organization for the project (which was Rede Feto): by the time that this agreement was signed in the New York office, it was already two weeks after the 2009 suco elections. The pre-election activities for this project were thus not implemented at all. For other reasons, the conduct of post-election activities was also short-lived.²⁷

Delays in the start-up of other projects were also cited, and these were believed to be due to the late signing of agreements by UNIFEM/UN Women and the project implementers, late releases of the funds, and delayed hiring of project staff, consultants, and advisers. Fund releases for the programme are also centralized at the regional office, and the perception is that these are done behind schedule most of the time. Personnel hiring is also processed at the regional office, and this step is also observed to be a cumbersome and time-consuming procedure.

On the other end, there is a perceived need for quality controls over the affairs of the local office in Timor-Leste. This is because the local office was not really intended to do procurement and managerial tasks. Hence, while the capacities of the local office on these tasks are still being upgraded through the decentralization process, the regional and head offices of UNIFEM/UN Women continue to perform the quality control function over the programme and all other tasks being done in Timor-Leste.

The evaluation also believes that the absence of a Programme Manager (PM), the lack of an M&E System for the programme, and the non-existence of the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) may have also contributed to these delays. There being no PM, there was no responsible person for the programme. It was also not possible to measure the extent of the delay because there was no monitoring done for the programme. Further, there was no longer any oversight control over the programme because the PSC was not convened at all.

- *Weaknesses by Project Implementers* – At another layer of programme implementation, delays were also incurred reportedly because it took some time for the Rede Feto Secretariat to identify and make final arrangements with their member-NGOs which ultimately delivered the project activities in the districts (for the suco support projects). According to these NGOs which were consulted by the evaluation, the actual start of project activities in the districts had been late, and the release of funds from the Rede Feto Secretariat had also been late.²⁸

On this point, the evaluation would further like to point out that the absence of an inception exercise for the programme and the projects was a key weakness here, because the issues as to how the projects would finally be implemented should have been addressed during the inception phase.

²⁷ This was because Rede Feto eventually cancelled the agreement two months afterwards.

²⁸ For the suco support projects, the Rede Feto Secretariat sub-contracted their member-NGOs to undertake the project activities. One NGO was sub-contracted for each district. Hence, there were nine (9) NGOs which did the work in the districts.

- *Adverse Weather Conditions* – It was also cited in the project report that the rainy season was a factor for the non-implementation of some planned activities in the districts. As there were several NGOs that had no local offices in the districts, this situation required travel by their personnel from Dili to their destinations, and some roads could be impassable during periods of heavy rain.

b. Progress in the Achievement of Outputs²⁹

- *Achievement of Output 1.1: Women run for elections in winnable positions on party lists for the presidential and legislative elections, vote and campaign on women's agenda*

According to the IPWPDM Progress Report, the programme advocated for the adoption of a women's policy platform by the political parties that were then participating in the 2007 parliamentary elections. A programme for capacity-building of women-candidates was also implemented, and interactive discussions, meetings and seminars were also held for the women-candidates to gain confidence. Advocacy activities were also done so that the political parties will fill up the seats in the list which are reserved for women.³⁰

Data on the number of women fielded by the 14 political parties that participated in the 2007 parliamentary elections are shown in Table 6. While all parties fielded the minimum required number of women-candidates, it is more interesting to point out that 10 out of the 14 (71%) fielded more women than required by the electoral law. However, it does appear that women are not the priority candidates: only 3 out of the 14 parties (21%) fielded more women than required in their first 20 seats, while 9 out of the 14 parties (64%) gave more opportunities to women in the last 32 seats [Table 6].

Table 6. Selected Data on 2007 Parliamentary Elections

| | Number of Women-Candidates | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | On the Full List of 65 | On the Last 32 Seats | On the First 20 Seats |
| CNRT | 22 | 9 | 7 |
| PDC | 20 | 11 | 5 |
| PST | 19 | 9 | 7 |
| ASDT-PSD | 18 | 9 | 6 |
| FRETILIN | 18 | 10 | 5 |
| AD KOTA-PPT | 17 | 8 | 5 |
| PD | 17 | 9 | 5 |
| PNT | 17 | 9 | 5 |
| PUN | 17 | 9 | 5 |
| UNDERTIM | 17 | 9 | 5 |
| PDRT | 16 | 8 | 5 |
| PMD | 16 | 8 | 5 |
| PR | 16 | 8 | 5 |
| UDT | 16 | 8 | 5 |
| <i>Minimum Required</i> | 16 | 8 | 5 |

Source: Fokupers [2009]

²⁹ Due to weaknesses in the programme results framework as discussed earlier on pages 11-12, this section discusses only those outputs which are applicable for the evaluation.

³⁰ In the IPWPDM Progress Report (June 2007-May 2008) submitted to Norway. However, it appears that the activities being reported in this section were not charged to the Norwegian budget.

The monitoring work done during the 2007 elections also showed that while almost all the political parties (13 out of 14) spoke about women's issues during their campaign, only 6 out of the 14 parties (i.e. PR, UDT, PST, ASDT-PSD, PUN, and UNDERTIM) actually had a written agenda for women in their programmes of action.

The data therefore suggest that while the expected output has been achieved (at least in the 2007 elections), it could be more out of compliance by the political parties to the rules than their readiness and capabilities to put more women in the national parliament.

- Achievement of *Output 1.3: Women run for elections as independent candidates during the municipal and suco elections, vote and campaign on women's agenda*

The IPWPDM took part in a larger effort to increase the quota for women in the suco councils starting in the 2009 elections. The programme also implemented Information, Education and Communication (IEC) activities in the districts on the new law. According to the final project report submitted to UNDEF, this was a factor in the increase in the number of women who ran in the suco councils [Table 7].³¹

Table 7. Women Candidates in Suco Positions

| | Ermera | Lautem | Oecusse | Viqueque | Total |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|---------|----------|-------|
| <u>2009</u> | | | | | |
| Women Representatives | 306 | 153 | 166 | 162 | 787 |
| Young Women Representatives | 153 | 77 | 83 | 81 | 394 |
| Suco Chief | 4 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 15 |
| <u>2004-2005</u> | | | | | |
| Women Representatives | 199 | 84 | 52 | 131 | 466 |
| Young Women Representatives | 60 | 53 | 30 | 96 | 239 |
| Suco Chief | 24 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 29 |

Sources: UNDEF Final Report, UNDP 2009 Community Elections Report

However, the data also show that in 2009, there were actually fewer women who ran as suco chiefs in the four districts covered by the programme compared to the previous period. It was explained in the project report that this was because of the shift to independent candidacy: political parties were prohibited from supporting candidates in the 2009 elections [Table 7]. The field discussions with the elected and candidate women suco chiefs in Baucau and Dili nevertheless pointed out that the political parties were indeed active in their communities during the said election. One elected woman suco chief in Baucau said that this was a factor for her victory, while the losing woman candidate in Dili also believed that her inability to get support from her party was a reason why she lost the election. Hence, there could have been other reasons why there were fewer women who ran as suco chiefs in the last suco elections. The programme had also been wrong in dismissing the role of political parties in that exercise.

³¹ Overall, the UNDP reported that there were 3 women who ran for each of these positions in the country. The project targeted a 25% increase in the women-candidates from the 2004-2005 elections.

In the end, there did not appear to be much changes created by the intervention. The number of elected women representatives, young women representatives, and women suco chiefs in the four districts actually covered by the programme (i.e. in the UNDEF Project) remained just about the same.³² There were also only 3 women suco chiefs elected in the four districts out of 139 sucos comprising the aggregate area [Table 8].³³

Table 8. Elected Women in the Suco Positions

| | Ermera | Lautem | Oecusse | Viqueque | Total |
|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| <u>2009</u> | | | | | |
| Women Representatives | 104 | 68 | 36 | 70 | 278 |
| Young Women Representatives | 52 | 34 | 18 | 35 | 139 |
| Suco Chief | 1 | - | - | 2 | 3 |
| <u>2004-2005</u> | | | | | |
| Women Representatives | 102 | 68 | 35 | 67 | 272 |
| Young Women Representatives | 52 | 34 | 17 | 35 | 138 |
| Suco Chief | 2 | - | - | - | 2 |
| No. of Sucos | 52 | 34 | 18 | 35 | 139 |

Sources: UNDEF Final Report, UNDP 2009 Community Elections Report

- *Achievement of Output 2.2: Capability-building of national women elected officials*

Progress in the achievement of this output can be seen from the GRC Project, which reported active intervention by women parliamentarians on the 2010 budget, to make it gender-responsive. It was also reported that the GMPTL drafted a Gender Equality Law in 2009.

While these are indeed positive indications of capacity-building, these results cannot be fully attributed to the IPWPDM because there are several other similar interventions to the same target group. For instance, there has been much work in UNIFEM/UN Women on Gender-Responsive Budgeting (GRB) through the MDG-F Joint Programme.³⁴ There were also other factors that pushed for the Gender Equality Law, and that it was later on decided to prioritize the Law Against Domestic Violence, which was eventually passed in 2010.³⁵

³² It was mandated under the law that there ought to be 2 women representatives and 1 young woman representative in each suco council.

³³ The project targeted a 20% increase in the women suco council members and a 5% increase among the suco chiefs.

³⁴ SEPI believes that the capacities on GRB should be attributed to the MDG Task Force rather than the GRC, as the support of the latter on this matter had been limited to the organizing of the GRB workshops.

³⁵ The passage of the Law Against Domestic Violence was reported by the MDG-F Programme as among its outputs. Nevertheless, SEPI noted that there were also other factors for the passage of this law and that it took 8 years (prior to the MDG-F Programme) to pass this law.

- Achievement of *Output 2.4: Effectiveness of elected municipal and suco women and men representatives to deliver women's agenda enhanced*

As earlier reported, the 2010 municipal elections were postponed, which makes this output applicable only to the women suco chiefs and their council members (without prejudice to the programme intent to now cover the municipal elections expected in 2013). Based on the project reports and the field visits, there have been no changes created by the project intervention at this level. The monitoring reports concluded that there have been project effects on the aspects of public speaking and increased self-confidence by the women suco chiefs. The field discussions did not also indicate yet any accomplishments about women's agenda, although all the suco chiefs reported that they have already developed a community development plan.

2. Beneficiary Satisfaction

Informants from the 3 ministries consulted by the evaluation rated the performance of the gender advisers posted in their ministries as "Good" to "Very Good" from among 5 choices. The reasons cited why they did not give a rating of "Excellent" were: (a) the limited time of service by the advisers; and (b) the personal weaknesses of the advisers (i.e. nobody is perfect).³⁶

The monitoring report on the GRC Project shows that while there is high awareness by the members of parliament on the GRC, the satisfaction on the GRC between the women and male MPs vary widely, as 100% of surveyed women-MPs were either "Very Satisfied" (36%) or "Satisfied" (64%) while only 25% of the male MPs were "Satisfied" and the rest were "Indifferent", "Dissatisfied" or "Very Dissatisfied".³⁷

The women suco chiefs reached by the mission said that they were "Satisfied" with the trainings that they attended under the 1st suco support project (i.e. the one funded by UNDEF). When asked why they did not give a higher rating, the common explanation given is the manner by which the trainings were delivered: the trainings were held in the district centers, and they had to travel from their sucos to attend these trainings. They also said that there was a limitation in the trainings because it was only themselves who were able to attend, and not the rest of their suco council members. They therefore suggested that it would be better for the next phase of the programme to hold suco-level training activities instead of the large sessions in the district centers.³⁸

3. Enhancement of Capacities

It appears that the development of capacities for the target group has been different at the national and suco levels. At the national level, there is evidence that the women-parliamentarians have developed both conceptual and technical capacities to advocate for gender equality. The technical capacity is specifically on the budgeting aspect, which is observable from their actions during the deliberation on the state budget. Informants nevertheless believe that these results could be attributed more to another programme being implemented by UN Women.³⁹

However, at the sucos, the monitoring report indicates that only the basic (not yet the transformative leadership) skills have been developed, particularly in the area of public speaking. Personal confidence was also reported to have been built. This could be due to the nature of service delivery (i.e. the post-election training was rendered by NGOs).

³⁶ From a choice of "Excellent", "Very Good", "Good", "Weak" or "Poor".

³⁷ The sample size of the monitoring work was 25% of the members of the national parliament (i.e. 17 out of the 65). 13 were women and 4 were men. This means that all 13 women-parliamentarians were either "Satisfied" or "Very Satisfied", and only one male-MP was "Satisfied" with the GRC.

³⁸ The women suco chiefs were made to choose between a set of prepared cards. For each card were written the following choices: "Kontente Par Mate" (Fully Satisfied), "Kontente Los" (Very Satisfied), "Kontente" (Satisfied), "Kontente It Oan" (Somewhat Satisfied), and "La Kontente" (Not Satisfied),

³⁹ Aside from the IPWPDM, UNIFEM/UN Women is also implementing another programme entitled *Supporting Gender Equality and Women's Rights in Timor-Leste* which is funded under the MDG Achievement Fund. This programme includes a component on Gender- Responsive Budgeting (GRB).

It turned out that the most of the NGOs that implemented the project activities at the sucos had competencies that are different from the project requirement [Table 9]. Only one NGO (i.e. Caucus Feto Iha Politica) has a core competence which is in line with the programme activities. It was also reported that some NGOs did other tasks which competed with the project activities.⁴⁰

Table 9. Summary of NGO Competencies

| | Competencies Cited |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| UNFETIP (Baucau) | Culture, Children |
| HAFOTI (Aileu) | Socio-Economic Development |
| GFFTL (Viqueque) | Literacy, Civic Education, Livelihood |
| Sta. Bahkita (Ermera) | Children's Education |

Sources: Interviews and Group Discussions with the NGOs

4. Utilization of External Technical Assistance

Access to external technical assistance had been prominent in the national-level projects. As earlier reported, five Gender Advisers were posted in four GoTL Ministries throughout the life of the *Gender Mainstreaming Project*. It was also reported that a Gender Adviser was for a time assigned to help the GMPTL, as part of the *GRC Project*. This was however short-lived, and a gap in the project plan did not allow the project to hire the services of a legal adviser, as sought by the GMPTL.⁴¹

For the suco support projects however, there were not much technical inputs provided, as the frontline delivery of services was coursed through the trained local facilitators. As reported earlier, the main offerings of these facilitators were the pre-existing training modules (pre-election and post-election) which were developed under the previous PERWL Programme. The pre-election transformative leadership training module appeared to be highly conceptual, while the post-election module was reported to have covered the basic skills in running the suco councils.

At the level of UNIFEM/UN Women, there were clear efforts made to access technical assistance in M&E. However, it was reported that the work done by an M&E expert in 2009 was not successful. A second PME Consultant came on board in 2010 and has been helpful in carrying out some monitoring work for the IPWPDM Programme. Recently, an International UNV was also taken in to do some work for monitoring and reporting, and another one is being envisioned to help in planning.

5. Ability to Address Gaps in Technical Capacity

The programme's ability to address the gaps in technical capacity among the target groups is related to its access and utilization of external technical assistance. It can be stated that these gaps are being addressed at the national parliament through the GRC. It also appeared that the technical gaps in gender assessment, planning, and capacity-building among the ministries covered by the *Gender Mainstreaming Project* have also been responded to.

⁴⁰ It turned out from the discussions that some NGOs also took on other projects, aside from the project agreements that they had with Rede Feto. These projects were believed to have competed with the priorities and time of the NGOs.

⁴¹ It was explained that the project document for the *GRC Project* did not include the cost of hiring a legal adviser.

However, the same statement will not apply for the suco support projects. The design and actual interventions done for these projects were indeed not meant for technical capacity-building. This need was nonetheless raised by the women suco chiefs and council members during the consultations, and will be recommended by the evaluation to be part of the design for the succeeding half of the programme.

D. Programme Efficiency

1. Allocation of Resources

The budget in the original programme document followed an output-based format which shows the estimated cost of delivering each of the outputs and outcomes. Based on this budget, the financial costs appear to have been allocated rationally across the outputs and outcomes. However, as earlier mentioned in this report, the actual funds raised for the programme was much lower (i.e. roughly 1/3 of the projected budget). There is no copy of a revised budget for the programme in the Timor-Leste Office of UNIFEM/UN Women based on the available funding, and there was also no inception document for the programme. Hence, it could not be determined if the actual resources on hand were still rationally allocated among the programme outputs and outcomes.

At another level, the budgets in the component-project documents reviewed by the evaluation had different formats. There was one project budget which obviously followed the output-based method, and this was the budget for the first suco support project (i.e. funded by UNDEF). The budget formats for the other projects were structured according to the conventional expense line approach, which does not reflect the spending plan for each project output and outcome. Apparently, the format applied for each project budget was mainly influenced by donor standards and requirements. As the programme and project documents and the respective budgets for these were developed over time, it had obviously been difficult for UNIFEM/UN Women to check the uniformity and rationale of the budget allocations. Along this line of thinking, it can be stated that the quality controls being applied under the centralized UNIFEM/UN Women structure was mainly administrative (i.e. compliance with the rules and templates) than managerial (i.e. how the budgets will lead towards the results).

2. Adequacy and Appropriateness of Staff and Other Resources

The shortfall in the programme budget was the reason cited for not filling up the post of Programme Manager (PM) since it was vacated in 2009. The absence of a revised budget nonetheless makes it unclear whether the programme had a plan at all to either adjust to the resources available, or to proceed without the necessary staffing. In actuality, it turned out that the programme management function was being done by somebody else (either the former Country Programme Manager or the National Coordinator).

Informants who were involved in the project execution did not raise any problem about the number of staff positions and advisers made available for the projects. What they reported to be an issue were the inability to fill in those positions particularly after these have been vacated, and a perceived short period of time by which the advisers were posted in their ministries. It was particularly reported that the coordinator position in the GRC Project had been vacant for six months now, and that a second post (i.e. for the Media Officer position) had also been vacated. This situation is believed to be major problem for the GRC Project, especially because the remaining counterpart staff from UNDP will be going on leave soon.

There was also a case in which Rede Feto cancelled a project agreement with UN Women for the conduct of workshops because of their lack of a coordinator who could do the job. Some informants also believed that the budgets allotted for the training activities under the suco support projects were not enough. Nevertheless, the evaluation is of the opinion that this problem could be mainly due to the lack of an inception exercise for the programme and the projects, through which the budget and staffing issues could have been addressed beforehand.

3. Effects of the Governance and Management Structures on Programme Efficiency

The inability to convene the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) and make it functional has created a gap on information among the other stakeholders about the progress of the programme as a whole. Their lack of information and also participation in setting the directions for the programme may have led to inefficiencies: possible synergies and cost-savings from the coordination of efforts during the 2007 and 2009 elections were foregone. The lack of a local oversight mechanism may have also perpetuated a management system which is susceptible to inefficiency: delays in action-taking and decision-making are left unchecked and are seemingly allowed to go on, as no clear solutions to the inefficiencies are taken.

There were experiences shared to the evaluation which show that the centralized management system in UNIFEM/UN Women is inefficient. Transaction costs are high, as transactions need to pass through regional and head office tiers. On several occasions, the staff reported that transactions go through subsequent loops, as the regional office remands the transaction back to the office in Timor-Leste. There was also a case of a leakage somewhere in the system: one of the project reports got lost along the route, and the office had been unaware of the situation until the donor who was expecting the report followed it up.

At the same time, it can be fairly stated that the controls being exercised over the procurement of goods and services ensure that quality inputs for the programme are being obtained at the least cost. The arrangement could however still result in a net loss for the programme, in terms of its inability to deliver results.

The programme's relations with donors and other stakeholders have also been strained by these inefficiencies. The donors reported that there have been serious delays in the submission of reports. These have been exacerbated by a seeming inability to comply with the demand, despite follow-ups done by the donors and promises reportedly made by UNIFEM/UN Women to act accordingly.

UN Women is apparently aware of this problem. According to the current Country Programme Manager, there are steps being taken that will ultimately lead towards the decentralization of the agency. This process has started with the posting of a senior-level country programme manager and the on-going conduct of a risk assessment. However, it is believed that the process will take more time because of the on-going transition from UNIFEM to UN Women, and because of the other steps that need to be taken in order to comply with the requirements set for the Timor-Leste office to become a fully-delegated Country Office.

4. Efficiency of the Implementation Approach

The experience showed that there were inefficiencies in the centralized management system of UNIFEM/UN Women, particularly in the suco support project funded by Aus AID [Table 5]. The details and effects of such inefficiencies have been described in the earlier section of this report.

There were also operational inefficiencies which were noted by the evaluation. The first suco support project under the programme which was funded by UNDEF (i.e. the one that went full cycle) obviously incurred a huge investment in human resource training: it was reported that around 900 candidates took the pre-election (transformative leadership) training course, and roughly 200 facilitators were also trained under a Training of Trainers (ToT) curriculum. These approaches were carried over from the previous PERWL Programme.

The fallout rate from these huge trainings could nevertheless be high. A monitoring report done last year estimated that among the elected women representatives and young women representatives in the suco councils of the four districts covered by the project, only 14% and 20% of them, respectively, completed the pre-election training. If these data are correct, it means that the fallout rate from the pre-election trainings could be more than 50% (i.e. less than half of the 900 persons trained as candidates for the suco elections in 2009 actually got seats in the suco councils). The women suco chiefs consulted by the evaluation also said that they need training for their suco council members, as it is only themselves who got the training and it is a problem in their leadership of their suco councils.

There is also an indication of inefficiency in the ToT approach. In Ermera, it turned out that out of 50 facilitators who were trained in the district, only 5 actually qualified and delivered the task. Also, it was reported that there are only 2 out of the 5 who remain as facilitators in the area.

5. Efficiency of the Monitoring System

There is no overall monitoring plan which has been developed for the programme, and there is no monitoring system in place. There were only some monitoring activities which were done in the latter part of 2010. It follows that there is an absence of information about the progress of the programme. The non-existence of a Programme Manager and a Programme Steering Committee also makes the monitoring system irrelevant.

Still, there are current efforts to upgrade the PME work in the country office in Timor-Leste. With the arrival of the new Country Programme Manager, trainings on RBM and PME among the staff have taken place. The PME Consultant had also been responsible for the monitoring activities done for the programme.

E. Programme Sustainability

1. Local Ownership and Support

On the whole, the development of a sense of local ownership over the programme has been made weak by the dysfunction in the Programme Steering Committee (PSC). Key local institutions, such as SEPI and STAE, have not been made aware about the implementation of the programme, after they were reported to have been consulted during the planning phase.

While there were engagements with the political parties during the 2007 elections and on some post-election occasions, there are no records to show the involvement of political parties in knowledge-sharing about the programme. Caucus Feto Iha Politica did not also appear to have been involved in the governance of the programme, although this group participated as the NGO implementer (of Rede Feto) in Manatuto district. At the moment, there is also no mechanism by which the elected suco chiefs can verbalize their needs and suggestions about the programme.

There were however, steering committees or similar mechanisms that were made functional at the level of some projects. Even though of an informal nature, the first suco support project reported that a committee composed by UNIFEM/UN Women, Rede Feto, SEPI, the NGO implementers, and district representatives was formed.

The most functional committee that was set up for an oversight purpose was the GMPTL, which acted as the steering committee for the *GRC Project* itself. There is visible evidence that the GRC is being supported by the women-parliamentarians in Timor-Leste through the GMPTL. These can be seen from their participation in the activities of the project, as well as from their discussions as a committee, in which the progress of the *GRC Project* has been part of their agenda.

2. Likelihood of Self-Continuation

There are indications of sustainability in the *GRC Project*, in which it was reported that the national parliament has verbally committed to be responsible for the administrative costs of the GRC facilities by this year. It was also reported that the GRC has been integrated into the organizational structure of the parliament. However, there is no formal agreement on this at this time. It does not also follow that the GRC will itself become sustainable, because of the absence of a plan to pay for the larger personnel costs (including advisers), as well as the costs of capacity-building for the legislators in the next session.

While technically not part of the programme, there are nevertheless positive indications also of self-continuity in the *Gender Mainstreaming in Line Ministries Project*. The ministries consulted have carried on with their gender units and plans. In the GoTL agencies where there are no longer any gender adviser attached, the gender officers and unit head have continued the tasks started by the former gender advisers assigned to them. SEPI had also continued to engage the services of 4 international advisers, using state funds.

The interventions for the suco support projects have stopped since the UNDEF-supported project ended in 2010 (the AusAID-funded project ended earlier in late-2009 after Rede Feto cancelled its Project Cooperation Agreement with UNIFEM/UN Women). At the moment, the women suco chiefs and councils reached by the mission reported that they are being supported by INGOs, such as The Asia Foundation and the Paz Y Desarrollo, for their capacity-building needs, as well as GTZ and World Vision for their small infrastructure projects. The women suco chiefs also noted that while they have attended the project trainings, they have not been able to apply their learnings well because it was only themselves who were able to attend these trainings, and not the rest of their council members. The NGOs and facilitators who used to work in their districts are no longer active, however, because the project has ended and there is obviously no financial means for them to continue the services.⁴²

3. Considerations and Efforts on Sustainability

There is no explicit plan for the sustainability of the programme, as the programme document does not include any section that pertains to the programme's exit and the continuation of its interventions.

At the level of the projects, sustainability considerations were present in the project documents for the *GRC Project* and the first suco support project (i.e. funded by UNDEF). In these projects, it was made clear how the project activities are expected to continue after the project has ended or once donor support has ceased. The reasons as to why there are variations in the contents of the project and programme documents about sustainability are unclear, because the persons who actually wrote these documents are no longer with UN Women. However, it is possible that donor preference on the templates of the project proposals/documents is one plausible factor (i.e. some donors require a section about sustainability in the documents, while others at that time did not). It was also obvious that UNIFEM did not give much attention to sustainability considerations in the project/programme documents at that time.

By practice nonetheless, the projects were meant to build local capacities and this was an unwritten way of developing the sustainability of the interventions. The actual experience however shows that there are underlying factors to also consider when making these assumptions. Among these is local financial capacity to cover the cost of the activities. This appeared to be the factor why there is greater potential for sustainability in the *GRC Project*, because it is the parliament who is supposed to take over this project in the long-term, and there are greater chances to raise internal financing by the national parliament of Timor-Leste than the NGOs.

Still, it did appear to be ambitious for the *GRC Project* to assume that the national parliament would be able to take over and run the GRC after two years of project implementation (i.e. starting in 2011). As it is turning out, the parliament is open to take on the physical costs of the GRC, but is not yet ready to cover its full operational costs. The costs of personnel and international advisers are obviously high, and it may take more time for the budget of the national parliament to make these adjustments, especially in view of many (and competing) priorities and an increasing state overhead cost.

The (UNDEF-funded) suco support project ran under a set of sustainability assumptions which did not work out in real life. One of these is the assumption about "*a pool of trainers at the local level who can continue to provide trainings and support*". The field visits showed that this is not happening: it turned out that there are only a few of the trained facilitators now who can continue with the services, and they cannot do it without funding. Another assumption forwarded is that "*The capacity of the implementing partner's NGO members will also be strengthened through the adaptation of manuals on transformative leadership, management of capacity building activities, and the development of skills*", which was presumed to be a factor for project sustainability. While it may be true that the capacities of the NGOs were strengthened, these are not leading to a continuity of their services to the end-beneficiaries.

⁴² As earlier reported, the project trainings were not specific to the sucos and were held at the districts.

III. Conclusions

1. The programme is aligned with the national development plan being implemented in Timor-Leste. It is particularly contributing to the achievement of the political dimension of the said plan, by enabling greater and more meaningful participation by women in the national parliament and the suco councils. The programme has also been part of the effort to improve the governance system in the country through the introduction of gender planning in the ministries and gender targeting in the public workforce.⁴³
2. The programme goal is contributing to the advancement of the gender equality agenda in Timor-Leste, as stated in the national development plan. The programme outcomes are also linked to the GE objective in the said plan and its action programme. Several outputs are also relevant to the indicators mentioned in the plan, although some output statements are not as identifiable to the plan because of gaps in their formulation and coherence.
3. The programme is advancing the implementation of CEDAW in the country by addressing the problem of gender discrimination in the political system and in the governance structures. In combination with affirmative action policies that have been adopted in Timor-Leste, there are interventions that are building the capacities of women-candidates so they can participate in the electoral processes. Elected women are also being capacitated so they can become effective women-leaders. Discrimination in the governance structures is also aimed to be lessened through gender assessment and targeting in the line ministries.

Aside from CEDAW, the programme is also contributing to the achievement of Goal 3 of the MDGs through support to the affirmative action policies which mandated the increased representation of women in the national parliament.

4. The programme is designed to support sustainable capacity-building among the target groups (i.e. the women-parliamentarians, the ministries, the women suco chiefs and suco council members) through transfers of knowledge and skills. However, there have been variations in project designs which affected the extent to which such capacities are being built. These variations are due to the presence or absence of local sustainable institutions (such as the Gender Resource Center) and the manner of project execution (i.e. whether directly implemented by hired staff and advisers or coursed through NGOs).
5. The programme design was influenced by the previous PERWL Programme which was implemented by UNIFEM/UN Women in the previous period (2004-2007). Strategic adaptation was made in the integration of national-level projects with the district-level interventions which was promoted by the PERWL model. Hence, the programme had intended to respond to needs at both national and local levels. The programme was also designed to respond to similar needs at the intermediate level (i.e. the municipal governments), although this did not push through.
6. There is a need to respond to the national elections scheduled next year (2012), especially in view of the new quota system and the lessons from the 2007 national elections. However, the programme design for the whole period (2007-2013) does not include any envisioned intervention for this event.
7. There are flaws in the programme design. While there is coherence and synergy between the suco support projects and the GRC Project, one of the component projects (i.e. the Gender Mainstreaming Project) did not turn out to be a logical element of the programme theme. There is also a gap in the programme structure given the absence of project-level frameworks for the cost-sharing agreements.⁴⁴ There are also deficiencies in the formulation of the programme results frameworks and its links with the project frameworks. These flaws were due to weaknesses in

⁴³ A comment was raised on the importance of the NDP (i.e. if it is being implemented at all). Statements on the NDP included in the conclusions as well as on the findings portion of this report were simply meant to address the guide question stipulated in the Evaluation TOR (see Annex C). Whether or not it is practically important to examine is beyond this report.

⁴⁴ There were no results frameworks which were specific to the cost-sharing agreements (i.e. which result would be achieved by the implementation of activities being charged to each agreement?).

results-oriented planning and programming in UNIFEM/UN Women at the time of programme and projects development [2006/2007], and lapses in quality control at the regional and head offices. These were also influenced by donor standards and different funding cycles.

8. The flaws in the programme design are contributing to the challenges in implementation. Unless improvements are made on the programme design, it will be difficult to arrive at a logical culmination of the results from the projects/programme frameworks. There is also an operational challenge in the time frames of the projects vis-à-vis the programme, and the inadequacy of the funds actually raised (compared to the projected total programme budget). The different funding modalities applied for the projects and programme also adds to the difficulties in applying the programme concept in this case.
9. There were also variances in actual implementation compared to the original intentions stated in the programme design. One of these is the absence of a Programme Manager (PM), and this was supposedly caused by the inadequacy of the funding received for the programme (this was also an effect of the limitations brought about by project-specific funding). Another is the non-existence of the Programme Steering Committee (PSC). This weakness has caused a lack of information on the programme among the stakeholders, and their inability to participate meaningfully in its governance. Among national stakeholders, this omission has lessened their sense of ownership over the programme. A third variance is the lack of an M&E Plan which was among the commitments made in the programme document.
10. While most of the projects under the programme portfolio are nearing completion one component project is significantly delayed. This was caused by both internal and external factors. The lengthy and time-consuming management system in the centralized structure of UNIFEM/UN Women, complicated by a perceived need to perform quality control over the affairs of its office in Timor-Leste, has contributed to the delay. The absence of a PM and PSC were also factors for the inability to check on and address the delay. There were also weaknesses in project implementation, on the side of some NGO implementers which made lapses in project planning and operational delivery.
11. There has been progress in the achievement of some outputs (as these are defined in the current results framework). More women than required were fielded by the political parties in the 2007 parliamentary elections. There were also more women who ran as women-representatives and young women-representatives in the 2009 elections. Although of varying degrees, there are indications of capacities being built among the women-parliamentarians and some women suco chiefs.
12. At the same time, some issues arose from these achievements. While women were indeed fielded by their political parties, they were not the priority candidates in their party lists. Only a few parties carried a written women's agenda during the 2007 campaign. Also, there were only minimal changes in the number of women elected as suco chiefs and suco council members over the last two electoral cycles. Further, the interventions have been able to build capacities of the women suco chiefs only at the basic level.
13. There are varied levels of satisfaction among the programme beneficiaries. The women-parliamentarians gave an average-to-high rating of satisfaction on the GRC Project. The male parliamentarians, on the other hand, were generally unsatisfied with the GRC. Their perception on the GRC as being exclusive to women was a factor for their dissatisfaction, and this must be rectified in the second half of the programme.

The ministries also gave an average-to-high rating on the performance of the gender advisers who were posted to their ministries. The limited time of service by the advisers and their personal weaknesses were factors in their thresholds of satisfaction.

The elected women suco chiefs in the relevant programme areas commonly gave an average level of satisfaction on the training courses that they got from the programme. There was a weakness in the approach taken, as these were large activities held in the district centers. The approach was also perceived to be ineffective, because the rest of the suco council members

have not been able to participate in these training activities (there are gaps in the knowledge and skills levels between the trained women suco chiefs and their council members).

14. The enhancement of capacities among the target groups has also led to different results. While technical capacities are visible among the women-parliamentarians, only the basic capacities have so far been developed among the women suco chiefs. One factor for this varied level of results is the manner of service delivery, as the NGOs which supported the women suco chiefs and their suco councils did not have the technical competence required for the tasks. Another factor was the access to expert technical assistance. Support to the women-parliamentarians had been aided, albeit briefly, by a Gender Adviser. This technical component was not however, included in the project designs for the suco support projects. There is therefore a need to continue to support the elected women suco chiefs and their councils in the upgrading of their capacities, especially considering the overall context of small state allocations for the development of infrastructure and basic facilities in the sucos, and the risk of failure of the overall concept.
15. There was no uniform method for the allocation of resources in the programme. While the overall programme budget followed an output-based budget format, most of the component-projects did not. This was another weakness in the programming approach taken by UNIFEM/UN Women for this IPWPDM Programme.
16. There have been weaknesses in staffing, as the programme had been unable to fill in some key positions in the programme and projects after these have been vacated (i.e. the PM, Coordinator for the GRC Project, and the Project Coordinator position in Rede Feto), not assigned an item at all (i.e. there was no manager position for the Gender Mainstreaming Project), and this gap has been traced to inadequacy of funding. The financial data gathered by the evaluation however shows otherwise. Inefficiencies on this aspect are thus more logically linked to a failure in the inception of the programme and the projects, and inability of the management system to fill in the personnel gaps on time.
17. There are inefficiencies being incurred in the centralized management system of UNIFEM/UN Women. The number of transactions is high because of the structure. The quality control function is also done at the regional office and in headquarters, and these add to the transaction costs being incurred by the programme. While there are gains from this set-up in terms of obtaining quality goods and services at probably least costs, a net loss is being incurred by the programme in terms of its inability to deliver the expected results in a timely manner.
18. There are also inefficiencies in the implementation approach, in terms of fallouts from the huge training activities and the pool of trained facilitators. The monitoring system had also not worked at all, and this was a factor for the loss of programme control.
19. The inefficiencies in the programme have been unchecked because of the absence of a PM and a PSC. These inefficiencies have led to strained relationships with donors and frustrations among the stakeholders in Timor-Leste.
20. On the whole, there is a low level of local ownership and support for the programme to continue because of the absence of a PSC and weaknesses in communications and confidence-building. There is only an indication of such support and ownership in the GRC Project. This is because of the suitability of the project design and clarity on the exit plan and sustainability strategy of the project.
21. Among the component-projects (which are technically part of the programme), it is also only the GRC Project which has a chance for self-continuity. However, this will not completely happen in the immediate period. The sustainability plan had been ambitious and it has to be adjusted according to the fiscal realities in the country. The Gender Mainstreaming Project interventions have also continued at the ministries, although this is not really a part of the programme concept.
22. Operationally, the programme and its component-projects were geared at sustainable capacity-building. However, there were some wrong assumptions made on the project designs. Among these is the ability of the local mechanisms (i.e. local trainers and NGOs) to continue the project activities. These are not sustainable because they are unable to cover the costs of the activities

by themselves. A related mistake was the non-consideration of the core functions and strategic directions of these NGOs. The absorptive capacity of the local sustainable organization (i.e. the national parliament) was also overestimated.

IV. Recommendations

A. Strategic Options

It is imperative that the interventions should continue, especially considering the implications of the forthcoming 2012 national elections in Timor-Leste, and the responsibility to respond to the expressed needs of the women suco chiefs and their councils. There is also a possibility for the municipal elections to be scheduled in 2013; should this be the case, it will be within the time frame of the IPWPDM Programme.

The experience however shows that the programme cannot proceed successfully if it operates within the current management system and structure of UN Women. Decentralization of the programme management and quality control functions to the Timor-Lest Office will be a key requirements to catch up with the lag time, and effectively move on to the next phase of programme implementation.

The discussions about this matter nevertheless indicate only little confidence that this requirement will be complied with in the immediate period. Other strategic options will thus have to be considered in order to raise the changes of achieving the programme results.

1. *Strategic Option 1: UN Women will empower the Timor-Lest Office to function as a full Country Office, with delegated authority to manage the IPWPDM Programme, make decisions and submit reports on behalf of the regional office and headquarters, and itself enforce the agency's quality control procedures. The IPWPDM Programme Document will be updated to include the interventions for the 2012 national and 2013 municipal elections, as well as continued support to the women-led suco councils and the GRC.*

For this option to become doable, it will be necessary for UN Women to make the necessary adjustments in the soonest time and for the donors to consider the continuation of financial support for the second half of the programme. These mean that UN Women should take steps to make the Timor-Leste Office a fully-delegated Country Office immediately. This could be done through the issuance by UN Women of an exemption on the requirements to conform as a Country Office applicable to the Timor-Leste Office, especially considering that Timor-Leste is a priority country and the fact that a Senior Country Programme Manager is already in place. The staffing requirements that will make the Timor-Leste Office as a Country Office should also be fast-tracked.

A formal commitment to undertake this effort within the next two or three-month period may be needed to appease the concerns of the donors and other stakeholders on the doability of this option.

2. *Strategic Option 2: Gender-related interventions on the 2012 national elections and the 2013 municipal elections will form the components of a separate programme to be implemented by UNDP or UNEST, with technical support from UN Women. UN Women will continue to provide post-election support to the women-led suco councils and the GRC, using the unexpended portion of the IPWPDM Programme funds.*

This option requires the approval by the donor (particularly AusAID) to grant a no-cost extension to the suco support project.

3. *Strategic Option 3: The contribution agreements on the programme and the remaining projects are not extended, and new funds are granted to UNDP or UNEST for them to continue the activities related to the GRC and the women-led suco councils. UNDP or UNEST will also be the implementer of the interventions related to the 2012 national and 2013 municipal elections. UN Women may continue to be the Technical Adviser on Gender for the successor programme.*

It follows that Strategic Options 2 and 3 may be considered if there are no signs that Strategic Option 1 will be immediately realizable.

B. Operational Recommendations

1. Support to the GRC Project should continue and should consider the changes to be brought about by the 2012 parliamentary elections and the effects on future state budgets due to the advocacies raised in the 2011 Human Development Report.
2. Support to the suco councils should focus on the ten (10) women-led suco councils. Succeeding activities should address the needs expressed by the women suco chiefs and their councils during the course of this evaluation. These include suco-level and suco-specific training activities for all the council members, and assistance in the facilitation/liaison/follow-up of their project proposals on infrastructure and other basic facilities which were already submitted to the district administrators and national government offices. In general, the programme should assist these women-led suco councils in order for this model to succeed, and to publicly promote this model for later emulation by other women in the communities of Timor-Leste
3. In the delivery of support services to the suco councils, the programme may explore a tie-up with The Asia Foundation or the Paz Y Desarrollo. The Asia Foundation is implementing a suco council-based Governance, Election and Civil Society (GECS) Project until September 2011. This project is being implemented in the districts of Baucau, Ainaro, Oecussi and Bobonaro, and is staffed by district coordinators and facilitators. It was reported that UN Women also has an agreement with Paz Y Desarrollo along the same line of services.
4. The programme may also consider working through the UNEST network in the continuation of activities under the suco support project.
5. The current or new programme document should be revised based on the strategic and operational changes to be adopted for the programme. The results frameworks should be updated and a technical inception should be done.
6. Further donor support to the interventions should be granted through programme-level funding. This means that donor contributions ought to be based on the overall programme document and dedicated for the whole programme.
7. The women's sector in Timor-Leste may continue to be involved in the programme, through involvement of Caucus Iha Politica or Rede Feto in the Programme Steering Committee (PSC).
8. When working with NGOs, clear criteria for the selection of NGOs that will undertake the project activities should be set in the programme plans and documents.
9. Engagement with the political parties will be a requirement for the 2012 national and 2013 municipal (and even the preparations for the 2014 suco council) elections.

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Annex B. Summary of Results Framework (As Stated in the Programme Document)

Programme-Level (IPWPD) Results Framework (2007-2013)

| Results | Indicators |
|--|--|
| <p>Outcome 1: Gender aware and effective women are elected into decision making positions in national level state institutions and at the municipal and suco or village councils.</p> <p><u>Output 1.1:</u> Women run for elections in winnable positions on party lists for the presidential and legislative elections, vote and campaign on women's agenda</p> <p><u>Output 1.2:</u> Legislative electoral process monitored, evaluated and documented from a gender perspective</p> <p><u>Output 1.3:</u> Women run for elections as independent candidates during the municipal and suco elections, vote and campaign on women's agenda</p> | <p>- none -</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lists of political parties consist of minimum target of women candidates • Party programmes reflect needs identified during the women's congress and the agreed women's platform • Women campaign on women's agenda; • 30% women candidates campaign on women's agenda reflecting priority needs • Support mechanism established in at least 3 districts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender rights documentation and monitoring mechanisms established • Women caucus produced at least one electoral observer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment of performance of currently serving suco women representatives with lessons learned and recommendations • Increase in number of women candidates in the suco council election compared to 2004-2005 • Women campaign on women's agenda • Women candidates campaign on women's agenda reflecting priority needs • Support mechanism established in each district; • A pool of trained trainers on transformative leadership for each district • Increase in number of women elected as suco chiefs, aldeia chiefs and representatives from the elderly and traditional or lian nain in the suco councils as compared to the 2004-2005 election • Number of women candidates in the municipal elections • Number of women elected as mayors or municipal assembly representatives |

| | |
|--|---|
| <p>Outcome 2. Elected women leaders at the national, municipal and suco levels are able to influence a gender responsive rights-based agenda for women</p> <p><u>Output 2.1:</u> Constituencies and networks furthering women's agenda built</p> <p><u>Output 2.2:</u> Capability building of national women elected officials</p> <p><u>Output 2.3:</u> Understanding of the transformation agenda by national elected women officials enhanced</p> <p><u>Output 2.4:</u> Effectiveness of elected municipal and suco women and men representatives to deliver women's agenda enhanced</p> <p><u>Output 2.5:</u> Gender responsive local development agenda developed with constituencies and supported by municipal and suco council representatives (both women and men)</p> | <p>- none -</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-elected candidates continue political involvement, national and local elected officials meet at least twice a year • Number of study visits, elected officials and women's CSOs meet quarterly • Elected officials defend women's agenda reflected in two plenary discussions • At least 1 tabled bill • Number of interventions of female elected officials at the national, municipal and suco levels • At least 1 bill sponsored which reflect women's agenda • At least 1 intervention on budget discussion from a gender perspective • Concrete initiative by elected officials on a transformation agenda • Members of the community remind elected leaders of transformation agenda • Reporting by media of the transformation agenda • Number of elected women representatives reflecting commitments to gender responsive policies made in their campaign platforms • Number of policies and budgets proposed by women municipal assembly and suco council representatives • Policies and budgets proposed by municipal assembly and suco council representatives effectively reflect gender equality priorities as identified in the work plans • Results of assessments by constituencies on performance of municipal and suco council representatives • Number of local development plans that are gender responsive, consultative between municipal and suco council representatives and constituencies and have monitoring indicators • Number of projects or activities implemented as reflected in the local development plan • Number of community discussion fora organized to track implementation of community plans and satisfaction of constituencies • Results of local evaluation on community initiatives |
|--|---|

Annex C. Guide Questions Applied for the Evaluation (Extract from the Evaluation TOR)

1. Relevance of the Programme

- Do the programme outcomes and outputs align with the National Development Plan?
- How does the programme advance the implementation of CEDAW by the Government of Timor-Leste, and other global commitments on gender equality?
- Are the programme goal, outcome and output definitions relevant to advancing gender equality in Timor-Leste?
- How and to what extent the programme design supports sustainable capacity building in terms of technical knowledge, skills and understanding of gender equality and women's empowerment of national, municipal and suco election candidates and elected representatives?
- Has the management of the programme activities been responsive to changing needs and external environment?

2. Coherence of the Programme

- Is the programme design structured logically? (including the extent the programme design and results framework clearly defined the expected outcomes, outputs and indicators)
- Are there challenges in implementing the programme design?
- Have there been any variance in implementation from the programme design, and whether this can be attributed to the design structure?

3. Effectiveness of the Programme

- What progress has been made towards the programme's expected outcomes and outputs?
- To what extent are the programme beneficiaries satisfied with the results of the project to date including intended or unintended changes from specific activities in the work/life of the beneficiaries and their environment, directly or indirectly?
- To what extent has the capacities of elected representatives at the national and suco level been enhanced?
- Did the programme utilize external technical assistance effectively?
- Are the gaps in technical capacity not addressed?

4. Efficiency of the Programme

- Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes?
- Did the activity have sufficient and appropriate staff and other resources?
- Has the programme's governance and management structures enhanced or detracted from the efficient delivery of the programme outputs?
- Is the current implementation approach the most efficient way of achieving the programme outcomes and outputs?
- Has the programme delivered quality outputs in a timely and cost efficient manner?
- Has the programme's monitoring system provided relevant and useful information, including performance indicators that supports the programme implementation/delivery of the programme outputs including:
 - is the information collected useful, credible, reliable and sufficient to demonstrate that the outcomes and outputs have been achieved or progress is being made towards?
 - was the data gender-disaggregated sufficiently to measure how men and women are benefiting from the outcomes?

5. Sustainability of the Programme

- To what extent is the programme supported and owned by the Political Parties, Elected Representatives including the women's parliamentary caucus (GMPTL) and women suco chiefs, and the NGO women's caucus?

- Are the partnerships with the Women’s Caucus parliamentarians and Women’s NGO “Caucus: Feto iha politika” leading to sustainable institutional changes and results, i.e. what is the likelihood that the benefits from the programme will be maintained if the programme were to cease or has there been useful partnerships built?
- Are there indications that beneficiaries and or implementing partners have or will have sufficient ownership, capacity and resources to maintain the activity outcomes after UN Women funding will cease? If not, what kind of support would be required for partners to reach the sufficient level of capacity?
- Are there areas of activities that are clearly not sustainable and what lessons can be learned and recommended strategies to address them?
- To what extent were sustainability considerations taken into account in the execution and conduct of the project’s activities?

Annex D. List of Persons Consulted

A. UN Women

1. Micheline Baussard – Country Programme Manager
2. Elaine Tan – Former Country Programme Manager
3. Ana Paula Sequeira – IPWPDM Programme Coordinator
4. Maria Isabel da Silva – IPWPDM Programme Assistant
5. Jennifer Kelly – PME Consultant
6. Isabel Belo – IPWPDM Programme Assistant

B. Donor Agencies

1. Eoghan Walsh – Head of Mission, Irish Aid
2. Salina Hanjan – Gender Equality Officer, Irish Aid
3. Luis de Sousa Sequeira – Program Officer, AusAID

C. Implementing NGOs

1. Yasinta Leejina – Executive Director, Rede Feto
2. Francisca Alves – Secretariat, Rede Feto
3. Dinorah Granadeiro – Executive Director, FONGTIL
4. Teresa Verdial – Director, Alola Foundation
5. Maria Barreto – Director, Fokupers
6. Julieta Silva – Director, Caucus Feto Iha Politica
7. Paula Corte Real – Program Manager, Caucus Feto Iha Politica
8. Constantina Pires – Former Project Officer, UNFETIP
9. Filomena Franco – Former Project Officer, HAFOTI
10. Andre Godinho Nunes – Project Coordinator, GFFTL
11. Odete De Jesus Amaral – Assistant Project Coordinator, GFFTL
12. Alda Faria – Project Coordinator, Sta. Bakhtita
13. Mariana da Costa – Finance Officer, Sta. Bakhtita
14. Francisco da Silva Gari – Director, TLMDC

D. Beneficiaries

1. Josefa Soares – President, GMPTL
2. Osorio Costa – Chairperson, Gender Equality Committee
3. Rita Monteiro – Elected Suco Chief, Viqueque
4. Joana Fonceca Pinto – Elected Suco Chief, Viqueque
5. Cristalina Quintao – Elected Suco Chief, Ermera
6. Armando da Costa – Director of Gender and Policy Development, SEPI
7. Alfonso Soares – National Director of Planning, MOE
8. Dina Maria Mota – Gender Officer, MAF
9. Maria de Jesus – Gender Officer, MAF

E. Project Staff

1. Lumena Freitas Exposto – Senior Manager, GRC Project
2. Evelina Iman – Former Project Coordinator, UNDEF and AusAID Suco Projects
3. Reinaldo Borges – Media Officer, GRC Project

F. UN Agencies and UNMIT

1. Finn Reske-Nielsen – UN Resident Coordinator
2. Dan Radulescu – Electoral Project Manager, UNDP
3. Luca Bruccheri – Governance Programme Officer, UNDP
4. Ms. Elyse Ruest-Archambault – Gender Affairs Officer, UNMIT GAU
5. Ms. Annie Serrano – Senior Gender Adviser, UNDP

G. Others

1. Maria Fatima – Elected Suco Chief, Covalima
2. Teresita de Deus dos Reis – Elected Suco Chief, Baucau
3. Maria do Carmo de'Sa – Elected Suco Chief, Baucau
4. Magdalena Vidal Soares – Suco Chief Candidate, Liquica
5. Josefa Kai-Bete – Suco Chief Candidate, Dili
6. Railaco Laten Suco Council Members (14) – Ermera
7. Bucoli Suco Council Members (9) – Baucau
8. Motael Suco Council Members (5) – Dili
9. Mr. Vicente Maia – Local Governance Programme Manager, The Asia Foundation
10. Giolivia – Facilitator, Ermera District
11. Claudia Flores – Gender Adviser, SEPI